on the ground that if the railroad holds itself. out as a carrier of melons, it must furnish the necessary refrigerator cars, etc., and the failure of the car line company to keep its contract does not excuse it.- Mathis v. So. R. Co., 65 S. C. 271, 43 S. E. 684, 61 L. R. A. 824.

In the absence of statutory provisions, it is the duty of a carrier to provide all necessary facilities and means for transporting such property as may be offered, at least to the extent that would ordinarily be expected to seek transportation by that line.- Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Smith, 63 Tex. 322.

In cases where it is the duty of a carrier to furnish a refrigerator car, it may discharge this duty by owning the car or leasing it. The measure of responsibility of the carrier to the shipper for the sufficiency of the car is exactly the same whether it obtains the equipment by purchase or by lease.- Matter of Charges for Transportation of Fruit, 11 Inters. Com. R. 129.

In fulfilling its duty to furnish refrigerator cars, a railway may provide the same either by purchase on its own account, or by lease, and if the latter plan is adopted, it may enter into a contract whereby it agrees to use the cars of one line exclusively.— Re Transportation of Fruit, 10 Inters. Com. R. 360.

Carriers are left by law to procure equipment for their business by lease as well as otherwise and are not prohibited from leasing from a shipper. Nor are they compelled to contract in this respect with all shippers because they have with one.- · Consolidated F. Co. v. So. Pac. R. Co., 9 Inters. Com. R. 182.

[7]

— Effect of unprecedented rush of business.

See also post, § 37, note [8].

A railroad corporation should supply a reasonable equipment for its road, considering the amount of business likely to be done, but they are Lot bound to provide for a great, sudden and unexpected influx of business.- Wibert v. N. Y. & E. R. Co., 19 Barb. (N. Y.) 36; affd. 12 N. Y. 245.

Since the Texas statute requiring carriers to furnish sufficient accommodations for the transportation of all property that may be offered is simply declaratory of the common law, when an unexpected and unprecedented rush of business occurs, the carrier is generally excusable for refusing to accept the property for transportation.- Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Smith, 63 Texas, 322.

[8] Duty to furnish safe machinery and appliances. Provisions as to type of switches, warning signals, care and inspection of locomotives, use of appliances, etc.,- see N. Y. R. R. L., § 49. Power of former Board of Railroad Commissioners as to safeguards, see N. Y. R. R. L., § 50.

Use of stoves in passenger cars forbidden,- see N. Y. R. R. L., § 51. Centre-bearing" rails not to be used in construction of tracks of street surface railroads,- see N. Y. R. R. L., § 109.

Use of safety appliances required by federal Act,- see U. S. Comp. Stat., pages 3174-3176 as amd. by Act of Mar. 2, 1903, ch. 976. Duty not discharged by purchasing from reputable manufacturers,see post, note [20].

Excuses for failure to comply with Safety Appliance Act,- see post, note [71].

Power of the state to prescribe the location of tracks and the size and character of rails,- see ante, § 1, note [2].

Limits of state and federal regulation as to safety appliances,- see ante, § 25, note [10].

Compelling relaying of tracks,- see post, § 49, note [30].

The equipment of cars with automatic couplers which will not automatically couple with each other without the necessity of the men going between the cars, is not a compliance with the Act of Congress of March 2, 1893 (27 Stat. 531, c. 196).— Johnson v. So. Pac. R. Co., 196 U. S. 1, 25 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 158.

Locomotive engines are cars within the meaning of the Act of Congress of March 2, 1893 (27 Stat. 531, ch. 196), requiring any car" engaged in interstate commerce to be equipped with automatic couplers. -Johnson v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 196 U. S. 1, 25 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 158.

A carrier is bound to adopt the most approved modes of construction and machinery in known use in the business, and the best precautions in known practical use, for securing safety. It is not bound to use every possible prevention which the highest scientific skill may have suggested, or to adopt an untried machine or mode of construction.— Steinweg v. Erie R. Co., 43 N. Y. 123.

[9] Duty to render switching services.

Duty of carrier to furnish switch connections,- see post, § 27, note [1].

Duty to receive and deliver freight at private switches,- see post, § 27, note [13].

Switching charges,- see post, § 27, note [14].

Switching cars of live stock beyond the carrier's line and into stockyards not owned by the carrier, is not a gratuity, but is a service which the shipper has a legal right to demand and which the carrier is under legal obligation to furnish, at an additional charge.- Cattle Raisers' Assn. v. C. B. & Q. R. Co., 11 Inters. Com. R. 277.

[10] Duty as to hauling of sleeping cars and private cars.

Discrimination in hauling of private or sleeping cars,- see post, § 32, note [25].

Refusal to haul cars of a connecting line,- see post, § 35, note [5]. When Commission will compel the hauling of sleeping cars,- see post, § 49, note [30].

A carrier has a right to refuse to haul private cars which it deems dangerous to the safety or celerity of its service.-Worcester Excursion Car Co. v. Pa. R. Co., 1 Inters. Com. R. 811, 2 Inters. Com. R. 12, 792, 3 I. C. C. R. 577.

A railroad company is not a common carrier of sleeping cars, and hence may transport them on such conditions as it is willing to make. -Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Hamler, 215 Ill. 525, 74 N. E. 705.

[11] Duty to receive and transport.

See also, ante, note [2].

Compelling carrier to transport,- see ante, note [3], post, § 57, note [13].

Remedy for failure or refusal to transport,- see post, note [15]. Exoneration from duty,— see post, note [20].

Right of carrier to prescribe the time for reception of freight,— see post, note [22].

Refusal to transport as discrimination,- see post, § 32, note [15]. Establishment of embargo,- see post, § 32, note [22].

Duty of connecting carrier to forward goods in order of receipt,

see post, § 35, note [26].

Liability of carrier for delay in transporting,- see post, § 38, notes [29]-[37].

Consignments of freight must be transported in the order of receipt, see post, § 38, note [34].

A state statute provided that " a common carrier must, if able to do so, accept and carry whatever is offered to him, at a reasonable time and place, of a kind that he undertakes or is accustomed to carry."— Held, that this did not obligate an express company to receive currency for transportation at a time when it would be necessary to store the same

over night awaiting a morning train, it being the general rule of the company not to so receive such consignments.- Platt v. Le Cocq, 158 Fed. 723.

An express company cannot refuse to transport liquors to and from persons who have a right to receive and ship the same.- Crescent Liquor Co. v. Platt, 148 Fed. 894.

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An Arkansas statute (§ 6193, Sandels & H. Dig. Ark.) declares that railroad companies "shall furnish sufficient accommodations for the transportation of all such passengers and property as shall, within a reasonable time previous thereto, offer or be offered for transportation at the place of starting and the junctions of other railroads, and at sidings and stopping places established for receiving and discharging passengers and freights, and shall take, transport and discharge such passengers and property at, from and to such places on due payment of tolls," etc.- Held, this cannot be understood as depriving the carrier of the right to make reasonable regulations applicable to all persons and corporations relative to the manner in which such a commodity as coal shall be delivered for transportation, nor as compelling the carrier to set out on its sidetracks at such stations coal cars to be there loaded by means of wagons. That view of the statute, if adopted, would deprive the carrier of the power to serve the public in the most efficient, speedy and economical manner, and it will not be presumed that such was the purpose of the legislature. If the statute in question operates to modify the common law at all, it only modifies it to the extent of compelling railroads to carry all kinds of property which is tendered for carriage instead of only such property as they make a public profession of carrying.— Harp v. Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co., 125 Fed. 445.

Loading the freight upon the cars is incumbent on the carrier, and it cannot, as a condition of transporting the goods, require the shipper to do the loading.- London & L. Fire Ins. Co. v. Rome, W. & O. R. Co., 144 N. Y. 200, 39 N. E. 79, affg. s. c. 68 Hun (N. Y.), 598, 23 N. Y. Supp. 231.

A railroad corporation may not refuse or neglect to perform its public duties, simply because of a controversy with its employees over the cost of their part in performing such functions. The duties imposed must be discharged at whatever cost, and cannot be laid down or abandoned or suspended without the legally expressed consent of the state.- People v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 28 Hun (N. Y.), 543.

The transportation of express matter over railroads as a business separate from that of the railroad companies themselves, finds sanction only in the superiority of the service in the respects of speedy collection, transportation and delivery, and for such special and rapid service the justice of rates reasonably higher than those imposed for ordinary rail

road freight service is recognized. This implies, however, that such speedy and special service shall always be afforded, and the mere circumstance that one express company may have the only express office at the destination point and be one of two or more companies at the shipping point does not of itself constitute justification for confining all express service between the shipping and destination points to the route of that particular express company, especially when its route is circuitous and much speedier service could be rendered over a through route composed of the lines of two or more other express companies.- Herendeen v. U. S. Exp. Co. Decided by the N. Y. Public Service Commission of the Second District, Feb. 18, 1908.

When a state confers or permits the exercise of the various rights and powers enjoyed by railroad corporations, the law imposes upon the railroad corporation receiving or exercising them the duty of rendering to the public a service adequate to meet all reasonable requirements. - State v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co., Fla. 44 So. 213.

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A railroad is bound to receive and carry safely all property tendered for shipment.- Merchants D. Transp. Co. v. Thielbar, 86 Ill. 71.

A carrier has the right to deny transportation to a person mentally or physically disabled, only if he appears to be unable to care for himself or likely to require extra attention.— Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Smith, 85 Miss. 349, 37 So. 643; Weightman v. R. Co., 70 Miss. 563, 12 So. 586; Sevier v. R. Co., 61 Miss. 8.

The amount of business ordinarily done by a railroad is the only proper measure of its obligation to furnish transportation.- Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Queen City Coal Co., 99 Ky. 217, 18 Ky. L. R. 126, 35 S. W. 626; Ballentine v. No. Mo. R. Co., 40 Mo. 491; State ex rel. Crandall v. C. B. & Q. R. Co., 72 Neb. 542, 101 N. W. 23; State ex rel. McComb v. C. B. & Q. R. Co., 71 Neb. 593, 99 N. W. 309.

[12] Extent to which carrier holds itself out as such as affecting duty.

The nature and extent of the employment of business which a common carrier expressly or impliedly holds itself out as undertaking, furnishes the limits of their rights, duties, obligations and liabilities.Citizens' Bank v. Nantucket S. Co., 2 Story (U. S.), 16.

In the absence of provisions in the charter or the statutes, it is competent for a railroad company to fix its own policy as to the limits within which it will act as a common carrier, what business it will engage in, what means and methods of transportation it will employ, what goods it will carry, between what points and under what circumstances it will accept them, providing it acts in good faith, reasonably, and without interest to discriminate, doing for all under like circumstances what it does for anyone.- Harp v. Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co., 118 Fed. 169; affd. 125 Fed. 445.