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There is at least a prima facie presumption that a state railroad commission acted in good faith in fixing a rate, and that the rate is not confiscatory. The court may decline to hold that the sworn declarations of a bill for injunction and the supporting affidavits outweigh the prima facie presumption that the action of the commission is valid.— Central of Ga. R. Co. v. McLendon, 155 Fed. 974.

Where it is sought to restrain two legislative acts and an order of the state railroad and warehouse commission regulating rates, the commission has such charge in respect to the enforcement of these rates that it can properly be made a defendant, as well as the attorney-general.— Perkins v. No. Pac. R. Co., 155 Fed. 445.

A suit to enjoin the enforcement of railroad rates prescribed by a state commission is of such general importance and so far dependent on the particular facts which may be developed by the proofs, that it will not be disposed of on demurrer unless the bill is clearly insufficient.Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Storey, 149 Fed. 499.

For a detailed statement of the contents of a bill on which a federal injunction was granted by Judge McKenna restraining the enforcement of an order of the California Railroad Commission fixing certain rates. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Board of R. R. Comrs., 78 Fed. 236.

Where a state commission has made up schedules of rates, and the carrier complains only as to one rate or several, but does not attack the schedules in entirety, the court will not grant relief.- Pensacola & A. R. Co. v. State, 25 Fla. 310, 5 So. 833, 3 L. R. A. 661n.

Upon judicial review of the proceedings of a state railroad commission, no strictness of pleading is required, and both the complaint filed with the commission and the petition for review must be liberally construed for the purpose of obtaining a disposition of the matters involved, upon their substantial merits.- Chicago, I. & L. R. Co. v. Hunt, - Ind. App. 79 N. E. 927.

[17]

-Rule where reasonable doubt exists.

Where there is nothing satisfactory in the record, from which a reasonable deduction can be made as to the cost of transportation, the amount of the commodity transported, or the effect the rates fixed by a state commission will have upon the income of the carrier, the state court is right in refusing to disturb the rates so fixed.- Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Florida, 203 U. S. 256, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 108, affg. s. c. 48 Fla. 146, 37 So. 657.

A bill for temporary injunction restraining the Iowa Board of Railroad Commissioners from putting into effect a schedule of rates, on the ground that they would be ruinous to the road, was refused. Where the effect of the rates is doubtful, with a probability that they will prove compensatory,

and the amount of business to be affected thereby is comparatively small, the courts may well wait for the test of experience.- Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Dey, 38 Fed. 656.

Speculative suggestions as to what might happen, in the absence of affirmative showing that the carrier faces such a problem, as shown by actual test, will not warrant a court in overthrowing the findings of a state commission.-State v. Seaboard Air L. R. Co., 48 Fla. 150, 37 So. 658.

Where the railroad and the commission differ as to the reasonableness of rates fixed by the latter, and there is room for a difference of intelligent opinion on the subject, the court must not by enjoining the enforcement of such rates, substitute its judgment for that of the commission, but must leave the rates to the test of experiment.— Storrs v. Pensacola & A. R. Co., 29 Fla. 617, 11 So. 226.

If a commission thinks a schedule it has fixed would, as a rule, be remunerative to the carrier, but the latter thinks not, and the court finds there is room for a difference of intelligent opinion on the question, the court should not interfere, substituting its judgment for that of the specially qualified commissioners, but should leave the schedule to the test of experiment.- Pensacola & A. R. Co. v. State, 25 Fla. 310. 5 So. 833, 3 L. R. A. 661n.

[18]

Form and scope of injunction orders.

Where grounds for enjoining the enforcement of an act of a state legislature regulating railroad rates exist, the restraining order may enjoin executive and quasi-judicial officials from taking any steps calculated to enforce or apply the legislative act complained of.- Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 28 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 441.

If the injunction restraining enforcement of an order of a state commission is broader than the necessities of the case require, it will be modified acordingly.- McNeill v. So. R. Co., 202 U. S. 543, 26 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 722.

An injunction temporarily restraining officers charged with the duty of enforcing rates fixed by statute for gas, pending a determination of the constitutionality of such rates, will not be enlarged to restrain the actions of individual consumers who are not parties to the suit.- Consolidated Gas Co. v. Mayer, 146 Fed. 150.

The court cannot enjoin against all possible breaches of the law, or put the conduct of the defendant's entire business in jeopardy of contempt. Words like or by any other device or method" should be stricken from the injunction.— U. S. v. A. T. & S. F. R. Co., 142 Fed. 176; Swift v. U. S., 375, 25 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 276.

The court enjoined the Nebraska commission from enforcing a schedule of maximum rates, on the ground that it would not yield the carrier a reasonable compensation.- Held, that this did not enjoin the commission from inquiring into and fixing a reasonable rate for specific articles, and it was not necessary for the commission to apply to the court for permission to do so.- - Higginson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 100 Fed. 235. L. 1896, ch. 125, fixed the maximum price of gas furnished in the city of New York at 80 cents. The Consolidated Gas Company obtained, in a suit in the Circuit Court of the United States, in which the attorneygeneral of the state, the district attorney of New York County, The City of New York and the Gas and Electricity Commission of the state were made parties defendant, an injunction pendente lite, which restrained the defendants from enforcing the provisions of the statute, provided that the gas company might make the same charges as formerly and further provided that the difference between the old and new rate be paid into court, there to remain until final adjudication of the cause.Held, that a consumer, not made a party to the suit in the federal court, was not, by this injunction, enjoined from bringing a suit in the Supreme Court of New York State to restrain the gas company from cutting off his supply of gas on account of his refusal to pay the old rates, nor was the Supreme Court prohibited from entertaining such a suit.- Richman V. Consolidated Gas. Co., 186 N. Y. 209, 78 N. E. 871, affg. s. c. 114 App. Div. (N. Y.) 216, 100 N. Y. Supp. 81.

