[4] Those who are duly designated by competent authority to perform the full-time duties and responsibilities, whether or not in concurrent capacity, as Officers-in-Charge for one (1) final calendar month or more of the positions enumerated in Sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 hereof. The PICCI is not an originally chartered corporation, but a subsidiary corporation of BSP organized in accordance with the Corporation Code of the Philippines. The Articles of Incorporation of PICCI was registered on July 29, 1976 in the Securities and Exchange Commission. As such, PICCI does not fall within the coverage of NCC No. 67. As a matter of fact, by virtue of P.D. [No.] 520, PICCI is exempt from the coverage of the civil service law and regulation (and Constitution defining coverage of civil service as limited to those with original [charter) (TUCP v. NHA, G.R. No. 49677, May 4, 1989, Article IX-, B Sec. 1). Certainly, if PICCI is not part of the National Government, but a mere subsidiary of a government-owned and/or controlled corporation (BSP), its officers, and more importantly, its directors, are not covered by the term "national government officials a ns employees" to which NCC No. 67 finds application. Even the BSP, which is the sole stockholder of PICCI, is not covered by NCC No. 67, not only for the same reasons stated above but for the reason that it enjoys fiscal and administrative autonomy, which is defined as the "guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require" (Bengzon v. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133).16 Respondent maintains that petitioners' receipt of RATA from PICCI, in addition to their per diem of P1,000 per meeting, and another RATA from BSP, violates the rule against double compensation; that as former officers of the BSP, petitioners Gabriel P. Singson, Araceli E. Villanueva, Andre Navato, Edgardo P. Zialcita, and Melpin A. Gonzaga were also receiving RATA from 16 Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 8-9. the BSP, in addition to the RATA granted to them as PICCI Directors; that there is double payment of RATA, since petitioners' membership in the PICC Board is a mere adjunct of their positions as BSP officials; that double compensation refers to two sets of compensations for two different offices held concurrently by one officer; and that while there is no general prohibition against holding two offices which are not incompatible, when an officer accepts a second office, he can draw the salary attached to such second office only when he is specifically authorized by law which does not exist in the present case. In her letter, dated October 14, 1999, to petitioner Araceli E. Villanueva, Corporate Auditor Adelaida A. Aldovino reiterated her decision disallowing disbursements for RATA of PICCI directors for the reasons set forth in Notice of Disallowance No, 99001-101 (96-98). Thus, Moreover, while the directors are not strictly speaking Officers-in-Charge, but because they are doing duties in concurrent capacities and are already receiving RATA from their principal office, Budget Compensation Policy Guideline No. 6, dated September 1, 1982, is applicable. No. 3.0 of the guideline provides: 3.1 An Official/employee already entitled/granted commutable transportation/representation allowances and designated by competent authority to perform duties and responsibilities in concurrent capacity as Officer-in-Charge of another position(s), whether CES or non-CES, whether or not in the same ministry/bureau/office or agency and entitled to similar benefits/allowances, whether commutable or reimbursable, except where similar allowances are higher in rates than those of his regular position, in which case he may be allowed to collect the difference thereof, provided the period of his temporary stewardship is not less than one month on a reimbursable basis. In view of the foregoing, we are reiterating our decision disallowing disbursement for RATA of PICCI directors for reasons stated in our Notice of Disallowance No. 99-001-01 (96-98). Further, please be reminded that disallowance not appealed within six (6) months as prescribed under Section 48, 50 and 51 of PD 1445 shall become final and executory. 17 17 Rollo, pp. 62-63. rates prescribed for each of the following officials and employees and those of equivalent ranks, and the conditions enumerated under the pertinent sections of the General Provisions of the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA): In COA Decision No. 2002-081 dated April 23, 2002, respondent concluded that the payment of RATA to petitioners violated Item No. 4 of National Compensation Circular (NCC) No. 67, dated January 1, 1992, issued by the DBM, as the petitioners were already drawing RATA from their mother agencies and, hence, their receipt 4. Funding Source: of RATA from PICCI was without legal basis and constituted double compensation of RATA which is prohibited under the Constitution. It also explained that under the By-Laws of PICCI, the compensation of its directors should be in the form of per diem and not RATA, and as the By-Laws have the same force and effect of law as the corporate charter, its directors and officers are under obligation to comply therewith. Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution provides that no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any present emolument, office or title of any kind from any foreign government. Pensions and gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double or indirect compensation. This provision, however, does not apply to the present case as there was no double compensation of RATA to the petitioners. In Leynes v. Commission on Audit, 18 the Court clarified that what National Compensation Circular (NCC) No. 67 seeks to prevent is the dual collection of RATA by a national official from the budgets of "more than one national agency." In the said case, the interpretation was that NCC No. 67 cannot be construed as nullifying the power of therein local government units to grant allowances to judges under the Local Government Code of 1991. Further, NCC No. 67 applies only to the national funds administered by the DBM, not the local funds of the local government units. Thus, In all cases, commutable and reimbursable RATA shall be paid from the amount appropriated for the purpose and other personal services savings of the agency or project from where the officials and employees covered under this Circular draw their salaries. No one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source (Italics ours) In construing NCC No. 67, we apply the principle in statutory construction that force and effect should not be narrowly given to isolated and disjoined clauses of the law but to its spirit, broadly taking all its provisions together in one rational view. Because a statute is enacted as a whole and not in parts or sections, that is, one part is as important as the others, the statute should be construed and given effect as a whole. A provision or section which is unclear by itself may be clarified by reading and construing it in relation to the whole statute. Taking NCC No. 67 as a whole then, what it seeks to prevent is the dual collection of RATA by a national official from the budgets of "more than one national agency." We emphasize that the other source referred to in the prohibition is another national agency. This can be gleaned from the fact that the sentence "no one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source" (the controversial prohibition) immediately follows the sentence that RATA shall be paid from the budget of the national agency where the concerned national officials and employees draw their salaries. The fact that the other source is another national agency is supported by RA 7645 (the GAA of 1993) invoked by respondent COA itself and, in fact, by all subsequent GAAs for that matter, because the GAAs all essentially provide that (1) the RATA of national officials shall be payable from the budgets of their respective national agencies and (2) those officials on detail with other national agencies shall be paid their RATA only from the budget of their parent national agency: The pertinent provisions of NCC No. 67 read: 3. Rules and Regulations: 3.1.1 Payment of RATA, whether commutable or reimbursable, shall be in accordance with the 18 463 Phil. 557 (2003). Clearly therefore, the prohibition in NCC No. 67 is only against the dual or multiple collection of RATA by a national official from the budgets of two or more national agencies. Stated otherwise, when a national official is on detail with another national agency, he should get his RATA only from his 21 Department of Budget and Management, represented by Sec. Emilia T. Boncodin v. Olivia D. Leones, G.R. Nó. 169726, March 18, 2011. parent national agency and not from the other national agency he is detailed to. 19 (Italics supplied.) Moreover, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7653 (The New Central Bank Act) defines that the powers and functions of the BSP shall be exercised by the BSP Monetary Board, which is composed of seven (7) members appointed by the President of the Philippines for a term of six (6) years. MB Resolution No. 15,20 dated January 5, 1994, as amended by MB Resolution No. 34, dated January 12, 1994, are valid corporate acts of petitioners that became the bases for granting them additional monthly RATA of P1,500.00, as members of the Board of Directors of PICCI. The RATA is distinct from salary (as a form of compensation). Unlike salary which is paid for services rendered, the RATA is a form of allowance intended to defray expenses deemed unavoidable in the discharge of office. Hence, the RATA is paid only to certain officials who, by the nature of their offices, incur representation and transportation expenses.21 Indeed, aside from the RATA that they have been receiving from the BSP, the grant of P1,500.00 RATA to each of the petitioners for every board meeting they attended, in their capacity as members of the Board of Directors of PICCI, in addition 19 Id. at 572-574. 20 Min. No. 1-January 5, 1994 15. Philippine International Convention Center. Decision to authorize the representation and transportation allowance of the members of its Board of Directors. ACTION TAKEN The Board decided as follows: 1. To authorize the representation and transportation allowance in the amount of P1,500.