to dispose of the three laboratories acquired by it, namely, the Paragon, G. M., and Sen Jacq. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Manton stated he believed the order of the commission should be affirmed in all respects, holding that the commission has power to order a respondent to dispose of property acquired by it which it is found using as a means of unfair competition in trade. On October 26, 1925, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari on petition of the commission to review the above-mentioned decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals. The case is now before the Supreme Court awaiting briefs and argument. Pacific States Paper Trade Association-Price fixing in paper products on the Pacific coast.—This complaint involved, besides the Pacific States Paper Trade Association and 35 specifically named respondents, the following five trade associations operating in Pacific coast territory. Seattle-Tacoma Paper Trade Conference. Portland Paper Trade Association. Paper Trade Conference of San Francisco. Los Angeles Wholesale Paper Jobbers' Association. The respondents embraced practically all wholesale dealers in paper and paper products throughout the States of Oregon, Washington, and California. Other States affected in great part by the activities of the respondents are Idaho, Nevada, Arizona, Montana, New Mexico, and the Territory of Alaska. Respondents were charged with combining 24d conspiring together to fix and enhance prices of paper and paper products throughout the Pacific States, and to confine the distribution thercof through wholesale channels, all with the effect of substantially lessening and restraining competition and hindering the natural flow of commerce in paper and paper products in channels of interstate trade. Among the means charged as being employed by respondents to effectuate their alleged unlawful schemes are coercion, boycotting, and intimidation of manufacturers into cutting off sources of supplies of those competitors who failed to abide by the fixed prices and conditions laid down by said combination. The Pacific States Paper Trade Association et al. petitioned the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for review of certain parts of the commission's order (five subdivisions). Briefs were filed, argument had, and in February, 1925, the opinion of the court was handed down sustaining the commission on two of said subdivisions, slightly modifying one subdivision, and reversing the commission on the two remaining subdivisions. Petition for rehearing filed by the commission was denied on March 9, 1925. Petition for certiorari was then filed by the commission in the United States Supreme Court, which petition was granted May 25, 1925. Commission's brief has been filed, and at close of the fiscal year the case awaits repondents' brief and oral argument, which is expected to be had during the October term, 1926. The American Tobacco Co. case-Price agreements on tobacco products. The commission's order in this case, directed against practically all of the wholesale tobacco dealers in and about Philadelphia, commanded these dealers to cease and desist from fixing, enforcing, and maintaining and from enforcing and maintaining by combination, agreement, or understanding among themselves, or with or among any of them, or with any other wholesaler of cigarettes or other tobacco products, resale prices for cigarettes or other tobacco products dealt in by such respondents, or any of them, or by any other wholesaler of cigarettes or other tobacco products. The American Tobacco Co., which also appeared as one of the respondents in this proceeding, was directed to cease and desist from assisting and from agreeing to assist any of its dealer-customers in maintaining and enforcing in the resale of cigarettes and other tobacco products manufactured by the said the American Tobacco Co. resale prices for such cigarettes and other tobacco products, fixed by an such dealer-customer by agreement, understanding, or combination with any other dealer-customer of said the American Tobacco Co. The American Tobacco Co. was the only one of the respondents to appeal from the order, and it filed its petition for review in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The case was argued on November 19, 1924, and on October 20, 1925, the court reversed the order of the commission. The commission applied to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals on the ground that the lower court appears to hold that the commission's finding of price agreement between the jobbers and the manufacturer was not supported by evidence; that it is lawful for the manufacturer to aid and abet jobbers in making effective their illegal price agreement; that it is not unlawful for a jobbing association to agree to fix prices and prevent members and nonmembers who do not observe the agreed price from procuring goods; that it is not an unfair method of competition for a manufacturer to join with a jobbers' association in compelling observance of prices illegally agreed upon; that it is unlawful for jobbers to sell goods at prices satisfactory to themselves and which, in the past, have sustained their business, though such prices may be lower than those agreed upon by the members of the association of competing jobbers; and, conversely, that it is fair competition for jobbers to combine to coerce competitors into charging prices which they have agreed upon as satisfactory to themselves; that a combination in restraint of interstate commerce in violation of the Sherman Act is not also an unfair method of competition; that it is not to the interest of the public to prevent jobbers from agreeing upon prices at which they will sell and from agreeing to prevent those who will not observe their prices from getting the goods. The petition for certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court on March 8, 1926, and at the close of the year the case was awaiting hearing. The Shade Shop case-Appropriation and simulation of trade name. This is a District of Columbia case. Alfred Klesner, doing business under the name and style of "Shade Shop, Hooper & Klesner," was charged by the commission with a violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission act, in that he had appropriated and simulated the trade name "The Shade Shop " adopted by one W. Stokes Sammons in connection with his business of manufacturing and selling window shades. Sammons had been engaged exclusively in the business since 1901. The commission's order prohibited Klesner, his servants, agents, and employees from using the words "Shade Shop" standing alone or in conjunction with other words as an identification of the business conducted by him, in any manner of advertisement, signs, stationery, telephone, or business directories, trade lists, or otherwise. The respondent having refused to comply with the order, the commission, on May 13, 1924, filed, in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, its petition for enforcement thereof. The case was argued November 5, 1924, and decision of the court rendered on June 1, 1925. The sole question discussed in the court's opinion was the matter of its jurisdiction to enforce the commission's orders in the District of Columbia, and the commission's petition was dismissed on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction. The case is now pending in the Supreme Court of the United States on certiorari where it awaits briefs and argument. The Procter & Gamble Co. case-False advertising and misbranding-Soap.