usually associated with long hours.15 Under such circunstances it was perfectly natural for the union to stand for a shorter work day, and against the employment of women and children, and to exercise its power in organizing the immigrants.

The policy of the Amalgamated Union has been to control the supply of labor, and no serious attempt has been made to set up barriers against workmen entering the trade. In 1904 the highest initiation fee charged was $15, and this in only three locals. Eighteen locals charged $10, while 107 charged $5 or less.16 In no case did the dues exceed 75 cents per month, the majority of the locals charging 50 and 60 cents.17 The union does not set up any serious obstacles to young men entering the trade. The apprenticeship rules provide that apprentices between 16 and 19 years of age may become what are known as "honorary members. ''18 The question of apprenticeship is left to local regulation. The usual rule is one apprentice to four or five journeymen, although some locals limit the number to as few as one to ten. They are required to pay 25 cents per month dues, and carry the quarterly working card. They serve three years at the trade before they are called upon to pay full dues, and be entitled to full privileges. 19 No initiation fee is charged at the time of initiation into full membership.

In regard to hours the regulations vary from local to local, and the last available reports show that the work day varies from 8 to 10 hours. In 1904, 61 locals reported a ten hour day, while 77 locals reported a nine hour day or better. Only three locals could report an eight hour day.20 The attitude of the union

15 In Grand Rapids the hours were from 10 to 12, and the wage from 12%1⁄2 to 22 cents per hour. International Wood Worker, Oct. 1899, p. 114. In Oshkosh the hours were from 9 to 10, and the wages 6 to 15 cents per hour. Ibid., April, 1898.

16 Proceedings Third Annual Convention, p. 28.

17 Constitution, Revised 1904, Sect. 68-70. All applicants for membership who are 60 years or over, or of poor health, may become honorary members. They pay 25 cents per month dues, and except for death and disability benefits, they enjoy all rights and privileges of the union.

18 Dues have been raised by last convention to 75c per month, subject to ratification. Proceedings Fourth Convention, p. 56.

19 Constitution, Revised 1904, Sect. 70.

20 Proceedings of Third Annual Convention, p. 28.

has been strongly in favor of the shorter work day, and in many places it has succeeded in reducing the number of hours of work.

There are no regulations in regard to the introduction and use of machinery, or the number of machines to be run by each workman. In fact there is little occasion for such questions to rise in the industry. There has come up at frequent intervals the question of workmen owning certain kinds of tools, and the sentiment has developed that all tools should be owned and provided by the employer. The Wood Workers' Council of Chicago has a regulation which prohibits any member from offering to furnish his own knives, clamps, and hand saws and screws as an inducement to obtain work (except the wood turners), subject to a fine of $25, and suspension from the union, until the fine is paid. There are no regulations which are intended to restrict the output of the workmen, and if such restriction exists, it is individual and outside of the formal rules of the organization.

21

THE TRADE AGREEMENT

The activities of a trade union center around the trade agreement. If a union accomplishes its purpose well, it must be successful in collective bargaining, for the only justification of its existence is the aid which it renders in improving the conditions under which the workmen perform their labor, and in effecting greater justice in the distribution of the products of industry. In the history of trade unionism the union has had first to gain recognition of the right to exist as a combination of workmen, then the right to bargain collectively, which implies the right to quit work collectively, or in other words, to strike. The right to combine and the right to strike have both received legal recognition, so that with the growth in strength of a union, more attention is paid to the methods of framing and enforcing the trade agreement, than to the question of strikes. The making of the agreement to-day among the most efficient labor organizations has become a legislative act, participated in by the two most important industrial parties, namely, the employers' asso

a Constitution of A. W. W. O. of Chicago, Sect. 25.

ciations and the trade unions. The agreement itself becomes the industrial law governing the conditions of employment in a particular trade for the period of time specified by the agreement.22

