In another respect, within the domain of natural science, the materialism of the Stoics led to results producing some most astonishing assertions. If the attributes of things, the soul and even the powers of the soul, are all corporeal, the relation of attributes to their objects, of the soul to the body, of one body to another body, is that of mutual intermingling. Moreover the essential attributes of any definite material belong to every part of that material; and the soul resides in every part of the body, without the soul's being identical with the body, and without the attributes being identical with the material to which they belong, or with one another. Hence it follows that one body may intermingle with another not only by occupying the vacant spaces in that body, but by interpenetrating all its parts, without, however, being fused into a homogeneous mass with it. This view involves not only a denial of the impenetrability of matter, but it further supposes that a smaller body when mingled with a greater body will extend over the whole of the latter. It is known as the Stoic theory of universal intermingling (κράσις δι' ὅλων), and is alike different from the ordinary view of mechanical mixture and from that of chemical mixture. It differs from the former in that presence of some material pro- 1 Let a piece of red-hot iron be taken, every part of which is heavy, hard, hot, &c. Not one of these attributes can be confounded with another, or with the iron itself, but each one runs through the whole iron. Now, if each attribute is due to the identity. CHAP. VI. (b) Theory of universal intermingling. CHAP. every part of the one body is interpenetrated by every part of the other; from the latter, because the bodies after mixture still retain their own properties.' This peculiar theory, which is one of the much debated 1 Diog. vii. 151 : καὶ τὰς κράσεις δὲ διόλου γίνεσθαι, καθά φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ τῶν φυσικῶν, καὶ μὴ κατὰ περιγραφὴν καὶ παράθεσιν· καὶ γὰρ εἰς πέλαγος ὀλίγος οἶνος βληθεὶς ἐπὶ πόσον ἀντιπαρεκταθήσεται εἶτα συμφθαρήσεται. According to Stob. Εcl. i. 374, the Stoics more accurately distinguish μίξις, κρᾶσις, παράθεσις, σύγχυσις. Παράθεσις is σω μάτων συναφὴ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιφανείας; for instance, the combination of various kinds of grain. Μίξις is δύο ἢ καὶ πλειόνων σωμάτων ἀντιπαρέκτασις δι ̓ ὅλων, ὑπομενουσῶν τῶν συμφυῶν περὶ αὐτὰ ποιοτήτων; for instance, the union of fire and iron, of soul and body. Such a union is called is in the case of solid bodies, κράσις in the case of fuids. Σύγχυσις is δύο ἢ καὶ πλειόνων ποιοτήτων περὶ τὰ σώματα μεταβολὴ εἰς ἑτέρας διαφερούσης τούτων ποιότητος γένεσιν, as in the making up salves and medicines. According to Alex. Aphr. De Mixt. 142, a, Chrysippus distinguished three kinds of μίξις: παράθεσις, Οι union of substances, in which each retains its οἰκεία οὐσία or ποιότης κατὰ τὴν περιγραφήν; σύγχυσις, in which both substances, as well as attributes, are destroyed (φθείρεσθαι), giving rise to a third body; κράσις δύο ἢ καὶ πλειόνων τινῶν σωμάτων ὅλων δι ̓ ὅλων ἀντιπαρέκτασιν ἀλ. λήλοις οὕτως, ὥστε σώζειν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ μίξει· τῇ τοιαύτῃ τήν τε οἰκείαν οὐσίαν καὶ τὰς ἐν αὐτῇ = ποιότητας. Materials thus united can be again separated, but can never be so united: ὡς μηδὲν μόριον ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι μὴ μετέχον πάντων τῶν ἐν τῷ μίγματι, For such a union to be possible, (1) it must be possible for one material to penetrate every part of another, without being fused into a homogeneous mass. Hence the expression σῶμα διὰ σώματος αντιπαρήκειν, σῶμα σώματος εἶναι τόπον καὶ σῶμα χωρεῖν διὰ σώματος κένον μηδετέρου περιέχοντος ἀλλὰ τοῦ πλήρους εἰς τὸ πλῆρες ἐνδυομένου (Plut. C. Not. 37, 2; Alex. 142, b; Themist. Phys. 37; Simpl. Phys. 123, b; Hippolyt. Refut. Har. i. 21); (2) it must be possible for the smaller body to extend over the whole size of the greater. This is affirmed by Chrysippus: οὐδὲν ἀπέχειν φά μενος, οἴνου σταλαγμὴν ἕνα κεράσαι τὴν θάλατταν, or even εἰς ὅλον τὸν κόσμον διατενεῖν τῇ κράσει τὸν σταλαγμόν (Plut. 10, Alex. 142, b; Diog.). The greater body is said to help the smaller, by giving to it an extension of which it would not otherwise be capable. Nevertheless, the bodies so united need not necessarily occupy