which it has been violated.-To P. N. NICHOLAS. iv, 327. FORD ED., Vii, 439. (Pa., April❘ 1800.)

1656.

How the good [in the new Constitution] should be secured and the ill brought to right was the difficulty. To refer it back to a new Convention might endanger the loss of the whole. My first idea was that the nine States, first acting, should accept it unconditionally, and thus secure what in it was good and that the four last should accept on the previous condition, that certain amendments should be agreed to; but a better course was devised of accepting the whole and trusting that the good sense and honest intentions of our citizens would make the alterations which | should be deemed necessary. Accordingly, all accepted, six without objection and seven with recommendations of specified amendments. AUTOBIOGRAPHY. i, 79. FORD ED., i, 109. (1821.) 1657. Let us go on perfecting the Constitution by adding. by way of amendment, those forms which time and trial show are still wanting-To WILSON C. NICHOLAS. iv, 506. FORD ED., viii, 248. (M., 1803.)

1659.

1658. The States are now so numerous that I despair of ever seeing another amendment to the Constitution, although the innovations of time will certainly call, and now already call, for some.-To GEORGE HAY. FORD ED., X, 265. (M., 1823.) Those who formerly usurped the name of federalists, which in fact, they never were, have now openly abandoned it, and are as openly marching by the road of construction, in a direct line to that consolidation which was always their real object. They, almost to a man, are in possession of one branch of the government, and appear to be very strong in yours. The three great questions of amendment now before you, will give the measure of their strength. I mean, 1st, the limitation of the term of the Presidential service; 2nd, the placing the choice of President effectually in the hands of the people; 3rd, the giving to Congress the power of internal improvement, on condition that each State's federal proportion of the moneys so expended shall be employed within the State. The friends of consolidation would rather take these powers by construction than accept them by direct investiture of the States. Yet, as to internal improvement particularly, there is probably not a State in the Union which would not grant the power on the condition proposed, or which would grant it

* *

without that. * If I can see these three great amendments prevail, I shall consider it as a renewed extension of the term of our lease, shall live in more confidence and die in more hope.-TO ROBERT J. GARNETT. vii, 336. FORD ED., x, 294. (M., Feb. 1824.)

1660. The real friends of the Constitution in its federal form. if they wish it to be immortal, should be attentive, by amendments, to make it keep pace with the advance of the age in science and experience. Instead of this, the European governments |

have resisted reformation, until the people, seeing no other resource, undertake it themselves by force, their only weapon, and work it out through blood, desolation and long-continued anarchy. Here it will be by large fragments breaking off, and refusing reunion, but on condition of amendment, or perhaps permanently.-To ROBERT J. GARNETT. vii, 336. FORD ED., x, 295. (M., 1824.) 1661. I have read with pleasure and satisfaction the very able and eloquent speech you have been so kind as to send me on the amendment of the Constitution, proposed by Mr. McDuffie, and concur with much of its contents.-To EDWARD EVERETT, vii, 437. FORD ED., x, 385. (M., April 1826.) 1662. CONSTITUTION (The Federal), Approval of.-I like much the general idea of framing a government which should go on of itself, peaceably, without needing continual recurrence to the State Legislatures. I like the organization of the government into Legislative, Judiciary and Executive. I like the power given the Legislature to levy taxes, and for that reason solely, I approve of the greater House being chosen by the people directly. For though I think a House chosen by them will be very illy qualified to legislate for the Union, for foreign nations, &c., yet this evil does not weigh against the good of preserving inviolate the fundamental principle that the people are not to be taxed but by representatives chosen immediately by themselves. I am captivated by the compromise of the opposite claims of the great and little States, of the latter to equal, and the former to proportional influence. I am much pleased. too, with the substitution of the method of voting by persons instead of that of voting by States: and I like the negative given to the Executive, conjointly with a third of either House; although I should have liked it better, had the Judiciary been associated for that purpose, or invested separately with a similar power. There are other good things of less moment.-To JAMES MADISON. ii, 328. FORD ED., iv, 475. (P., Dec. 20, 1787.)

1664.

I approved, from the first moment, of the great mass of what is in the new Constitution; the consolidation of the government; the organization into Executive. the Legislative; the happy compromise of inLegislative, and Judiciary; the subdivision of terests between the great and little States, by the different manner of voting in the different Houses; the voting by persons instead of to the Executive, which, however, I should States; the qualified negative on laws given have liked better if associated with the Judiciary also as in New York; and the power of taxation. I thought at first that the latter might have been limited. A little reflection soon convinced me it ought not to be.-To F. HOPKINSON. ii, 586. FORD ED., V, 76. (P., March 1789.)

