СНАР. V. (8) Inference from a sin gle premiss. (c) Refutation of fallacies. With these composite forms of inference other forms having only a single premiss1 were contrasted by Antipater, who thus made an addition to the field of logic of very doubtful worth. On a few other points connected with the Stoic theory of illation, some very imperfect information exists.2 The loss of better information will, however, be felt all the less, since in what we already possess we have conclusive evidence that the objections brought against the Stoic logic were really well founded. The petty littleness and minuteness with which the Stoics followed out even the most worthless logical forms3 is truly astonishing. Next to describing the inferences which were valid, another subject seemed to demand the greatest care on the part of the Stoics, and to afford at the same time an opportunity for the display of their subtlety. This subject was no other than the enumeration and refutation of false inferences, and in particular the exposing of the many fallacies which had τρίτον λεγόμενον παρὰ τοῖς Στωϊ- 1 Called μονολήμματοι συλλο 4 γισμοί. Such were ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν· and ἀναπνεῖς, της apa, See Alex. Top. 6; Anal. Pr. 7, a; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 167; Math. viii. 443; Apul. Dogm. Plat. iii. 272; Prantl, 477, 186. 2 Compare the remarks of Prantl, 481, on Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 2; Alex. Anal. Pr. 53, b; Galen; Ps. Galen. 3 Conf. Alex. Anal. Pr. 95, a; Galen. Diog. 186, mentions fallacies due to Chrysippus, which can only have been raised for the purpose of being refuted. become current since the age of the Sophists and Megarians. In this department likewise Chrysippus, as might be expected, led the van.' But Chrysippus was not always able to overcome the difficulties that presented themselves; witness his remarkable attitude towards the Chain-inference, from which he thought to escape by withholding judgment.2 The fallacies, however, to which the Stoics devoted their attention, and the way in which they met them, need not occupy our attention further.3 CHAP. V. D. Estimate of Stoic short In all these researches the Stoics were striving to secure a solid basis for a scientific process of proof. Great as was the value which they assigned to such Logic. a process, they nevertheless admitted, as Aristotle Its had done before, that everything could not be proved. comings. Here, then, was the weak point in science; but instead of strengthening this weak point by means of induction, and endeavouring to obtain a more complete theory of induction, they were content with conjectural data, sometimes involving their own truth, at other times needing to be established by inferences of which they were themselves the premisses. Thus, 1 The list of his writings contains a number of treatises on fallacies, among them no less than five on the ψευδόμενος. 2 Cic. Acad. ii. 29, 93: Placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur, verbi causa, tria pauca sint, anne multa, aliquanto prius, quam ad multa perveniat, quiescere, id est, quod ab iis dicitur ἡσυχάζειν. The same remark is made by Sext. Math. vii. 416; Pyrrh. ii. 253. The same argument was employed against other fallacies (Simpl. Cat. 6, 7). 3 Prantl, pp. 485-496. 4 Sext. Math. viii. 367 : àλλ' où δεῖ, φασὶ, πάντων ἀπόδειξιν αἰτεῖν, CHAP. (2) Its value. like their theory of knowledge, their theory of method ended by an ultimate appeal to the individual feeling. No very high estimate can therefore be formed of the formal logic of the Stoics. Comparatively little as is known of that logic, still that little is enough to decide our judgment absolutely. We see that since the time of Chrysippus the greatest care was expended by the Stoics in tracing into their minutest ramifications, and referring to a fixed type, the forms of intellectual procedure. At the same time, we see that in doing this the real business of logic was lost sight of that business being to portray the operations of thought, and to give its laws-whilst the most useless trifling with forms was recklessly indulged in. No discoveries of importance were even made as to the logical forms of thought, or they would have been recorded by writers ever on the alert to notice the slightest derivations from the Aristotelian logic. The whole activity of the Stoics in the field of logic was simply devoted to clothing the logic of the Peripatetics in new terms, and to developing certain parts of it with painful minuteness, whilst other parts were neglected. The part treating of inference obtained unusual care; but it was no improvement on the part of Chrysippus to regard the hypothetical rather than the categorical form as the original form τινὰ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνειν, ὑπόθεσιν τὸ ἀληθὲς εὑρίσκεσθαι ἐκεῖνο τὸ τοῖς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ληφθεῖ σιν ἐπιφερόμενον· εἰ γὰρ τὸ τούτοις ἀκολουθοῦν ἐστιν ὑγιὲς, κἀκεῖνα οἷς ἀκολουθεῖ ἀληθῆ καὶ ἀναμφίλεκτα καθέστηκεν. of inference. It was quite the reverse. Making all allowances for the extension of the field of logic, logic lost in scientific precision more than it gained by the labours of Chrysippus. The history of philosophy cannot pass over in silence this branch of the Stoic system, which was so carefully cultivated by the Stoics themselves, and was so important in determining their intellectual attitude. Yet, when all has been said, the Stoic logic is only an outpost of their system. The very care which was lavished on it since the time of Chrysippus only betokened the decline of intellectual originality. CHAP. V. CHAPTER VI. THE STUDY OF NATURE. FUNDAMENTAL POSITIONS. CHAP. Or far more importance in the Stoic system than the The present chapter will be devoted to considering the first of these groups-the fundamental positions held by the Stoics in regard to nature; among which three are specially characteristic of their system— Natural Science was divided by the Stoics themselves (Diog. 132): (1) εἰδικῶς into τόποι περὶ σωμάτων καὶ περὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ στοιχείων καὶ θεῶν καὶ περάτων καὶ τόπου καὶ κενοῦ (2) γενικώς into three divisions, TEρl Kóσμov, Tepl στοιχείων, and the αἰτιολογικός. The first of these divisions covers ground which is shared by the mathematician; and the third, ground which is shared by both the physician and mathematician. The precise allotment of the subject into these divisions is not known. At best, it would be a very uncomfortable division. |