by $1,900,000 a year, at a time when all signs pointed to a speedy renewal of the terrible convulsions in Europe, when Spain still owned the Mississippi river and the Floridas; when Napoleon was suspected of having bought Louisiana; when English ships were impressing American seaman by the score,-evidently did not expect to cause its rights to be respected by force.* Evidently, also, the two questions, which, as we saw in the last chapter, Jeffersonian Republicanism had to answer before it could prove itself a practical system of government, were in a fair way of being brought to a speedy test. If Napoleon had bought Louisiana, if the people of the West had to get his consent before taking their commerce through the mouth of the Mississippi, an embroilment with France was almost sure to follow. Europe would then have a chance to learn whether the young republic beyond the Atlantic would be able to avoid the terrible scourge of war by having recourse to peaceable coercion, and whether a government could exist whose domestic functions consisted in promoting agriculture and commerce, and diffusing information. To a temper less sanguine than Jefferson's, it would have seemed a bad omen that before the first half year of his administration had expired, he found a war on his hands which his theories were powerless to deal with. Following the custom of Europe, the United States had *See Henry Adams, Vol. I, p. 241. War with Tripoli. paid in the preceding ten years more than two million dollars in the form of what amounted to tribute to the four pirate states, Morocco, Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. About two months and a half after Jefferson's inauguration, the Pacha of Tripoli demanded more than he had agreed to accept in a treaty negotiated in 1796, and, when his demand was refused, declared war. Thus, without any responsibility of his own, Jefferson found himself obliged to use the much decried little navy created by the Federalists in defending the commerce of the country against a power upon whom peaceable coercion could not be brought to bear. But he did not fail to improve the opportunity to emphasize his strict construction theories. He sent a small squadron of frigates into the Mediterranean with orders to protect American commerce, but not to go beyond the line of defense, since Congress alone could declare war. A fight between an American frigate and a Tripolitan cruiser furuishes a somewhat curious illustration of the difference between "defending American commerce," and waging war. The American captured her enemy, killed twenty of her men and wounded thirty But after completely dismantling the captured vessel, cutting away her masts and throwing her guns overboard, she was dismissed with the survivors of her crew as Congress had not declared war! more. Such consolation as Jefferson could get out of such adherence to his theories was open to him. But a less confident man would have asked himself whether other nations than the Barbary pirates, upon whom his theory of foreign concerns could not be brought to bear, might not insult the United States, and whether in any case his theory could be relied on with perfect certainty. For this theory of foreign "concerns" was the keystone of the arch of Jeffersonian Republicanism. If that failed armies, navies, internal taxes, banking systems, liberal constructions of the constitution,-the whole troop of Federalist heresies and corruptions which the Republicans had never tired of denouncing, would be the inevitable result. If this theory could not stand the test of trial, the foundation principle of Gallatin's financial system-that the national debt, being a pillar of corruption, the expenses of the government must be so arranged as to permit its speedy payment-was gone, and the denunciations which Republicans had poured upon Hamilton because a national debt had not seemed to him the worst of national calamities, would be proved to have had no grounds. In truth, the issue between Hamilton and Gallatin, Federalism and Jeffersonian Republicanism, in one of its phases might have been narrowed down to this: Might not a nation as well as an individual have to choose debt as the least of all possible evils? Had the world advanced so far towards the millenium that a nation could work out its political salvation-devote itself in the most intelligent way to the advancement of the highest interests of its citizens-without going in debt? The history of the next three administrations will give us the answer to this question. QUESTIONS. 1. Jefferson drew a contrast between the Republican and monarchical Federalists. What did he mean? 2. What was one of the leading objects of Jefferson's inaugural? 3. To what extent did Jefferson attempt to give expression to the principles of the revolution of 1800, and why? 4. Compare the objects of Hamilton and Gallatin in their financial systems. 5. Show how the details of Gallatin's financial system were related to the political objects which he had in view. 6. Henry Adams says: "Gallatin's economies turned on the question whether the national debt or the risk of foreign aggression were most dangerous to America." Is he right? 7. Why did Gallatin propose to dispense with the internal taxes? 8. What amount of money did Gallatin propose to devote to the domestic functions of the government? 9. What was the Republican theory of the domestic functions of the government? 10. What sum did Gallatin propose to devote to the army and navy? 11. What was the Republican theory of foreign "concerns?" 12. What was Jefferson's theory of the relation between the United States and Tripoli, when Tripoli declared war against this country? 13. Discuss the practical outcome of his theory. 14. Could Tripoli be at war with the United States without the United States being at war with Tripoli? 15. What is the meaning of the clause in the constitution which says that Congress shall declare war? 16. What was the keystone of the arch of Jeffersonian Republicanism, and why? CHAPTER XXV. JEFFERSON'S FIRST MESSAGE. IN stating his reasons, in a letter addressed to the sons for substi for a speech, and ing internal President of the Senate, for substituting a message for the speech with which the first two Presidents had opened Congress, Jefferson showed his Jefferson's readesire to conciliate the moderate Federal- tuting a message ists. He did not wish to exasperate the for recommend friends of Washington and Adams by say- taxes. ing that in making speeches to Congress they had been imitating the king of England, and paving the way for the introduction of monarchy into this country. Ignoring the real reason, he said that he had had principal regard to the convenience of the legislature, to the economy of their time, and so on. The same characteristic appeared repeatedly in the message itself. The Republicans were opposed on principle, as we know, to internal taxes. But when Jefferson recommended their repeal, he did it on grounds which neither of his predecessors would have hesitated to take, provided they had agreed with him as to the facts. "Weighing all probabilities of expense," he said, "as well as of income, there is reasonable ground of confidence that we may now safely dispense with all internal taxes, and that the remaining sources of revenue will be sufficient to provide for |