CONSTITUTION (The Federal), Bill of Rights and.-See BILL OF RIGHTS.

1665. CONSTITUTION (The Federal), Compromises of.-The Constitution was a matter of compromise; a capitulation between conflicting interests and opinions.-To SAMUEL KERCHIVAL. vii, 37. FORD ED., X, 46. (M., 1816.)

CONSTITUTION (The Federal), Consolidation and.-See CENTRALIZATION.

1666. CONSTITUTION (The Federal), Construction of.-I told the President

[Washington] * * * that they [the Hamilton members of the Legislature] had chained it [the Treasury system] about our necks for a great length of time, and, in order to keep the game in their hands had, from time to time, aided in making such legislative constructions of the Constitution, as made it a

very different thing from what the people thought they had submitted to.-THE ANAS. ix, 104. FORD ED., i, 177. (Feb. 1792.)

1667, Our peculiar security is in the possession of a written Constitution. Let us not make it a blank paper by construction. I say the same as to the opinion of those who consider the grant of the treaty-making power as boundless. If it is, then we have no Constitution. If it has bounds, they can be no others than the definitions of the powers which that instrument gives. It specifies and delineates the operations permitted to the Federal Government, and gives all the powers necessary to carry these into execution. Whatever of these enumerated objects is proper for a law, Congress may make the law; whatever is proper to be executed by way of a treaty, the President and Senate may enter into the treaty; whatever is to be done by a judicial sentence, the Judges may pass the sentence. Nothing is more likely than that their enumeration of powers is defective. This is the ordinary case of all human works. Let us then go on perfecting it, by adding, by way of amendment to the Constitution those powers which time and trial show are still wanting.TO WILSON C. NICHOLAS. iv, 505. FORD ED., viii, 247. (M., Sep. 1803.)

1668. When an instrument admits two constructions, the one safe the other dangerous: the one precise, the other indefinite, I prefer that which is safe and precise. I had rather ask an enlargement of power from the nation, where it is found necessary, than to assume it by a construction which would make our powers boundless.-To WILSON C. NICHOLAS. iv, 506. FORD ED., viii, 247. (M., 1803.)

1669.

Strained constructions

* * * loosen all the bands of the Consti

the judiciary is the last resort in relation to the other departments of the government, but the compact under which the judiciary is denot in relation to the rights of the parties to deed is our Constitution a complete felo de se. rived." If this opinion be sound, then inFor intending to establish three departments, co-ordinate and independent, that they might check and balance one another, it has given, according to this opinion, to one of them alone, the right to prescribe rules for the government of the others, and to that one, too, which is unelected by and independent of the nation. For experience has already shown that the impeachment it has provided is not even a scare-crow; that such opinions as you observe also, by detachment, not belongthe one you combat, sent cautiously out, as ing to the case often, but sought for out of it, as if to rally the public opinion beforehand to their views, and to indicate the line they are to walk in, have been so quietly passed over as never to have excited animadversion, even in a speech of any one of the body entrusted with impeachment. The Constitution, on this hypothesis, is a mere thing of wax in the hands of the judiciary, which they may twist and shape into any form they please. * * * My construction of the Constitution is very different from that you quote. It is that each department is truly independent of the others. and has an equal right to decide for itself what is the meaning of the Constitution in the cases submitted to its action; and especially, where it is to act ultimately and without appeal.-TO SPENCER ROANE. vii, 134. FORD ED., X, 140. (P.F., 1819.)

*

1672. My construction of the Constitution is * * that each department is truly independent of the others, and is the meaning of the Constitution in the cases has an equal right to decide for itself what submitted to its action; and especially, where it is to act ultimately and without appeal. I will explain myself by examples, which, having occurred while I was in office, are better known to me, and the principles which governed them. A Legislature had passed the Sedition law. The Federal courts had subjected certain individuals to its penalties of fine and imprisonment. On coming into office, I released these individuals by the power of pardon committed to executive discretion. which could never be more properly exercised than where citizens were suffering without the

(1817.)

