Rates may be reasonable even though they do not afford a net income over and above the cost of operation, taxes and fixed charges.- State v. Seaboard Air L. Co., 48 Fla. 129, 37 So. 314; affd. 203 U. S. 261, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 109.

That the rates fixed by a commission for one road are unreasonable as compared with rates fixed on another, even a connecting road, does not show the commission's rates to be unjust.-Storrs v. Pensacola & A. R. Co., 29 Fla. 617, 11 So. 226.

That under schedules fixed by a state commission a railroad could not pay its reasonable operating expenses shows that the enforcement of such a rate would be a taking of property without just compensation. - Pensacola & A. R. Co. v. State, 25 Fla. 310, 5 So. 833, 3 L. R. A. 661n.

Rates fixed by a duly authorized commission are deemed reasonable until the contrary is shown.- Southern R. Co. v. Atlanta Stove Works, 128 Ga. 207, 57 S. E. 429.

An order was made by a state railroad commission, fixing rates for the transportation of coal.-Held, that the rate fixed is not shown to be confiscatory by a mere showing that if all classes of freight were carried at the rates fixed by the order, the revenue would be insufficient to enable the railroad to meet its obligations.- State v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 80 Minn. 191, 83 N. W. 60; affd. 186 U. S. 251, 22 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 900.

Where capital invested in the production of any commodity is com paratively unremunerative, yielding but a small return, a rate for the transportation of such commodity may be reasonable, although, if the carrier was required to do all his business at rates fixed on a corresponding basis, such rates would be unreasonable to the extent of being confiscatory-Steenerson v. Gt. Northern R. Co., 69 Minn. 353, 72 N. W. 713.

Twenty-five cents per car is a reasonable charge for the service of placing cars on private track scales for weighing, etc.- Norfolk & P. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 289, 49 S. E. 39.

[73] Orders.

Effect of orders,- see ante, § 23, notes [1]-[3].

Suspension of orders by Commission,- see ante, § 23, note [4]. Judicial review of orders,- see ante, § 23, notes [5]-[9].

Judicial restraint of orders,— see ante, § 23, notes [10]-[19].

Federal interference with orders of state commissions,- see ante, § 23, notes [20]-[28].

Scope of orders,- see ante, § 48, note [17].

Judicial enforcement of orders,- see post, § 57, notes. Reports of former Board of Rapid Transit Railroad Commissioners, -see post, § 83, note [3].

An order of a state commission that rates for the transportation of phosphate shall not exceed one cent per ton per mile does not make the rate per mile the same for any distance, but merely fixes a maximum within which the carrier may make, such reductions for distance as it thinks is warranted.- Seaboard Air L. R. Co. v. Florida, 203 U. S. 261, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 109, affg. s. c. 48 Fla. 129, 37 So. 314, and 48 Fla. 150, 37 So. 658.

Courts will not indirectly give power to the Interstate Commerce Commission to prescribe rates by granting it a peremptory order that in the future the railroads must follow the rates which the commission determined were, at the time of the inquiry, reasonable and just.Interst. Com. Commission v. Ala. Mid. R. Co., 168 U. S. 144, 18 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 45, affg. s. c. 74 Fed. 715, 69 Fed. 227.

A statute of a state, fixing maximum fares and for that purpose classifying railroads by the length of their lines and fixing different rates per mile for each class, does not deny to any corporation the equal protection of the laws, within the meaning of the U. S. Constitution.- Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680, 8 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 1028, affg. s. c. 49 Ark. 455, 5 S. W. 718; Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 U. S. 526, 2 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 832, affg. s. c. 91 Ill. 256; Illinois Cent. Railroad v. Illinois, 108 U. S. 541, 2 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 839, affg. s. c. 95 Ill. 313.

The defendant carriers changed their classification of freight by advancing hay and straw in carloads from the sixth to the fifth class. Upon complaint, the Interstate Commerce Commission found this change to be unwarranted and unlawful, and ordered the defendants to cease "classifying hay and straw in carloads as fifth class freight, and from charging and exacting fifth class rates" for the transportation of such commodities in carload quantities.- Held, in a proceeding to enforce such order, that it was invalid, as an attempt by the Commission virtually to fix rates.- Interst. Com. Commission v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co., 134 Fed. 942; affd. 202 U. S. 613, 26 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 766.

An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission permitting a carrier to make commodity rates on competitive traffic to the common market which are less than their rates on similar traffic to an intermediate noncompetiting point, but requiring that such commodity rates must not be lower than necessary to meet competition, nor be applied to articles not actually subject thereto, is a mere general statement of the law applicable, and is too indefinite to be judicially enforced.— Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. No. Pac. R. Co., 83 Fed. 249.

That a member of a state railroad commission was interested, as a shipper, in the rates fixed, his vote not being necessary to the decision, does not render such decision invalid.— Southern Pac. Co. v. Board of R. R. Comrs., 78 Fed. 236.

Where a discrimination in rates and services has been shown, the method of redress must always be left to the carrier, in the first instance, at least. An arbitrary and peremptory order, which leaves him with no discretion or freedom in making the best readjustment practicable, is unlawful.- Detroit, G. H. & M. R. Co. v. Interst. Com. Commission, 74 Fed. 803, revg. 57 Fed. 1005; affd. 167 U. S. 633, 17 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 986.

