Section 225. [Sec. 325 U. S. Code.] Investigation of motor vehicle sizes and weights and qualifications and hours of service of employees. The commission is hereby authorized to investigate and report on the need for Federal regulation of the size and weight of motor vehicles and combinations of motor vehicles and of the qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees of all motor carriers and private carriers of property by motor vehicle; and in such investigation the commission shall avail itself of the assistance of all departments or bureaus of the Government and of any organization of motor carriers having special knowledge of any such matter. (Part II, sec. 225, Aug. 9, 1935, c. 498, sec. 1, 49 Stat. 566.)

Notes of Decisions

1. Construction and interpretation.Preliminary, n. 60, State regulation, size and weight, decisions rendered prior to enactment of Motor Carrier Act.

Protection of the highways insofar as they may be used for interstate commerce does not require uniformity of action. The commission has jurisdicUnlike the railroads, local highways tion over the commercial considerations are built, owned, maintained, by the appertaining to the interstate truck State or its municipal subdivisions. business, but preservation and safety of The State has a primary and immediate the roads themselves has been left with concern in their safe and economical the State commissions. If Congress ocadministration. The State's present cupies only limited field, then State regregulations, or any others of like pur-ulation is not prohibited.—Thompson v. pose, if they are to accomplish their McDonald, 95 Fed. (2d) 937 (943)*. end, must be applied alike to interstate and intrastate traffic, both moving in large volume over the highways.-South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U. S. 177 (187)*.

The State may not, under the guise of regulations, discriminate against interstate commerce. But in the absence of national legislation especially covering the subject of interstate commerce, the State may rightly prescribe uniform regulations adapted to promote safety upon its highways and the conservation of their use, applicable alike to vehicles moving in interstate commerce and those of its own citizens. Id., p. 189.

This section imposes no duty and confers no authority on the commission to regulate the sizes and weights of motor vehicles. Its authority is limited to investigation and report of the need of such regulation.-Maurer and Myers v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598*; [provisions written by Coordinator; discussed].

State statute limiting weight of load on trucks is a valid exercise of police power, though the question of interstate commerce is involved, no specific act having been enacted by Congress that directly enters the field.-Houston & North Texas Motor Freight Lines V. Phares, 19 Fed. Supp. 420.

As rules prescribed by the commission relating to qualifications of drivers, parts and accessories necessary for safe operation, etc., do not become effective until July 1, 1937, State provisions relating to the same subjects are operative certainly until that date. Werner Transp. Co. v. Hughes, 19 Fed. Supp. 425 (433).

That the commission is expressly given power to investigate and report on the need for Federal regulation of the size and weight of motor vehicles negatives the idea that the power to regulate the size and weight of motor vehicles was embraced in the more gen

eral language of sec. 204 (a) (1).-Id., | purpose of sec. 225 to reserve to the p. 432. State.-Maurer and Myers v. 309 U. S. 598*.

Hamilton,

Provisions of State statute requiring report of highway accidents are not The United States Supreme Court has superseded by the Federal Motor Carrier upheld weight limitations lower than Act, nor by rules prescribed by the com- those presently imposed, applied alike mission pursuant to the authority con- to motor traffic moving interstate and ferred by sec. 204 (a) (1).—Id., p. 433. intrastate. Adoption of one weight or For history of legislation, Coordina- width regulation rather than another is tor's statement, regarding size and a legislative, not a judicial choice.weight of vehicles, see-Barnwell South Carolina Highway Dept. v. BarnBros., Inc., v. South Carolina State well Bros., Inc., 303 U. S. 177 (189, Highway Dept., 17 Fed. Supp. 803 (807-191) *. 808)*.

Statements of members of Congress in committee or in debate, while pertinent in construing a statute, are individual opinions of legislators.-L. & L. Freight Lines, Inc., v. Railroad Comm. of Florida, 17 Fed. Supp. 13 (15).

Before the court will hold the regulatory powers of the States are suspended and superseded so as to deprive the States of authority to prescribe size and weights of vehicles using State highways in interstate commerce there must be clear and unmistakable evidence of

25. Weight of vehicles.-Preliminary, an intent on the part of Congress to ocn. 60, State regulation, weight. cupy and preempt that field of regula

Not included in provisions of sec. 204 tion to the exclusion of the States. In(a) (1), n. 1 thereof.

junction denied.-L. & L. Freight Lines, Inc., v. Railroad Comm. of Florida, 17 Fed. Supp. 13 (15).