1670. In denying the right they [the Supreme Court] usurp of exclusively explaining the Constitution, I go further than you do, if I understand rightly your quotation from the Federalist, of an opinion that

under a law unauthorized by the Constitution, and therefore null. In the case of Marbury vs. Madison, the Federal judges declared that commissions, signed and sealed by the President, were valid, although not delivered. I deemed delivery essential to complete a deed, which, as long as it remains in the hands of

the party, is as yet no deed, it is in posse only, but not in esse, and I withheld delivery of the commissions. They cannot issue a mandamus to the President or Legislature, or to any of their officers. When the British treaty of arrived, without any provision against the impressment of our seamen, I determined not to ratify it. The Senate thought I should ask their advice. I thought that would be a mockery of them, when I was predetermined against following it, should they advise its ratification. The Constitution had made their advice necessary to confirm a treaty, but not to reject it. This has been blamed by some; but I have never doubted its soundness. In the cases of two persons, antenati, under exactly similar circumstances, the Federal court had determined that one of them (Duane) was not a citizen; the House of Representatives nevertheless determined that the other (Smith, of South Carolina) was a citizen, and admitted him to his seat in their body. Duane was a republican, and Smith a federalist, and these decisions were made during the federal ascendency. These are examples of my position, that each of the three departments has equally the right to decide for itself what is its duty under the Constitution, without any regard to what the others may have decided for themselves under a similar question.-To SPENCER ROANE. vii, 135. FORD ED., X, 141. (P.F., 1819.)

1673. The judges are practicing on the Constitution by inferences, analogies, and sophisms, as they would on an ordinary law. They do not seem aware that it is not even a constitution, formed by a single authority, and subject to a single superintendence and control; but that it is a compact of many independent powers, every single one of which claims an equal right to understand it, and to require its observance. However strong the cord of compact may be, there is a point of tension at which it will break. A few such doctrinal decisions, as barefaced as that of the Cohens, happening to bear immediately on two or three of the large States, may induce them to join in arresting the march of government, and in arousing the co-States to pay some attention to what is passing, to bring back the compact to its original principles, or to modify it legitimately by the express consent of the parties themselves, and not by the usurpation of their created agents. They imagine they can lead us into a consolidate government, while their road leads directly to its dissolution.-TO EDWARD LIVINGSTON. vii, 403. (M., 1825.) See 1684.

The House of Federal representatives will not be adequate to the management of affairs, either foreign or federal. Their President seems a bad edition of a Polish king. He may be elected from four years to four years for life. Reason and experience prove to us that a chief magistrate, so continuable, is an officer for life. When one or two generations shall have proved that this is an office for life, it becomes on every occasion worthy of intrigue, of bribery, of force, and even of foreign interference. It will be of great consequence to France and England to have America governed by a Galloman, or an Angloman. Once in office, and possessing the military force of the Union, without the aid or check of a council, he would not be easily dethroned even if the people could be induced to withdraw their votes from him. I wish that at the end of four years they had made him forever ineligible a second time. Indeed, I think all the good of this new Constitution might have been couched in three or four new articles, to be added to the good, old and venerable fabric, which should have been preserved even as a religious relique.-To JOHN ADAMS. ii, 316. (P., Nov. 13, 1787.)

1675.

There are very good articles in it, and very bad. I do not know which preponderate.-To W. S. SMITH. ii, 318. FORD ED., iv, 466. (P., Nov. 1787.)

1676. I dislike, and greatly dislike, the abandonment in every instance, of the necessity of rotation in office, and most particularly in the case of the President. Experience concurs with reason in concluding that the first magistrate will always be reelected, if the Constitution permits it. He is then an officer for life. This once observed, it becomes of so much consequence to certain nations to have a friend or a foe at the head of our affairs, that they will interfere with money and with arms. A Galloman, or an Angloman will be supported by the nation he befriends. If once elected, and at a second or third election outvoted by one or two votes. he will pretend false votes, foul play, hold possession of the reins of government, be supported by the States voting for him, especially if they are the central ones, lying in a compact body themselves, and separating their opponents; and they will be aided by one nation of Europe, while the majority are aided by another. The election of a President of America, some years hence will be much more interesting to certain nations of Europe than ever the election of a King of Poland was. Reflect on all the instances in history, ancient and modern, of elective monarchies, and say if they do not give foundation for my fears. The Roman Emperors, the Popes, while they were of any importance; the German Emperors, till they became hereditary in practice; the Kings of Poland; the Deys of the Ottoman Dependencies. It may be said that if elections are to be attended with these disorders, the seldomer they are renewed the better. But experience shows that the only way to prevent disorder is to