The power to "regulate" the facilities classified as accessorial service, conferred by the Interstate Commerce Act on the Interstate Commerce Commission, must be confined to existing conditions, and be one of "regulation" merely, not extending to deprivation, construction or reconstruction of properties, to carry out a decision. Hence, an order of the Commission directing a carrier to wholly discontinue a long-established custom of furnishing cartage in a particular city is. beyond the power of the Commission, if it will operate to deprive the carrier of his business at that place.- Detroit, G. H. & M. R. Co. v. Interst. Com. Commission, 74 Fed. 803, revg. s. c. 57 Fed. 1003; affd. 167 U. S. 633, 17 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 986.

The report, finding or decision of the Interstate Commerce Commission in a particular case should show the issues in the case and the findings of the commission thereon; should refer to the evidence as to disputed facts and the decision of the Commission as to such disputed facts; and if facts are undisputed, the report should show that fact.- Interst. Com. Commission v. L. & N. R. Co., 73 Fed. 409.

An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission which forbids a railroad from charging more than the third class rate for the transportation of window shades of all kinds will not be enforced, as it ignores the element of the value of the service in fixing the reasonable compensation of the carrier and denies him any remuneration for additional risk in carrying shades of a greater value.- Interst. Com. Commission v. D. L. & W. R. Co., 64 Fed. 723.

Since an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission is not binding until it has passed the scrutiny of the courts, and since there is no appeal or review of a decision adverse to the complainant, an order will be made favorable to the latter, in a doubtful case.— - Miner v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. Co., 11 Inters. Com. R. 422.

It is not a valid defense to a proposed order of a state commission that it would require the carrier to exercise the power of eminent domain, construct a railroad track, operate the same, etc.- Jacobson v. Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co., 71 Minn. 514, 74 N. W. 893.

A carrier cannot acquire any right to impose an unlawful rate from an approving act of the board of railroad and warehouse commissioners of Missouri.— McGrew v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 118 Mo. App. 379, 94 S. W. 719.

A proviso that "the charge for transportation or conveyance shall not exceed 35 cents per 100 pounds on heavy articles," etc., does not show intent to establish a rate for intermediate distances and weights in proportion to the amount specified but to establish a maximum beyond which the carrier could not go.- Ragan v. Aiken, 77 Tenn. 609.

§ 50. Power of commissions to order repairs or changes.— If, in the judgment of the commission having jurisdiction, repairs or improvements to or changes in any tracks, switches, terminals or terminal facilities, motive power, or any other property or device used by any common carrier, railroad corporation or street railroad corporation in or in connection with the transportation of passengers, freight or property ought reasonably to be made, or that any additions should reasonably be made thereto, in order to promote the security or convenience of the public or employees, or in order to secure adequate service or facilities for the transportation of passengers, freight or property, the commission shall, after a hearing either on its own motion or after complaint, make and serve an order directing such repairs, improvements, changes or additions to be made within a reasonable time and in a manner to be specified therein, and every common carrier, railroad corporation and street railroad corporation is hereby required and directed to make all repairs, improvements, changes and additions required of it by any order of the commission served upon it.

Power of Interstate Commerce Commission to order alterations in terminal facilities on complaint of shipper,- see Interst. Com. Act, § 1, post, Appendix B.

Statutory standard as to weight of rails, form of cattle guards, fences, crossings, signals, etc.,- see N. Y. R. R. L., §§ 31-34.

Power of former Board of Railroad Commissioners to compel repairs, changes and alterations,- see N. Y. R. R. L., § 161.

Power of former Board of Rapid Transit Railroad Commissioners to order repairs and alterations in switches, sidings, platforms, signal devices, etc.,- see N. Y. Rap. Tr. Act, §§ 6, 32a, post, Appen

Duty of carriers to furnish safe and adequate service and facilities generally, see ante, § 26.

Duty of carriers to furnish adequate and reasonable service and facilities, see ante, § 26.

Power of Commission to order switch and sidetrack connections,— see also ante, § 27.

General power of the state to regulate property devoted to public use,—

see ante, § 1, notes [1]-[22].

Power of the state to prescribe the size and character of rails,- see ante, § 1, note [2].

Exemptions from public control,—see ante, § 1, notes [16]-[21]. General rules of statutory construction,—see ante, § 1, notes [23]

Who are common carriers,— see ante, § 2, notes [2]-[7].

What constitutes a railroad or street railroad,— see ante, § 2, note [8]. Effect of receivership on power to regulate,- see ante, § 2, note [15]. Effect of vacancies on power of commission,—see ante, § 4, note [5]. Validity of commission plan of regulation,—see ante, § 4, note [14]. Compelling production of books and papers,—see ante, § 19, notes [3]-[6].

Punishment of witnesses for contempt,- see ante, § 19, notes [7]-[12]. Commission not bound by technical rules of procedure,- see ante, § 20, note [1].

Immunity of witnesses,― see ante, § 20, notes [2]-[9].

Effect, reviews and restraint of orders,—see ante, § 23, notes.

Review of orders,- see ante, § 23, notes.

Judicial enforcement of orders,—see post, § 57, notes.

[1] Highway crossings.

Power of the state to prescribe the character and style of highway crossings,― see ante, § 1, note [2].

Whether requiring maintenance of electric lights at crossings is a regulation of interstate commerce,— see ante, § 25, note [16]. Railway and street railway crossings,- see ante, § 35, notes [34]-[38].

A railroad must so improve and maintain a crossing as reasonably to subserve the growing needs of the public. It does not perform the full measure of its duty by making a sufficient crossing over a highway, when by growth of population and travel it becomes inadequate to accommodate. in a reasonable manner the increasing needs of the public.- Indiana v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co., 83 Fed. 284.

The duty of a railroad to restore a stream or highway which is crossed by the line of its road is a continuing duty, and if by the increase of