The agreement of the Wood Workers' Union does not regulate the conditions of employment for the entire industry, but each agreement applies only to a particular city or district, and often it applies only to a particular branch of the trade. The initiative in framing an agreement is taken either by a local or by a wood workers' council, and is in the form of a proposition setting forth the terms which are agreeable to the union. This proposition is then submitted to the employers, who accept it, reject it, or submit a counter-proposition; and, when an agreement is finally reached, it is usually the result of a compromise. Prior to the Grand Rapids convention in 1900, no central authority was exercised over the terms of an agreement, so that the terms depended upon the relative strength of the local union. Since that date all proposed agreements must be submitted to the general council, and must receive its sanction.23 In this way the general officers exercise a decided influence over the conditions of employment, and can prevent a local in any part of the country from lowering the standards of the union. This does not mean that the conditions of employment are uniform throughout the country. As a matter of fact, allowance is made in negotiating an agreement for all the forces that are likely to affect the trade. This may be illustrated by the agreement with the Planing Mill Association in Chicago in 1904, where these questions were all thoroughly treated. The employers argued against an increase in the wage scale on the ground that the wages asked were higher than those paid by their competitors in the Mississippi River towns, and other costs were also higher in Chicago, so that the demands of the union would set up unfair conditions of competition which would result in the loss of business to the Chicago firms, and that this would react upon the conditions of employment. The union leaders pointed out the fact that the firms in the Mississippi River towns were receiving their raw material from the same sources of supply as the Chicago firms, and that

"The method developed by the United Mine Workers is the best example. 23 Proceedings, Second Convention, p. 67.

they were paying Chicago freight rates on this raw material; and besides, if they entered into competition with Chicago firms in the latter's logical market, the former would have to pay the freight on the finished product from the Mississippi River to the point of sale; and that these rates were much higher than the rate on raw materials. This difference, the union leaders argued, was sufficient to offset differences in wage-scale and in rents. The knowledge of these facts and the successful application of this kind of argument could scarcely exist, if the framing of an agreement were left entirely to the local unions. The policy of revision of all agreements by the general officers has four important beneficial effects: First, impossible and unreasonable demands are struck out; second, underbidding from whatever cause is prevented; third, greater intelligence is brought to bear upon the framing of the agreement, and fourth, this results, in greater uniformity of wage scales throughout the industry, thus equalizing the conditions of competition among the employers. But before an agreement can become effective, it must be submitted in its final form to a mass meeting of the workman for ratification. This method of negotiating an agreement satisfies the democratic spirit which pervades the union, but it is open to several important criticisms. In the first place, an effort to raise the wages of the skilled workmen may be blocked by the votes of the unskilled, or of one group of workmen by the votes of another group. The jealousies of one group may prevent the union from taking advantage of an opportunity to raise the standard of another group, and thus destroy the solidarity of interests among the membership. This evil has been removed in a large measure in Chicago by the device of submitting the question of an advance in wages only to the group of workmen affected. For this purpose the wood workers' council has divided the workmen into four groups-groups that correspond in the main with the branches of the industry carried on in Chicago, namely, the Planing Mill employees, the Office Fixture employees, the Furniture Workers, and the sash, blind, and door workers. So long as the union adheres to the policy of the referendum in ratifying agreements, this method is an improvement over the

method of submitting each agreement to a mass meeting of all workmen.

In the second place the submission of an agreement to a referendum vote ties the hands of the officials. It depreciates their authority in the eyes of the employers, and it tends to arouse suspicion among the workmen themselves. The employers are likely to say, "Why treat with you officials when the agreement has to be submitted to the workmen for approval? Why not treat with the men direct?" On the other hand, the officers may make the best terms which they think possible, and yet the workmen may not be satisfied with them. In case the officials attempt to influence the vote of the mass meeting by speaking in favor of the terms, they lay themselves open to the charge of disloyalty to the cause, and to the charge of graft. It sometimes happens, as in the case of the Chicago Office Fixture Workers' agreement in 1903,24 that a rejection of the agreement will lead to better terms, but the chances are just as great that the employers will refuse to grant better terms, and such refusal usually results in a strike, an expensive alternative to each side. The union cannot afford to follow any policy that will depreciate any representative of the union in the eyes of the employers, or of the public. The union may fail to accomplish its purpose, even when its cause is just and fair, because the methods used in advancing its demands have aroused the opposition of the employers and the public.

The agreement is frequently very extensive in the number of items which it covers, but the principal provisions are for the recognition of the union and the closed shop, for a limitation of hours and the adoption of a minimum wage scale. It naturally applies only to those shops which are included in the contract, and the direct effects may be seen here, but there is an indirect effect which is too important to pass over without consideration. In so far as the conditions of labor in the organized shops are improved by the agreement, there naturally arises a strong pressure on those unorganized to meet these conditions, or to lose the more efficient workmen. This influence is felt particularly in

Inter Ocean, July 19, 1993; Journal, Aug. 1903, p. 54.