render them uninteresting by frequent changes. An incapacity to be elected a second time would have been the only effectual preventive. The power of removing him every fourth year by the vote of the people, is a power which will not be exercised. The King of Poland is removable every day by the Diet, yet he is never removed. Smaller | objections are, the appeal in fact as well as law, and the binding all persons, legislative, executive, and judiciary by oath to maintain that Constitution. I do not pretend to decide what would be the best method of procuring the establishment of the manifold good things in this Constitution, and of getting rid of the bad. Whether by adopting it, in hopes of future amendment; or after it has been duly weighed and canvassed by the people, after seeing the parts they generally dislike, and those they generally approve, to say to them: "We see now what you wish. Send together your deputies again, let them frame a constitution for you, omitting what you have condemned, and establishing the powers you approve. Even these will be a great addition to the energy of your government." At all events, I hope you will not be discouraged from other trials, if the present one should fail of its full effect. I have thus told you freely what I like and dislike; merely as a matter of curiosity, for I know your own judgment has been formed on all these points after having heard everything which could be urged on them. After all, it is my principle that the will of the majority should always prevail. If they approve the proposed convention in all its parts, I shall concur in it cheerfully, in hopes that they will amend it whenever they shall find it works wrong. To JAMES MADISON. ii, 330. FORD ED., iv, 477. (P., December 20, 1787.) 1677. As to the new Constitution, I find myself nearly a neutral. There is a great mass of good in it, in a very de

* * *

sirable form; but there is also to me a bitter pill or two.-To E. CARRINGTON. ii, 334. FORD ED., iv, 481. (P., Dec. 1787.)

1678.

I was much pleased with many and essential parts of this instrument from the beginning. But I thought I saw in it many faults, great and small. What I have read and reflected has brought me over from several of my objections of the first moment, and to acquiesce under some others. Two only remain of essential consideration, to wit, the want of a bill of rights, and the expunging the principle of necessary rotation in the offices of President and Senator.-To WILLIAM CARMICHAEL. ii, 398. FORD ED., v, 25. (P., May 1788.)

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terminable by the laws of the land. I disapproved, also, the perpetual re-eligibility of the President. To these points of disapprobation I adhere. My first wish was that the nine first conventions might accept the Constitution, as the means of securing to us the great mass of good it contained; and that the four last might reject it, as the means of obtaining amendments. But I was corrected in this wish the moment I saw the much better plan of Massachusetts, and which had never occurred to me. With respect to the declaration of rights, I suppose the majority of the United States are of my opinion; for, I apprehend, all the anti-federalists, and a very respectable proportion of the federalists, think that such a declaration should now be annexed. The enlightened part of Europe have given us the greatest credit for inventing this instrument of security for the rights of the people, and have not been a little surprised to see us so soon give it up. With respect to the re-eligibility of the President, I find myself differing from the majority of my countrymen; for I think there are but three States out of the eleven which have desired an alteration of this. And, indeed. since the thing is established, I would wish it not to be altered during the life of our great leader, whose executive talents are superior to those I believe, of any man in the world, and who, alone, by the authority of his name, and the confidence reposed in his perfect integrity, is fully qualified to put the new government so under way, as to secure it against the efforts of opposition. But, having derived from our error all the good there was in it, I hope we shall correct it, the moment we can no longer have the same name at the helm. These, my opinions, I wrote within a few hours after I had read the Constitution, to one or two friends in America.-To F. HOPKINSON. ii.

1680.

* * *

586. FORD ED., V, 76. (P., March 1789.) I received a copy [of the new Federal Constitution] early in November [1787] and read and contemplated its provisions with great satisfaction. As not a member of the Convention, however, nor probably a single citizen of the Union had approved it in all its parts, so I, too, found articles which I thought objectionable. The absence of express declarations ensuring freedom of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of the person under the uninterrupted protection of the habeas corpus, and trial by jury in civil as well as in criminal cases excited my jealousy; and the re-eligibility of the President for life I quite disapproved. I expressed freely in letters to my friends and most particularly to Mr Madison and General Washington my approbations and objections.-AUTOBIOGRAPHY. i, 79. FORD ED., i, 108. (1821.)

CONSTITUTION (The Federal), Federal Convention and.-See CONVENTION.

1681. CONSTITUTION (The Federal), Foundation of.-I consider the foundation of the Constitution as laid on this ground: