countenance to the resulting dedication. To say otherwise would be to hold that, although the public had acquired the device held by the patent, yet the owner of the patent or the manufacturer of the patented thing had retained the designated name which was essentially necessary to vest the public with the full enjoyment of that which has become theirs by the disappearance of the monopoly. In other words, that the patentee or manufacturer could take the benefit and advantage of the patent upon the condition that at its termination the monopoly should cease, and yet when the end was reached disregard the public dedication and practically perpetuate indefinitely an exclusive right. "The public having the right on the expiration of the patent to make the patented article and to use its generic name, to restrict this use, either by preventing its being placed upon the articles when manufactured, or by using it in advertisements or circulars, would be to admit the right and at the same time destroy it. It follows, then, that the right to use the name in every form passes to the public with the dedication resulting from the expiration of the patent. "Nor is this right governed by different principles where the name, which has become generic, instead of being an arbitrary one, is the surname of the patentee or original manu facturer." 53 54 There appears to be an exception to this general rule where the use of the name antedates the existence of the patent,5 particularly where it further appears that the name and not the patent gave its value to the article.55 In accordance with the general rule, the Patent Office has declined to register a trademark which is the name of a patented article,56 even in association with an arbitrary symbol; 57 McWilliams, 238 Fed. Rep. 159; 151 C. C. A. 235; Searchlight Gas Co. v. Prest-O-Lite Co., 215 Fed. Rep. 692; 131 C. C. A. 626; McIlhenny v. Bulliard, 265 Fed. Rep. 705, 711 (where above text cited with approval). 56-Ex parte Velvril Co., Ltd., 84 Off. Gaz. 807. 57-Ex parte Holophane Glass Co., 100 Off. Gaz. 450; Ex parte Farnum & Co., 18 Off. Gaz. 412. a registration as a trademark of the name under which a copyrighted publication was known and sold, after the expiration of the copyright, is void.58 It is by no means clear what trademarks applied to patented articles, other than mere names or words descriptive of the thing patented, will become publici juris upon the expiration of the patent. Thus the Supreme Court of Massachusetts has held that where a special word, device or symbol is added to the general descriptive name of the article of the patent, it is possible that the trademark right may exist in the combination of the word and the device or symbol, notwithstanding the expiration of the patent.59 In this connection, Lindley, L. J., says: "I do not mean to say that a manufacturer of a patented article can not have a trademark not descriptive of the patented article, so as to be entitled to the exclusive use of that mark after the patent has expired, for instance, if he impressed upon the patented articles a griffin or some other device; but, if his only trademark is a word or set of words descriptive of the patented article of which he is the only maker, it appears to me to be impossible for him ever to make out, as a matter of fact, that this mark denotes him as the maker, as distinguished from other makers." 60 In every case of the kind under consideration, however, others will be enjoined from using the mark in such a way as to deceive the public into the false belief that they are getting the goods of the original owner of the mark.61 Thus in the leading case, the court found that the Singer Sewing Machine sold by the defendant after the expiration of the Singer patent, embodied features not a part of the patented article, and which had been used by the complainant 58-Merriam Co. V. Syndicate Pub. Co., 237 U. S. 618, 622; 59 L. Ed. 1142 59-Lover Stamping Co. v. Fellows, 163 Mass. 191; 47 Am. St. Rep. 448. "If the words are generic and have become a name by which the public know the acetylene gas tank irrespective of its manufacture, then, of course, the plaintiff has no trademark and must look to its patent for protection. On the other hand, if the words are not generic, but indicate the product of the plaintiff, then the words may constitute a tradename, protected : such, even though the patent rights have expired. Batcheller v. Thomson, 93 Fed. 660; 35 C. C. A. 532; President Suspender Co. v. Macwilliam (C. C. A.), 238 Fed. 159; 151 C. C. A. 235." Crane, J., in PrestO-Lite Co. v. Ray, 220 N. Y. 522; 116 N. E. Rep. 350; reversing 162 App. Div. 62; 147 N. Y. Supp. 138. 60-In re Palmer's Trademark, L. R. 24 Ch. D. 504-521. 61-Singer Mfg. Co. v. Charlebois, 16 Rap. Jud. Q. C. S. 167; Centaur Co. v. Link, 62 N. J. Eq. 147; 49 Atl. Rep. 828; O'Sullivan to indicate itself as the manufacturer of the machine; and Mr. Justice White in reversing and remanding the case directed a decree of injunction in favor of the complainant, "perpetually enjoining the defendant, its agents, servants, and representatives, first, from using the word 'Singer' or any equivalent thereto, in advertisements in relation to sewing machines, without clearly and unmistakably stating in all said advertisements that the machines are made by the defendant, as distinguished from the sewing machines made by the Singer Manufacturing Company, second, also perpetually enjoining the defendant from marking upon sewing machines or upon any plate or device connected therewith or attached thereto the word 'Singer,' or words or letters equivalent thereto, without clearly and unmistakably specifying in connection therewith that such machines are the product of the defendant or other manufacturer, and therefore not the product of the Singer Manufacturing Company." 