State statute setting limits to height of loaded car, precluding its projection beyond the cab of the carrier car, re- Weight of trucks when loaded are substricting weight distribution of the ject to State limitation.-O'Neill v. Lang loaded car, prohibiting placing the Transp. Corp., 19 Fed. Supp. 477 (480). weight of the carried car above the Weighing the vehicle, change in empty driver, is an exercise of the State's pow-vehicle weight, obtaining tare weights, er to protect safe and convenient use of see-Practices of Motor Common Carits highways through control of size riers of Household Goods, 17 M. C. C. and weight of vehicles, which it was the 467 (487-8).

1

Section 226. [Sec. 326 U. S. Code.] Separability clause.-If any provision of this 1 chapter, or the application thereof to any person, or commerce, or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the 1 chapter, and the application of such provision to other persons, or commerce, or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby. (Part II, sec. 226, Aug. 9, 1935, c. 498, sec. 1, 49 Stat. 567.)

1

Section 227. [Sec. 327 U. S. Code.] Effective date of chapter.— This chapter (except this section, which shall become effective immediately upon approval) shall take effect and be in force on and after the 1st day of October 1935: Provided, however, That the commission shall, if found by it necessary or desirable in the public interest, by general or special order, postpone the taking effect of any provision of this chapter to such time after the 1st day of October 1935, as the commission shall prescribe, but not beyond the 1st day of April 1936. (Part II, sec. 227, Aug. 9, 1935, c. 498, sec. 1, 49 Stat. 567.)

1 "part" changed to "chapter" by U. S. Code, Sup. I to 1934 edition.

2 "and part," at this point deleted by Code.

LEGISLATION SUPPLEMENTARY TO INTERSTATE

COMMERCE ACT

Chapter 2

ELKINS ACT

Section 41. Liability of corporation carriers and agents; offenses and penalties.-(1) Liability of corporation common carriers; offenses; penalties; jurisdiction.—[No change made in the paragraph as set out in vol. 4, p. 2749.]

For historical note, see vol. 4, p. 2749, and for earlier notes of decisions, p. 2751, 5891.

Notes of Decisions

(See vol. 4, p. 2750, for outline of note headings)

11. Construction of language employed.-Under sec. 10 of the Interstate Commerce Act gist of the offense is fraud of obtaining transportation at less than established rate, by false billing or other devices. The particular devices by means of which the rebate is obtained and which constitute a fraud, are specifiled. Under sec. 41 of the Elkins Act gist of the offense is not the device, but solicitation or receipt of concession, and fraud is not a necessary element.United States v. Altman, 8 Fed. Supp. 880 (882).

Under Elkins Act the proceeding does not pertain to shipment alone, as, whether movement had been completed, for the transaction is not completed until lawful freight rate has been paid and received, and the law applies to any interference with or manipulation of the cost or manner of transportation. United States v. Miller, 18 Fed. Supp. 389 (392).

12. Purpose.-Purpose of the Elkins Act is to eliminate every form of inequality in use of interstate commerce as an instrument of business, and it is therefore made unlawful for anyone to

receive any concession in respect of transportation of any property in interstate commerce by a common carrier whereby an inequality results.-Boone v. United States, 109 Fed. (2d) 560 (562).

Purpose of the Elkins Act was to cut up by the roots every form of discrimination, favoritism and inequality, and to prohibit all rebates, concessions, or discrimination with respect to rail transport service.-United States v. Altman, 8 Fed. Supp. 880 (882).

Section 41, as amended, is supplementary to the Interstate Commerce Act, and may well be regarded as giving teeth to the Interstate Commerce Act.Southwestern Lbr. Co. of New Jersey v. Kerr, 11 Fed. Supp. 253 (footnote 267)*.

Interference with the even flow of interstate commerce on the part of any one, whether person or corporation, is the essence of the offense, aside from gain or loss occasioned thereby.-United States v. Miller, 18 Fed. Supp. 389 (390).

The purpose of the statute is to protect the carrier, as well as the shipper.--Id., p. 391.

8257

34. "Any" person includes others established rates and tariffs represents than carrier or shipper.-Indictment a tacit agreement which results in unwill lie against consignee's bookkeeper, due preference of forwarder c. 1. traflivestock merchant, and weighing bu- fic, undue prejudice against other c. 1. reau's inspector, for receiving rebate merchandise traffic, violates the Elkins through use of false weight, whereby Act.-Freight Forwarding Investigacarrier is deprived of its just freight tion, 229 I. C. C. 201 (262)*: intended rate.-United States v. Miller, 18 Fed. to apply only where forwarder traffic is Supp. 389. accorded expedited service not accorded other traffic in like circumstances.Id., 232 I. C. C. 175 (178)*.

Rebates, Concessions, and Discrimina- of the railways.-Powell V. United