for special appeal on which the case was heard in the court of appeals the court below holding that sections 6 and 9 of the Federal Trade Commission act did not confer any jurisdiction upon the commisison to employ subpoenas in any investigation made under section 6 of the act, but that the statute conferred power upon the commission to employ subpoenas only in adversary proceedings conducted under authority of section 5. The petition for rehearing was denied on January 21, 1928. The commission filed answer to the amended bill of complaint on February 14. On March 23 the court granted the motion of the federation for leave to file supplemental bill of complaint, in which it was claimed that final decree should issue against the commission, on the ground that its investigation had been completed, final report made to the Senate, and its authority thereby exhausted. The commission's answer to this supplemental bill was filed on April 4. At the close of the fiscal year negotiations were being conducted looking to a stipulation of the facts, in lieu of taking testimony in the suit for permanent injunction, in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

Royal Baking Powder case-Violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission act.-This company was charged, on complaint of the commission, with publishing false statements about the products of competitors, among which were (1) that competitors' baking powders contained alum and were therefore unfit for use in food; (2) that the alum contained in such powders is the astringent commonly sold in drug stores under the name of alum and chemically known as potassium aluminum sulphate; (3) that competitors' baking powders are poisonous, that they are made of ground-up cooking utensils, that they do not come within the pure food laws, that they pucker up the stomach in the same manner that lump alum puckers up the mouth, and that they are made of the same substance used as a styptic after shaving. It was further charged that respondent had advertised anonymously to the same effect. Answer was filed, testimony taken, and briefs and oral argument presented to the commission. Thereafter, on March 23, 1926, the commission issued its order dismissing the proceeding. On the same day counsel for the commission filed a petition for reargument of the case before the commission, which petition was on said day granted. Notices of such dismissal and the granting of the petition for reargument were served upon the baking powder company simultaneously. Thereafter the case was reargued before the commission, upon which it vacated its order of dismissal entered March 23, 1926, and directed the reopening of the case solely for the taking of further testimony with respect to misleading advertising, anonymous advertising, and the circulation of erroneous extracts from the book A Collation of Cakes. The order expressly

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provided that no evidence be taken with respect to statements by the respondent relative to the deleteriousness of alum baking powder, and also confirmed the previous dismissal with respect to the use by respondent of the slogan "No alum-no bitter taste," since the commission was of opinion that its use as before them in this case was not an unfair method of competition. Thereupon, on October 22, 1926, the Royal Baking Powder Co. filed in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia a petition for a writ of certiorari which the court caused to be issued and served upon the commission, commanding it to certify and transmit to that court the record and papers in the case before the commission, it being the contention of the company that the commission lost jurisdiction of the proceedings before it upon its entering the order of dismissal of March 23, 1926. On October 30, 1926, the commission moved the court to dismiss the petition and to quash the writ of certiorari, and on November 13, 1926, in addition to its motion to quash the writ of certiorari, the commission also filed a demurrer to the petition. Thereafter the matter was argued, briefs were filed, and on June 21, 1927, the court rendered its decision sustaining the commission's motion to quash the writ of certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction in the court. (Not reported). The court declined to pass upon the demurrer to the petition, offering at the election of the petitioner to transfer the matter to the equity side of the court. This was done, and the equity court, on November 7, 1927, granted the commission's motion to dismiss the bill, saying (decision not reported): "From an examination of the decided cases bearing upon the questions presented herein the court is of opinion that, by the entry of the order of dismissal, on March 23, 1926, the commission did not exhaust its jurisdiction over the case pending before it; that its order reopening the case, as well its subsequent orders in relation thereto, were administrative and procedural in character; and that the same are not subject to review by this court." Final decree was signed November 15, 1927, the court at the time taking occasion to discuss allowance of writ of supersedeas, applied for by the company. It said: "It is not here necessary to decide whether this court, because of the limitations of the equity rule, supra, is or is not vested with discretion to grant a supersedeas which shall operate as an injunction against the Federal Trade Commission pending the appeal; but in view of the fact that this court reached the conclusion herein that the several orders complained of were administrative and procedural, and, as such not here properly subject to review, it is of opinion that it should not thus do indirectly that which it has directly held it had no right or jurisdiction to do." The company noted an appeal to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, and on March 22, 1928, filed the tran

body; (6) falsely representing the existence of a drug or a biological product; (7) falsely representing that respondents are manufacturers or compounders of the products in which they deal or that they own, control, or operate a factory or laboratory; and (8) falsely representing the absence of an objectionable ingredient in their products. Photo-Engraving case-Conspiracy to fix and enhance prices— Violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission act.—This case is of national scope in which were named as respondents (1) the American Photo-Engravers' Association, a trade association of the manufacturing and commercial photo-engravers and the national organization for some 31 local photo-engravers' associations or clubs, the members of which produced from 75 per cent to 90 per cent of the total output of photo-engravings in the United States; and (2) the International Photo-Engravers' Union of North America, with which over 90 per cent of the workmen in the industry in the United States are affiliated and organized into some 75 local unions, also named parties respondent.

In the complaint of the commission the employers operating through their local and national associations and the employees operating through their unions were charged with combining, conspiring, confederating, and agreeing together to adopt, maintain, and enforce a scale of uniform and enhanced prices for the sale of photo-engraving products and to limit, lessen, hinder, and suppress competition in such products. After full trial, in which some 3,500 pages of oral testimony and 339 documentary exhibits were received in evidence, the commission issued its findings of fact and thereupon dismissed the complaint as to the unions but entered an order against the American Photo-Engravers' Association and the local or sectional organizations thereof directing them to cease and desist from combining, conspiring, confederating, cooperating, or agreeing together or with others for the purpose or with the result of limiting, lessening, hindering, regulating, or suppressing competition as to price in the sale of photo-engraving products, or as to any process, operation, or time element in such products, or of enhancing the prices of photo-engraving products sold in interstate commerce; and for such purposes, from coercing, intimidating, or preventing any manufacturers of such products from individually and freely making such prices for their products as the free exercise of their individual judgment shall direct, and from preventing such manufacturers from competing in price among themselves or with others engaged in the same business. It is also provided in the order that for the purpose of carrying it into effect these respondents shall cease and desist from certain practices, some of which are as follows: (a) Agreeing upon or using the so-called standard price scale or similar device as a means for hindering, lessening, or curtailing price com

petition; (b) from seeking, advocating, or making any agreement or understanding that members of a club or association or individual photo-engravers of one locality or section shall not sell their products at prices lower than the customary agreed or understood price in any territory where sales are to be made; also from advocating and declaring that it is unethical or unbusinesslike or remiss or negligent for a photo-engraver located in one locality or section to compete in price or otherwise with one or more photo-engravers in any other section or locality; (c) using any device, contract, provision, mutual understanding, or other means with unions or otherwise as a means for inducing or compelling any photo-engraving concern to adhere to certain prices or minimum prices for photoengraving products; (d) from reprimanding, fining, suspending, or expelling from any employer organization any member for competing in price or failing to live up to any uniform price understanding; (e) from asserting or using the privilege to inspect books of accounts of any photo-engraver for the purpose of obtaining evidence of price cutting or failure to abide by uniform price understandings; and (f) from holding estimating classes for the purpose of securing uniform price understandings.

Motion-Picture case-Restraint of trade-Violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission act.-In this case respondents were charged in the complaint of the commission with having entered into a combination and conspiracy to secure control of and monopolize the motion-picture industry and to restrain, restrict, and suppress competition in the distribution of motion-picture films. Hearings were held at numerous points throughout the United States at which over 17,000 pages of testimony and 728 documentary exhibits were received in evidence. After receiving briefs and hearing oral argument the commission on July 9, 1927, made its findings as to the facts and issued an order against certain of the respondents, namely, the Famous Players-Lasky Corporation, Adolph Zukor, and Jesse L. Lasky, their agents and representatives, directing them to cease and desist substantially as follows: (1) From continuing in force or attempting to carry into effect the conspiracy (which the commission found they had entered into) for the purpose of lessening and restricting competition in foreign or domestic commerce; (2) in the business of producing, distributing, and exhibiting motion-picture films, from leasing and distributing such films by so-called block-booking, a system by which motion-picture films are supplied or offered to theaters or exhibitors in a group or "block," the exhibitor or theater to book all the films in the group or "block" or be permitted to book none; and (3) from building or acquiring, or threatening so to do, any theaters for the purpose or with the intent or effect of intimidating or coercing exhibitors of motion-picture films to lease

or book and exhibit motion-picture films of the Famous PlayersLasky Corporation.

Shortly after the close of the fiscal year the commission filed in the United States Circuit of Appeals for the Second Circuit its petition to enforce the order to cease and desist, in which petition it alleged that the above-named respondents have failed and neglected to obey the order, and have continued and are continuing to violate the terms thereof. This petition is now pending in court.

Export trade-Violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission act as extended by the export trade act.-Complaint had been issued by the commission against a number of individuals and corporations of New York, engaged in the business of exporting automobiles, trucks, and auto parts, in which they were charged with using certain unfair methods of competition in export trade. Upon hearing of the charges the commission found that seven of the respondents had been indulging in the unfair practices as alleged, and on March 3, 1927, directed them and their agents and representatives to cease and desist from pursuing or continuing the unfair methods of competition in export trade for the purpose or with the effect of injuring the public and competitors and bringing into disrepute the export trade of the United States by any of the following methods: (1) Representing themselves as willing and able or promising to furnish for export trade automobiles, motor trucks, or chassis as and for new, complete, and fully equipped machines with standard parts, when they are not properly equipped or do not intend to furnish such machines or parts in accordance with their representations and undertakings; (2) promising or representing themselves as willing and able to furnish in export trade automobiles, motor trucks or chassis as and for new, complete, and fully equipped machines with standard parts, when they are not properly equipped or do not intend to furnish such machines or parts in accordance with their representations and undertakings; (3) demanding or exacting payments in advance of receipt or opportunity for full inspection by purchasers of the merchandise furnished or conducting their export trade in any manner as to cause such demands to be made without opportunity for inspection when and if such merchandise so furnished in export trade is not in exact accordance with their representations and undertakings; and (4) conducting their export trade by any similar means or methods as to tend to prejudice the public and competitors and others engaged in American export trade.

METHODS OF COMPETITION CONDEMNED

The following list shows unfair methods of competition and Clayton Act violations which have from time to time been con