62 It is manifest, however, that to create this right in the public, two conditions of facts are prerequisite; first, there must have been a patent, second, the patent must have expired. Where the owner of the trademark had made an unsuccessful application for a patent upon the article to which the trademark was applied, Bradley, J., held that he had a valid subsisting right to the trademark upon the rejection of his application, and said: "His failure to establish his patent (which would have covered all his rights) ought not to preclude him from falling back on his right to the trademark." 63 In a case where the patent had not expired, Judge Vann, speaking for the Court of Appeals of New York, said: "Assuming that upon the expiration of the patent any one may use the name, until that time arrives, why should the inventor be deprived of a right which, without question, would be his if he had not taken out a patent for his invention." 64 Where a name indicating a patented article exists, an exclusive licensee for the sale of the patented articles under a license to which the defendant is not a party can not enjoin him from conducting an unfair competition by means of the name; the licensor not being a party to the action, and no Rubber Co. v. Genuine Rubber Co., 64-Waterman v. Shipman, 130 N. Y. 301, reversing s. c. 8 N. Y. Supp. 814. To the same effect see George Frost Co. v. E. B. Estes & Sons, 156 Fed. Rep. 677. infringement of the patent being charged, and the defendant having the right to deal in the articles known by the name.65 If the patent is reissued the trademark will be valid during the life of the reissued patent. "Now Manufactured by."-Where plaintiff's patent had expired and defendant issued a circular reading "Marshall Springs now manufactured by D'Arcy Spring Co.," which was shown to have produced the impression upon some of plaintiff's customers that plaintiff had gone out of business, the use of that circular was enjoined." 66a Names of copyrighted books.-The protection of such names, before or after the expiration of the copyright, is purely a matter of the application of the rules of unfair competition.67 The right to the use of the name passes to the public upon the expiration of the copyright, but injunctive relief will be granted against the passing off of a reprint as and for the production of the original publishers under the copyright." 68 § 46. Generic term, defined.-By "generic term" (Latin, genus, gener; French, genre) is meant a term which may not be appropriated as a trademark because it is too general and comprehensive in its meaning to become the monopoly of an individual in application to merchandise. The word in its proper signification includes the use of geographical names, proper names, and descriptive words, used in commerce. is a matter of regret that the courts have not defined these several phrases in their relations to each other, but such is the fact.68a The correctness of the author's definition is clearly es 65-Johnson v. Seaman, 108 Fed. Rep. 951; 48 C. C. A. 158; reversing Seaman v. Johnson, 106 Fed. Rep. 915. 66-Hiram Holt Co. v. Wadsworth, 41 Fed. Rep. 34. 66a-Marshall Ventilated Mattress Co. v. D'Arcy Spring Co., 280 Fed. Rep. 945, 949; C. C. A. 6. 67-See post, § 85. 68-Ogilvie v. G. & C. Merriam Co., 149 Fed. Rep. 858; modified in G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Ogilvie, 159 It Fed. Rep. 638; 95 C. C. A. 423; 16 68a-Perhaps the most comprehensive opinion as to generic terms tablished by analysis of the three classes of words and the reasons why they are not sustained as trademarks. We will examine them in their order. (a) Geographical names.-Mr. Justice Strong has said: "It must be considered as a sound doctrine that no one can apply the name of a district or country to a well-known article of commerce, and obtain thereby such an exclusive right to the application as to prevent others inhabiting the district, or dealing in similar articles coming from the district, from truthfully using the same designation." In our futher examination of the use of geographical names in trade, we will find that they are never properly sustained as technical trademarks except where they are used by one who is the sole owner of the entire locality to which the name is applied. In such a case the geographical name has ceased to be generic, because one person has the sole and exclusive right of trade or manufacture in the locality. Thus the author reasons that geographical names are ordinarily generic, and whenever they are held not to be valid trademarks it is because they are generic. color in connection with a sufficiently complex combination of other things may be recognized as saying so circumstantially that the defendant's goods are the plaintiff's as to pass the injunction line. New England Awl & Needle Co. v. Marlborough Awl & Needle Co., 168 Mass. 154, 156; 46 N. E. 386. So, although the plaintiff has no copyright on the dictionary, or any part of it, he can exclude a defendant from a part of the free field of the English language, even from the mere use of generic words, unqualified and unexplained, when they would mislead the plaintiff's customers to another shop. Reddaway v. Banham (1896), App. Cas. 199. So, the name of a person may become so associated with his goods that one of the same name coming into the business later will not be allowed to use even his own name without distinguishing his wares. Brinsmead v. Brinsmead, 13 Times Law R. 3; Reddaway v. Banham (1896), App. Cas. 199, 210. See Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U. S. 169, 204; 16 Sup. Ct. 1002; Cream Co. v. Keller, 85 Fed. 643. And so, we doubt not, may a geographical name acquire a similar association with a similar effect. Montgomery v. Thompson (1891), App. Cas. 217." Holmes, J., in American Waltham Watch Co. v. United States Watch Co., 173 Mass. 85; 53 N. E. Rep. 141.. 69-Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. (80 U. S.) 311-327; 20 L. Ed. 581; followed in Genessee Salt Co. v. Burnap, 67 |