Where the state has empowered the city council to fix the maximum prices of gas, the council has fixed such a maximum and a federal court has enjoined the company from obeying and the city from enforcing such ordinance, the state may nevertheless assert the validity of the ordinance and sue to enforce it.-State ex re'. Atty.-Gen. v. Cincinnati Gas L. & C. Co., 18 Oh. St. 262.

An order of court requiring the making of certain connections by railroads should have provided that the railroads might, after the court's change of schedule went into effect, agree upon a new schedule not in violation of law, and that either road, in the absence of such new schedule, might, after reasonable notice to the other and to the attorney for the commonwealth, apply to the court or judge in vacation for such modification in the order as it might show to be proper.- Southern R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 758, 37 S. E. 294.

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The affirmance by the courts of a rate fixed by commission is simply an affirmance of the reasonableness of the rate at the time of the determination, and if at any time thereafter facts should arise which would make such rate confiscatory, the courts are always open to relief from the restriction of the rate.- Village of Saratoga v. Saratoga Gas, E. L. & P. Co., 122 App. Div. (N. Y.) 203, 107 N. Y. Sup. 341, revd. on other grounds, 191 N. Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693.

[20] Federal interference with orders of state commissions — In general.

Where the defendant carrier, in the course of a proceeding in a state court, contended that consistently with the Interstate Commerce Act, the state had no jurisdiction to grant the relief in quesion, and such contention was essentially decided adversely to the defendant, a federal question exists, and federal courts may review the judgment granting such relief. - Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 350, revg. s. c. 12 Tex. Ct. R. 498, 85 S. W. 1052.

A federal court has jurisdiction to grant restraining orders protecting the right of a railroad to carry on interstate commerce in a state without becoming subject to orders of a state commission which so directly burden such commerce as to amount to a regulation thereof.- McNeill v. So. R. Co., 202 U. S. 543, 26 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 722.

Rates for the transportation of persons and property within the limits of a state are primarily for its determination, but the question whether they are so unreasonably low as to deprive the carrier of his property without just compensation, cannot be so conclusively determined by the legislature of the state or by regulations adopted under its authority, that the matter may not become the subject of judicial inquiry.- Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 418, affg. s. c. 64 Fed. 165. Federal courts will restrain state officers from enforcing a unconstitutional state statute whose enforcement would violate rights guaranteed by the U. S. Constitution, doing irreparable damage to the petitioner.— Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 107, 17 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 262.

The federal courts may enjoin any interference with or obstruction of interstate commerce.- In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 900.

The North Carolina Corporation Commission is declared by statute to be a court of record.— Held, that it is nevertheless, in the exercise of many of its functions merely an agent of the state, and may be enjoined by a federal court as to acts not judicial in character.- Southern R. Co. v. Greensboro I. & C. Co., 134 Fed. 82.

Jurisdiction of federal courts in a suit to restrain compliance with a Vermont statute unreasonably reducing fares, see Ball v. Rutland R. Co., 93 Fed. 513.

[21]

Attempts to prevent resort to federal courts.

A state statute providing that if a foreign corporation removes to a federal court cases commenced against it in a state court, its license to do business within the state shall thereupon be revoked, is not unconstitutional.- Security Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U. S. 246, 26 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 619.

A state cannot tie up a citizen of another state, having property rights within its territory invaded by the unauthorized act of its own officers, to suits for redress in its own courts. He may invoke the federal court.Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co., 154 U. S. 362, 14 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 1047; Chicot v. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 529, 13 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 695; Lincoln v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529, 10 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 363; Cowles v. Mercer Co., 7 Wall. (U. S.) 118.

When a state gives a foreign corporation power to do business within the state, it does not grant a mere license which can be revoked at the pleasure of the state, and a statute providing that in a suit against such a corporation, if it should remove the cause to any federal court, it would forfeit its right to do business within the state, is unconstitutional as violating the obligation of contract.— Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Ludwig, 156 Fed. 152.

A statute of Alabama fixed 22 cents per mile as the maximum rate for the transportation of intra-state passengers, and provided for maximum freight rates. Another statute provided that the bringing of a suit by a foreign corporation in a federal court "shall ipso facto forfeit all its right or license to engage or carry on business, originating or terminating within this state."— Held, that the provision relative to expulsion was unconstitutional.- Seaboard Air L. R. Co. v. R. R. Commission, 155 Fed. 792.

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A manufacturer of syrups brought suit to restrain the dairy and food commissioner of a state from doing acts intended to affect the standing and injure the sale of his products, which, such manufacturer alleged, were unlawful acts done by the commissioner under cover of his office. - Held, that this was not a suit against a state.- Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481, 28 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 597.

A suit to restrain an unlawful order of a state railroad commission is not a suit against a state.- Mississippi R. R. Commission v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 203 U. S. 335, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 90; McNeill v. So. R. Co., 202 U. S. 543, 26 Sup Ct. R. (U. S.) 722, affg. s. c. 134 Fed. 82; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co., 154 U. S. 362, 14 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 1047; Seaboard Air L. R. Co. v. R. R. Commission, 155 Fed. 792; Perkins v. No. Pac. R. Co., 155 Fed. 445; Southern R. Co. v. McNeill, 155 Fed. 156. A suit against individuals for the purpose of preventing them as officers of a state from enforcing an unconstitutional enactment to the injury of the rights of the plaintiff, is not a suit against the state within the meaning of the U. S. Const., 11th Amendment.- Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S. 537, 23 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 398.

An Act of Alabama prescribed maximum rates of toll to be charged on a bridge, which was operated by a railroad corporation, and prescribed

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