Social Organization and Mechanism Design: Proceedings of the Second Francqui Colloquium, 10-11 June 1996, BrusselsDe Boeck Supérieur, 1999 - 344 páginas By presenting a collection of contributions by leading experts, this book illustrates the variety of issues that the discipline of "mechanism design", as a branch of game theory, is capable of dealing with : voting rules, trial procedures, public good production, cost-sharing, monopolistic regulation, bequest function, etc. However, the book illustrates also the fundamental unity of the basic questions : information gathering, communication, individual as well as coalitional strategic and dynamic behavior. |
Contenido
CHAPTER | 6 |
CHAPTER | 11 |
CHAPTER | 13 |
Selffulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games | 53 |
CHAPTER 4 | 73 |
CHAPTER 5 | 93 |
Social Learning in Recurring Games | 107 |
CHAPTER 7 | 139 |
CHAPTER 9 | 185 |
CHAPTER 10 | 209 |
Interim Efficiency in a Public Goods Problem | 239 |
Simple Public Good Mechanisms | 252 |
Conclusions | 259 |
A Model of Efficient Discovery | 279 |
CHAPTER 14 | 311 |
| 335 | |
Términos y frases comunes
adverse selection agent assume assumption Barberà Baron-Myerson Bayesian equilibrium Bayesian game coalition-proof correlated equilibrium condition consider constraint convergence convex correlated equilibrium correlated strategy cost sharing Crémer d'Aspremont defined definition denote deviations distribution dominated strategies Econometrica efficient equili example exists feasible finite firm Gérard-Varet given implies incentive compatibility induced inequalities interim efficient Journal of Economic Lagrange multipliers learning Lemma linear maximal median voter scheme Milgrom mixed action profile moral hazard Nash equilibrium optimal contract outcome functions payoff play players probability problem production proof proposition rational expectations recurring game repeated game risk aversion satisfying self-fulfilling mechanisms sequence Shapley Shapley value social choice functions solution stage game stochastic subset Theorem tion transfer scheme trembling hand perfect undominated unique users utility profile vector