The German word "Ansatz," meaning "Compound," has been refused registration as a trademark for bitters, 20 as have been the words "Chili Colorow" (meaning red pepper in provincial Spanish), as a trademark for codiments.21 Vice-Chancellor Shadwell held a complainant who marked watches manufactured by him for the Turkish trade with the Turkish word "Pessendede" (meaning warranted) in Turkish characters, entitled to the exclusive right to so mark his watches. This was, however, not necessary to the decision of the case, and was a mere dictum.22 The case of Broadhurst v. Barlow was that of plaintiffs who used, beside a symbol of a lion in a scroll, the words "Exactly 12 Yards," in Turkish, Armenian and Greek, upon the rolls of cloth made by them for exportation to Greece and Turkey. With other relief, the defendant was enjoined from using the words "Exactly 12 Yards" in the languages used by plaintiffs. This relief would seem to be incidental to the portion of the injunction which related to fanciful scrollwork used by both parties.23 The use of the word "Grenadine" as a trademark for a syrup made of pomegranite juice was protected by injunction against a defendant who began the sale of another syrup under the name of "Grenade Syrup," notwithstanding the word "Grenade" in French signifies "Pomegranite." This was purely a case of unfair competition.24 The patent office has refused registration for the words "Fur Familien-Gebrauch" (For 872; 39 C. C. A. 321. Followed in Seb. 432; Curtis v. Bryan, 2 Daly, Selchow v. Chaffee & Selchow Mfg. Co., 132 Fed. Rep. 996. 20-In re Weisman, Newton, Dig. 119. 212; Cox, 434; Siegert v. Abbott (2), Cox, Manual, 718; Societe Anonyme v. Western Distilling Co., 43 Fed. Rep. 416; Fischer v. Blank, Cox, Manual, 731; 138 N. Y. 244. 24-Rillet v. Carlier, 61 Barb. S. C. 435; 11 Abb. Pr. N. S. 186; Seb. 334. The word "Ethiopian" printed in Egyptian characters upon stockings was protected from infringement, but in a case of unfair competition. Hine v. Lart, 10 Jur. 106; 7 L. T. 41. Family Use) and "Lawrence Feiner Familien-Flannel" (Lawrence Fine Family Flannel), but upon the ground that they were mere words in common use and not distinctive.25 And it is now the fixed rule of that office that no descriptive words reproduced in letters from a foreign language will be admitted to registration, when registration would be refused to their English equivalents.26 The Court of Chancery of New Jersey has held that the French "brassiere" (brace) is not susceptible of appropriation as a trademark for a combined corset cover and bust supporter,27 and a similar ruling has been made as to the Italian "Conserva Di Tomate" (preserved tomato).28 So also of "Tipo Chianti" (Chianti Type) for wine.29 § 60. Words become generic through use.-A word originally fanciful and indicative of origin or ownership may through the laches of the owner become publici juris. Thus the word "Chlorodyne," while originally a good trademark, became generic through the failure of the manufacturer to prosecute a suit brought by him to restrain its use,30 and because it had become the name of the article.31 This, of course, is substantially a holding that the trademark has been abandoned by the owner's neglect. The American courts have been averse 25-In re Lawrence & Co., 10 Off. Gaz. 163; Seb. 504. 26-Ex parte Stuhmer, 86 Off. Gaz. 181. In this case the applicant sought registration for the words "Gold Label" produced in Hebrew characters. 27-Charles R. De Bevoise Co. v. H. & W. Co., 60 Atl. Rep. 407; 69 N. J. Eq. 114. 28-Roncoroni v. Gross, 86 N. Y. Supp. 1112. 29-Italian Swiss Colony v. Italian Vineyard Co., 158 Cal. 252; 110 Pac. Rep. 913. 30-Browne v. Freeman (1), 12 W. R. 305; 4 N. R. 476. 31-Browne v. Freeman (2), W. N. 1873, 178; to same effect, see Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Garner, 55 In this case the controlling fact was that the complainant's and defendant's marks were used on different classes of goods. The court, however, expressly names the laches of the complainant as a ground for withholding relief, citing, in support of this proposition, inter alia, the opinion of Chancellor Walworth in Smith v. Adams, 6 Paige, 435-443: and the copyright case of Lewis v. Chapman, 3 Beavan, 133, where a delay of six years was held to disentitle the plaintiff from relief. to so holding. It was said in Taylor v. Carpenter that the court was "not aware that a neglect to prosecute, because one believed he had no rights, or from mere procrastination, is any defense at law, whatever it may be in equity, except under the statute of limitations pleaded and relied on. or under some positive statute, like that as to patents, which avoids the right if the inventor permits the public to use the patent some time before taking out letters." 32 Words primarily indicative of origin or ownership remain valid as trademarks notwithstanding the fact that the articles to which they are applied may obtain such extensive sales that the marks have also become indicative of quality.33 Whether or not a word has become public property, in that it has acquired a generic meaning, descriptive of a general kind, quality, or class of goods is a pure question of fact to be determined from the evidence in each particular case.34 § 61. The use of generic names protected.