[00] a month of the Members of the Board of Directors of the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC); 2. To approve the actual expenditure for 1993; 3. To approve the actual expenses for 1992 incurred by PICC, not covered by the original budget, subject to existing Commission [on] Audit rules and regulations; and 4. To instruct PICC Management to prepare and submit proposal for 1994 within two (2) months from date of receipt. (Signed) FE B. BARIN Secretary to their P1,000.00 per diem, does not run afoul the constitutional proscription against double compensation. Petitioners invoke the ruling of ADEPT v. COA22 whereby the Court took into consideration the good faith of therein petitioners and, thus, allowed them to retain the incentive benefits they had received for the year 1992. Respondent points out that the records of the case do not support petitioners' claim of good faith, because they themselves were the authors of the By-Laws of PICCI which prohibit the receipt of compensation other than per diems and, therefore, should have been conversant with the constitutional prohibition on double compensation. The Court upholds the findings of respondent that petitioners' right to compensation as members of the PICCI Board of Directors is limited only to per diem of P1,000.00 for every meeting attended, by virtue of the PICCI By-Laws. In the same vein, we also clarify that there has been no double compensation despite the facts that, apart from the RATA they have been receiving from the BSP, petitioners have been granted the RATA of P1,500.00 for every board meeting they attended, in their capacity as members of the Board of Directors of PICCI, pursuant to MB Resolution No. 1523 dated January 5, 1994, as amended by MB Resolution No. 34 dated January 12, 1994, of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. In this regard, we take into consideration the good faith of petitioners. The ruling in Blaquera, to which the cited case of ADEPT v. COA was consolidated with, is applicable to the present case as petitioners acted in good faith. The disposition in De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, 24 which cited Blaquera, is instructive: Nevertheless, our pronouncement in Blaquera v. Alcala 25 supports petitioners' position on the refund of the benefits they received. In Blaquera, the officials and employees of several government departments and agencies were paid incentive benefits which the COA disallowed on the ground that Administrative Order No. 29 dated 19, January 1993 prohibited payment of these benefits. While the Court sustained the COA on the disallowance, it nevertheless declared that: 22 G.R. No. 119597, companion case of Blaquera v. Alcala, G.R. No. 109406, September 11, 1998, 356 Phil. 678. 23 Rollo, p. 72. 24 451 Phil. 812 (2003). Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we cannot countenance the refund of subject incentive benefits for the year 1992, which amounts the petitioners have already received. Indeed, no indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts and circumstances. The officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in the honest belief that the amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such benefits. This ruling in Blaquera applies to the instant case. Petitioners here received the additional allowances and bonuses in good faith under the honest belief that LWUA Board Resolution No. 313 authorized such payment. At the time petitioners received the additional allowances and bonuses, the Court had not yet decided Baybay Water District [v. Commission on Audit] 26 Petitioners had no knowledge that such payment was without legal basis. Thus, being in good faith, petitioners need not refund the allowances and bonuses they received but disallowed by the COA.27 In subsequent cases, 28 the Court took into account the good faith of the recipients of the allowances, bonuses, and other benefits disallowed by respondent and ruled that they need not refund the same. As petitioners believed in good faith that they are entitled to the RATA of P1,500.00 for every board meeting they attended, in their capacity as members of the Board of Directors of PICC, pursuant to MB Resolution No. 1529 dated January 5, 1994, as amended by MB Resolution No. 34 dated January 12, 1994, of the BSP, the Court sees no need for them to refund their RATA respectively, in the total amount of P1,565,000.00, covering the period from 1996-1998. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Decision No. 2002-081, dated April 23, 2002, of the Commission on Audit and its Resolution No. 2003-115, dated July 31, 2003, which denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration thereof and upheld the disallowance of petitioners' Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) in the total amount of P1,565,000.00 under Notice of Disallowance No. 99-001-101 (96-96) dated June 7, 1999, are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Petitioners need not refund the Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) they received pursuant to Monetary Board Resolution No. 1530 dated January 5, 1994, as amended by Monetary Board Resolution No. 34 dated January 12, 1994, of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas granting each of them an additional monthly RATA of P1,500.00 for every meeting attended, in their capacity as members of the Board of Directors of Philippine International Convention Center, Inc. (PICCI), or in the total amount of P1,565.00.00, covering the period from 1996-1998. SO ORDERED. Carpio, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez and Mendoza, JJ., concur. CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. (Sgd.) RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice 25 Supra note 22. 