is that the Commission interprets $ 21(d) (2) of the FTC Act and Rule 4.10 (g) of our rules to allow release of information submitted in investigations only in adjudicatory proceedings under Part III of our rules and in rulemaking proceedings before an administrative law judge or presiding officer. (Majority Statement at 20) The Commission's past interpretation of those provisions as well as the legislative history of § 21 (d) (2) show that they allow release in consent agreement proceedings as well as adjudicatory opinions. In order to understand the majority's analysis, it is necessary to review our confidentiality rules, which are hardly models of clarity. The majority's statement sets out the basic scheme and I will not repeat it in detail here except to note certain essential points. Section 21 (b) limits release of information submitted pursuant to a subpoena. Most materials at issue here, however, were submitted pursuant to H-S-R procedures. Submissions under H-S-R procedures are treated as submitted voluntarily in lieu of subpoenas and, consequently, are exempt from release under the Freedom of Information Act under S 21 (f). Thus, 21 (f) simply creates an exemption from the FOIA Act; it does not affect our discretionary release of material. Section 6 (f) of the FTC Act bars release of "commercial or financial" information which is "privileged or confidential." Finally, the Commission has adopted Rule 4.10 (d) which limits our discretion to release information which is submitted in a law enforcement investigation even if not under subpoena. The principal question in this case is: What provision bars release of H-S-R material? As I have argued above, the express authorization in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act should make the FTC Act irrelevant. But assuming arguendo that FTC Act provisions apply, all four provisions to which the majority point - don't bind the S 21 (b), S 21 (f), § 6(f), and Rule 4.10 (d) proceedings." The use of the word "administrative" in the rule is a clear indication that the Commission interprets its own statute to permit it to disclose submitted documents in circumstances other than APA adjudications. This interpretation is consistent with the legislative intent of the confidentiality provisions of the FTC Improvements Act. While Section 21(d) (2) authorizes disclosure in "Commission adjudicative proceedings," that phrase was not intended and should not be construed to be limited to adjudications as defined 3 by the Administrative Procedure Act. Even the General Counsel concludes that it is not so limited, arguing that it includes at least "on-the-record" rulemaking proceedings under Section 18 of the FTC Act. But there is no logical reason to include rulemaking and not consent order proceedings within the scope of 4 Section 21 (d) (2). Both are administrative proceedings. A broad construction of Section 21(d) (2) to permit disclosure in consent order proceedings is supported by the legislative history of the Improvements Act. The Senate report on the bill that became the FTC Improvements Act states that S 21 (d) (2) allows the Commission to disclose Section 21 material "in administrative or judicial proceedings." S. Rep. No. 96-500 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1979). also stated: Congressman Preyer, a conferee, 3 It is a familiar principle of statutory construction that the The General Counsel's description of Section 18 rulemaking as Magnuson-Moss); see also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. The Commission may disclose trade secrets and in the following circumstances * * relevant and material information may be disclosed in Commission proceedings, but it may be made subject to appropriate protective orders ⭑ Rec. H3870 (May 20, 1980). 126 Cong. See also 126 Cong. Rec. S5678 (May 21, 1980) (Remarks of Senator Ford). This broader interpretation of Section 21 (d) (2) is the one adopted by the Commission in Section 4.10 (g) of its Rules of Practice. That rule, which was issued in final form after an opportunity for comment, would be accorded deference by a court as a contemporaneous interpretation by the agency of its own organic statute. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). In explaining its rules, the Commission stated that "under amended Rule 4.10 (g) information will not be disclosed in administrative or adjudicatory proceedings without affording the submitter an opportunity to obtain a protective or in camera order." 46 Fed. Reg. 26287 (May 12, 1981). Thus, I conclude that S 21(d) (2) and Rule 4.10 (g) both allow the Commission substantial discretion in releasing materials obtained in the course of a Commission investigation when the Commission is explaining to the public why it accepted a consent agreement. Even though the FTC Act, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, and the Commission's rules give us wider discretion than the majority argues, I do not believe the Commission should release all information no matter how sensitive or how unrelated to the relevant issues in a particular proceeding. The Commission, 5 in past cases, particularly the Hood and General Foods decisions, has adopted a standard which should be applied. past decisions represent the Commission's recognition that there is some equitable standard which should limit release of information even if not specified in a statute. 6 These II. Refusal to Extend the Comment Period The majority also rejects Chrysler's request for an extension of the 60-day comment period. I disagree for the reasons stated below. The issue in extending a comment period is whether the public interest in receiving further comment outweighs the parties' understandable desire for the Commission to make its 5 H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 58 F.T.C. 1184, 1188 (1961). Requests for in camera treatment must show "that the public disclosure will result in a clearly defined, serious injury to the person or corporation whose records are involved." 6 General Foods Corp., 95 F.T.C. 352, 355 (1980). The showing |