-Possibly the widest deviation from the narrow path of trademark protection which has been accomplished by the law of unfair competition is to be found in the cases involving the deceptive use of generic terms. The Supreme Court of the United States has held in regard to the name of a person used as a descriptive name of a patented article, during the life of a patent, that while that name becomes publici juris upon the expiration of the patent, it must be so used by manufacturers other than the original maker as not to deceive the public into the belief that the goods offered for sale are the goods of such original maker, 35 The same rule has been established in England.36 So it was held by Mr. Justice McKenna, when circuit judge, that Syrup of Figs" was entitled to injunctive protection. 32-Taylor v. Carpenter, 2 Wood. & M. 1; 9 L. T. 514; Cox, 32. 33-Burton v. Stratton, 12 Fed. Rep. 696-702; Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tennessee Mfg. Co., 138 U. S. 537 547; 34 L. Ed. 997. 34-Williams Mfg. Co. v. Noera, 158 Mass. 110; 32 N. E. Rep. 1037. 35—Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U. S. 169; 41 L. Ed. 118; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Bent, 163 U. S. 205; 41 L. Ed. ́ 131. See also, to the same effect, Fairbanks v. Jacobus, 14 Blatchf. 337; Fed. Case No. 4608; Adee v. Peck Bros. & Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 209; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Brill, Cox, Manual, 672. 36-Singer Mfg. Co. v. Loog, H. L. 8 A. C. 15; 53 L. J. Ch. 481; 48 L. T. 3; 31 W. R. 325; Cartmell, 306. He said: "Respondent urges that the words 'Syrup of Figs' are descriptive, and that complainant deceives when it uses them to designate its compound. The deceit does not appear on the face of the bill, and it is unimportant if they are descriptive. The question is now, not whether complainant has the exclusive right to use the words 'Syrup of Figs' or 'Fig Syrup,' but it is whether respondent has, by use of them and other words, and by the other imitations alleged and exhibited, so far imitated the form of complainant's device and description to represent its goods as its goods, and appropriate its reputation and trade. The gravamen of the action is the simulation of complainant's devices and the deception of purchasers. This is the principle of the best considered cases, uniting them, notwithstanding their diverse facts." 37 In affirming the decision of Judge McKenna, however, the Circuit Court of Appeals held that "Syrup of Figs" was not a generic name.38 The later case of California Fig Syrup Co. v. Worden 39 put the plaintiff's right to relief upon the proper ground of unfair competition, aside from any technical trademark right in the words. 37-California Fig Syrup Co. v. Improved Fig Syrup Co., 51 Fed. Rep. 296-297; citing Burton V. Stratton, 12 Fed. Rep. 696; Baking Powder Co. v. Fyfe, 45 Fed. Rep. 799; Nerve Food Co. v. Baumbach, 32 Fed. Rep. 205; Anonyme, etc., Societe v. Western Dis. Co., 43 Fed. Rep. 417. 38-Improved Fig Syrup Co. v. California Fig Syrup Co., 4 C. C. A. 264; 54 Fed. Rep. 175-178. It is very difficult to understand how the court could conclude that "Syrup of Figs" was not a generic name. It lacks every requisite of a valid trademark, and is undoubtedly either deceptive or merely descriptive of one of the ingredients of the medicine (a liquid laxative). It has been so held in California Fig Syrup Co. v. Stearns, 67 Fed. Rep. 1008; s. c., 73 Fed. Rep. 812-814; California Fig Syrup Co. v. Putnam, 66 Fed. Rep 750. Since the foregoing was written, the United States Supreme Court has held the mark to be deceptive. Clinton E. Worden & Co. v. California Fig Syrup Co., 187 U. S. 516; 47 L. Ed. 282; reversing Clinton E. Worden & Co. v. California Fig Syrup Co., 42 C. C. A. 383; 102 Fed. Rep. 334; the latter affirming the injunction granted in limine in California Fig Syrup Co. v. Clinton E. Worden & Co., 86 Fed. Rep. 212, and on final hearing in California Fig Syrup Co. v. Worden, 95 Fed. Rep. 132. 39 (1) 86 Fed. Rep. 212-215; California Fig Syrup Co. v. Worden (2), 95 Fed. Rep. 132. 151 WHAT CONSTITUTES A VALID TRADEMARK. [§ 61 From the doctrine stated by the Federal Supreme Court 40 it follows that the designs, symbols and marks used by a patentee during the life of the patent upon packages containing. the patented article may not be imitated by another upon the expiration of the patent, and such imitation will be enjoined.+1 The rule of unfair competition, that no man has a right to represent his goods as the goods of another, is distinctly applied in several of the more recent English decisions to terms strictly generic and of which technical trademark rights could not be predicated. Thus where the manufacturers of "Reddaway Camel Hair Belting" sought to enjoin a rival manufacturer from styling his product "The Bentham Camel Hair Belting," Lord Justice Lindley, in the Court of Appeal, said: “The catchwords are 'Camel Hair Belting.' * The use of the catch-words alone may establish the plaintiff's right to relief. The plaintiffs have no right to the exclusive use of these words; but they have a right to restrain any one from so using them as to pass his goods off as the goods of the plaintiffs." 42 So an injunction was granted. Very similar to this was the case in which the plaintiffs manufactured a soap under the name "The Self-Washer." The defendants thereafter applied the term "Selfwashing" to their soaps. It was held that the terms "Selfwasher" or "Self-washing" were used in a descriptive sense. and therefore neither could be appropriated as a valid technical trademark; but because of the paper used by the defendants in wrapping their soap, being an imitation parchment paper, and the type used by them, which closely resembled that used by the plaintiffs the defendants were enjoined, Lord Justice Cotton, in the Court of Appeal, observing: "There may be no monopoly at all in the individual things separated, but if the |