26 425 Phil. 326 (2000). 27 De Jesus v. COA, supra note 24, at 823-824. 28 Molen, Jr. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 150222, March 18, 2005, 453 SCRA 769; Querubin v. Regional Cluster Director, Legal and Adjudication Office, COA Regional Office VI, Pavia, Iloilo City, GR. No. 159299, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 769; De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 156641, February 5, 2004, 422 SCRA 287; Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit, 461 Phil. 737 (2003). 29 Rollo, p. 72 30 Rollo, p. 72 [G.R. No. 188154. October 13, 2010] SECOND DIVISION LOURDES A. CERCADO, Petitioner, vs. UNIPROM, INC., Respondent. SYLLABUS of the Ruling of the Court 1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; TERMINATION OF EMPLOΥΜΕΝΤ; RETIREMENT; DEFINED; RETIREMENT AGE, DISCUSSED.-Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement between the employer and the employee whereby the latter, after reaching a certain age, agrees to sever his or her employment with the former. Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7641, pegs the age for compulsory retirement at 65 years, while the minimum age for optional retirement is set at 60 years. An employer is, however, free to impose a retirement age earlier than the foregoing mandates. This has been upheld in numerous cases as a valid exercise of management prerogative. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPULSORY RETIREMENT AGE BELOW SIXTY YEARS, WHEN SUSTAINED.-In Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. NLRC, the Court upheld the retirement of private respondent pursuant to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) allowing Pantranco to compulsorily retire employees upon completing 25 years of service to the company. Interpreting Article 287, the Court ruled that the Labor Code permits employers and employees to fix the applicable retirement age lower than 60 years of age. The Court also held that there was no illegal dismissal involved, since it was the CBA itself that incorporated the agreement between the employer and the bargaining agent with respect to the terms and conditions of employment. Hence, when the private respondent ratified the CBA, he concurrently agreed to conform to and abide by its provisions. Thus, the Court stressed, "[p]roviding in a CBA for compulsory retirement of employees after twenty-five (25) years of service is legal and enforceable so long as the parties agree to be governed by such CBA." Similarly, in Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) v. Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (APAP), the retirement plan contained in the СВА between PAL and APAP was declared valid. The Court explained that by their acceptance of the CBA, APAP and its members are obliged to abide by the commitments and limitations they had agreed to cede to management. The foregoing pronouncements served as guiding principles in the recent Cainta Catholic School v. Cainta Catholic School Employees Union (CCSEU), wherein the compulsory retirement of two teachers was upheld as valid and consistent with the CBA provision allowing an employee to be retired by the school even before reaching the age of 60, provided that he/she had rendered 20 years of service. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RETIREMENT PLAN; A RETIREMENT PLAN GIVING THE EMPLOYER THE OPTION TO RETIRE ITS EMPLOYEES BELOW THE AGES PROVIDED BY LAW MUST BE ASSENTED TO AND ACCEPTED BY THE LATTER; CLARIFIED.-In Progressive Development Corporation v. NLRC, although the retirement plan was not embodied in a CBA, its provisions were made known to the employees' union. The validity of the retirement plan was sustained on the basis of the finding of the Director of the Bureau of Working Conditions of the Department of Labor and Employment that it was expressly made known to the employees and accepted by them. It is axiomatic that a retirement plan giving the employer the option to retire its employees below the ages provided by law must be assented to and accepted by the latter, otherwise, its adhesive imposition will amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. In the above-discussed cases, the retirement plans in issue were the result of negotiations and eventual agreement between the employer and the employees. The plan was either embodied in a CBA, or established after consultations and negotiations with the employees' bargaining representative. The consent of the employees to be retired even before the statutory retirement age of 65 years was thus clear and unequivocal. Implied knowledge, regardless of duration, cannot equate to the voluntary acceptance required by law in granting an early retirement age option to an employer. The law demands more than a passive acquiescence on the part of employees, considering that an employer's early retirement age option involves a concession of the former's constitutional right to security of tenure. * * Acceptance by the employees of an early retirement age option must be explicit, voluntary, free, and uncompelled. While an employer may unilaterally retire an employee earlier than the legally permissible * *** |