-Procter & Gamble Co. manufactures soap, some of which it advertises and sells as "P & G White Naphtha Soap." It also manufactures and sells a washing powder under the name of "Star Naphtha Washing Powder." The commission alleged that at the time such soap and powder are sold to the consuming public they contain no naphtha nor do they contain any petroleum distillate in an amount sufficient to be effective as a cleansing ingredient. After hearing, the commission ordered Procter & Gamble Co. to cease using the word "Naphtha" as a brand name for any soap or soap products when such commodities at the time of their sale to the consuming public contain no naphtha, or naphtha in an amount of 1 per cent or less by weight. The company, on August 28, 1924, petitioned the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to review the commission's order. On January 5, 1926, the court rendered its decision sustaining the first section of the commission's order prohibiting the use of the word "Naphtha" as a designation for a kerosene ingredient of soap. The court, however, vacated the remaining part of the commission's order which prohibited the use of the word "Naphtha soap containing not more than 1 per cent of naphtha (a volatile ingredient) at the time of sale to the consumer, the court indicating that the order should have been directed to the naphtha content to be placed in the soap at the time of manufacture. Thereafter, both parties filed petitions for rehearing, which were denied by the Circuit Court of Appeals on April 7, 1926. The Procter & Gamble Co. then filed a petition in the Supreme Court of the United States for certiorari, to which the commission filed a cross petition likewise praying for certiorari because, among other things, it is the contention of the commission that the regulation of the amount of naphtha to be placed in the product at the time of manufacture, as the Circuit Court of Appeals indicates, is not sound. At the close of the fiscal year the case was awaiting the action of the Supreme Court. CASES IN UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS The Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. case-Suppression of competition in the manufacture and sale of beet sugar.-The respondents in this case-namely, the Utah-Idaho Co., the Amalgamated Sugar Co., E. R. Wooley, A. P. Cooper, and E. F. Cullen-were charged by the commission with stifling and suppressing competition in the purchase of sugar beets and in the manufacture and sale of refined beet sugar, by means of a combination or conspiracy involving, among others, the following unfair trade practices: (1) The circulation of false, misleading, and unfair reports as to competitors and prospective competitors (a) concerning financial standing and responsibility; (b) that they would be unable to secure sugar-beet seed, or the beets, or to pay for those they did purchase; (c) that their contemplated factories would not be built, etc. (2) The circulation of false reports to the effect that respondents (a) occupied all the producing territory in which their competitors contemplated operating; (b) had contracts for all the beets to be grown, etc. The commission, after very extensive hearings, dismissed the complaint as to the respondent E. F. Cullen and entered its order to cease and desist against the other respondents. The respondents filed petitions for review in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The commission, as required by statute, filed with the court a transcript of the record, consisting of 13,428 pages of testimony and approximately 6,000 pages of exhibits. Subsequent to the filing of transcript, the court ordered the petitioners to prepare and serve a condensed narrative of the transcript. Counsel for petitioners (Utah-Idaho Sugar Co.) sought (by motion) a modification of the order concerning the preparation and service of the condensed narrative. This was opposed by the commission, and the motion was denied. In compliance with the court's order all the petitioners except Wooley prepared and served on the commission a condensed narrative of the record. This condensed narrative consists of four bound volumes, a total of 1,433 pages. Petitioner Wooley having failed to prepare and serve a condensed narrative, the commission filed a motion within the time specified by the court to dismiss his petition for review. Wooley opposed this motion, briefs were filed, and the question arising upon the motion was argued. This motion was denied by the court, which at the same time granted Wooley leave to adopt as his abstract of record the abstract prepared by the Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. Subsequently, on September 14, 1925, the case was called by the court and continued to the September term, 1926, and thereafter by stipulation continued to the December, 1926, term at St. Louis. The case is therefore in that court awaiting briefs and argument. Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce case.--In this case respondents were charged with engaging in a confederation and conspiracy to maintain a monopoly of the grain trade at Minneapolis and the immediate surrounding territory; and that, in order to carry out the monopoly and destroy the business of its competitors, the chamber of commerce and its organization were used as a medium through which the unfair methods of competition were accomplished by its members in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission act. After hearing, the commission entered its order on December 28, 1923, directing the Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis and the other respondents to cease and desist from combining and conspiring among themselves or with others, directly or indirectly, to interfere with, or injure, or destroy the business or the reputation of the St. Paul Grain Exchange, or its officers and members, or the Equity Cooperative Exchange, or its officers and stockholders (or |