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tion of peace with honor! And the noteworthy fact is that his remark struck nobody as ridiculous. No one interrupted him amidst shouts of derisive laughter, to ask how a nation could talk about honor, which for three years had allowed itself to be insulted and outraged, and at last treated as a province with no rights save such as England and France might deign to grant.

At the close of the long debate, the three resolutions were carried. By a vote of one hundred and eighteen to two the House of Representatives said that the United States could not submit to the edicts of Great Britain and France without a sacrifice of their independence. But the debate which preceded the vote showed how little the vote meant. The Federalists believed that the embargo could be repealed, and no resistance offered to England without submission. The Republicans believed that to repeal the embargo without declaring war was submission, and while the opposition to the embargo in New England was making it more and more evident that embargo could not be enforced much longer, they were unwilling to declare war. Evidently Gallatin was right when he said "A majority will not adhere to the embargo much longer, and if war be not speedily determined on, submission will ensue.'

QUESTIONS.

1. Why was Jefferson so reluctant to abandon the embargo? 2. What was the policy of Madison and Gallatin?

* Gallatin to Nicholson, Dec. 29, 1808: Adams' Gallatin, 384

3. Do you think it was wise?

4. The text calls Campbell's report the first message of the incoming administration. Why?

5. The report argued that the alternatives were abject and degrading submission, war with both France and England, and a continuance of the embargo; do you admit it?

6. Is submission of necessity “abject and degrading?”

7. Quincy argued that since the nation felt itself unable to fight both its aggressors at the same time, it might, without compromising its honor or its dignity, declare war against one of them-ignoring the other; do you agree with him?

8. If the United States had adopted Quincy's policy, which nation do you think it should have fought; France or England?

9. The report argued that a measure which would supply exclusively one of the belligerents would be war with the other; do you think so?

10. What were the three resolutions recommended by the report?

11. For what purpose was it written?

12. What was Quincy's theory of it?
13. What did the debate on it show?

14. What do you think of Troup's speech?

CHAPTER XXXVI.

SUBMISSION.

HILE Madison and Gallatin were attempting to

WHI

bring Congress to the point of repealing the embargo in favor of war, they were endeavoring to work on England through Erskine. They told Erskine that the alternatives open to the United States were embargo and war; that the people of the country were beginning to regard the embargo as too passive; and that America must be driven to endeavor to maintain her rights against the two greatest powers in the world, unless one of them should revoke her anti-neutral decrees. In that case, the United States would side with that one against the other, provided the other persisted in her war upon the commerce of the United States.* Madison hoped through Erskine to induce England to revoke her decrees when she saw that it would result in a war between the United States and Napoleon.

Before the vote on the resolutions recommended by Campbell's report had been taken, Gallatin presented his annual report on the finances (December

nual report.

10, 1808). It amounted to a recommenda- Gallatin's antion of war. He told Congress that even

in case of war against both England and France, no in

*Erskine to Canning, December 4, 1808.

ternal taxes were contemplated.* Internal taxes, as we know, had always been bitterly opposed by the Republicans. Gallatin told them that they need not hesitate to declare war through fear of internal taxes. He said that loans should be principally relied on and that the revenue derived from duties on imports would be amply sufficient, during long intervals of peace, not only to defray current expenses, but to pay the debts contracted in

war.

In accordance with the policy of the incoming Administration, Smilie offered (January 7) in the House of Representatives a resolution declaring that a committee should be appointed to take into consideration the pro

priety of providing by law for an early meetExtra session. ing of the next Congress. It was distinctly understood that the extra session was con

templated for the purpose of declaring war. In the debate on the bill providing for the extra session on the fourth Monday in May, J. G. Jackson, Madison's brotherin-law, said: "I think, by passing this bill, we give the nation a pledge that it shall be the ne plus ultra, which shall give to foreign nations time to revise their conduct towards us, and will give them time to consider whether or not they will have war with us."†

If the Federalists had believed this, if through earnest conferences between the members of the Admin

*Annals of Congress, 1808-1809, 1765.
†Annals of Congress, 1808-1809, 1095.

istration and the leaders of the Federalists, partisanship could have been subordinated to patriotism, if they could have been convinced of the sincere desire of the Administration to isolate the enemies of the United States so that the country might have but one enemy to fight, and that enemy Napoleon-the United States would have been spared a great humiliation, and a still greater danger. But they did not believe it. They believed that if war was declared against France and England, the war against France would be merely nominal, since France had no territory that we could attack without encountering the fleets of England. Many of them believed that the Administration had no idea of declaring war under any circumstances, that the proposed extra session for the purpose of declaring war was a mere trick to deceive the people, as Quincy declared in a speech as remarkable for its ability as it was for its bitterness.

He

Quincy told the House that it had been deceived when it passed the embargo laws, that coercion was its real object, and not precaution, as was pretended. said that the proposed extra session had a similar object-that it was not intended that Quincy's speech. Congress should declare war under certain

contingencies that was a mere pretence; its real object was to delude the people into submitting to the embargo a little longer, that if the people would bear it, "this embargo will be continued, not only until next May, but until next September, yes, sir, to next May twelve

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