more space than was previously occupied by one of them (Alex. 142, b; Plotin. Enn. iv. 7, 8). The absurdities which this theory involves were exposed by Arcesilaus (Plut. 7), and in detail by Alexander, Plutarch, Sextus, and Plotinus (Enn. ii. 7, περὶ τῆς δι' ὅλων κράσεως). but distinctive features of the Stoic system,' cannot have been based on scientific observation. On the contrary, the arguments by which Chrysippus supported it prove that it was ultimately the result of speculative considerations. We have, moreover, still less reason to doubt this fact, inasmuch as the materialistic undercurrent of the Stoic system affords for it the best explanation. 1 πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ λέγεται περὶ κράσεως καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνήνυτοι περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου σκέμματός εἰσι παρὰ τοῖς Δογματικοῖς στάσεις, Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 56. 2 According to Alex. 142, a, the following arguments were used by Chrysippus:-(1) The argument from Kоival ěvvoiai-our notion of paσis is different from that of σύγχυσις οι παράθεσις. (2) Many bodies are capable of extension, whilst retaining their own properties; frankincense, for instance, when burnt, and gold. (3) The soul penetrates every part of the body, without losing its properties. (4) The same holds good of fire in red-hot metal, of fire and air in water and earth, of poisons, and of light. It is clear that the first of these arguments does not embody the real reason in the mind of Chrysippus; it might, with equal justice, have been used to prove anything else. Just as little does the second; for the phenomena to which it refers would be equally well explained on the theory of mechanical (παράθεσις) or chemical (σύγχυσις) mixture. Nor does the fourth argument, taken independently of the theory of the corporeal nature of properties, necessarily lead to the idea of κράσις as distinct from παράθεσις and σύγχυσις. Even the fact, greatly insisted upon by the Stoics, that things so mixed could be again separated into their component materials (Alex. 143, a; Stob. i. 378), is not conclusive. On the other hand, the relation of the soul to the body, of property to subject-matter, of puois to purov, of God to the world, cannot be otherwise explained, except by кpâσis, if a material existence be assigned to the soul to puois to is and to God. The third argument, therefore, supplies the real ground on which this theory was based; and from this argument Simplicius rightly deduces it (Phys. 123, b): τὸ δὲ σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀρχαῖοι ὡς ἐναργὲς ἄτοπον ἐλάμβανον, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ὕστερον προσήκαντο ὡς ἀκολουθοῦν ταῖς σφῶν αὐτῶν ὑποθέσεσιν σώματα γὰρ λέγειν πάντα δοκοῦντες, καὶ τὰς ποιότητας καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ διὰ παντὸς ὁρῶντες τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν χωροῦσαν καὶ τὰς ποιότητας ἐν ταῖς κράσεσι, συνεχώρουν σώμα διὰ σώματος xwpeîv. CHAP. VI. CHAP. VI B. Dynamical theory of nature. Although the stamp of materialism was sharply cut, and its application fearlessly made by the Stoics, they were yet far from holding the mechanical theory of nature, which appears to us to be a necessary consequence of strict materialism. The universe was (1) Matter explained on a dynamical theory; the notion of force and force. was placed above the notion of matter. To matter, they held, alone belongs real existence; but the characteristic of real existence they sought in causation, in the capacity to act and to be acted upon. This capacity belongs to matter only by virtue of certain inherent forces, which impart to it definite attributes. Let pure matter devoid of every attribute be considered, the matter which underlies all definite materials, and out of which all things are made;1 it will be found to be purely passive, a something subject to any change, able to assume any shape and quality, but taken by itself devoid of quality, and unable to produce any change whatsoever. This inert and powerless matter is first reduced into shape2 by means of attributes, all of which suppose tension in the air currents which produce them, and consequently suppose a force producing tension. Even the shape of bodies, and the place they occupy in 1 (η ἄποιος ὕλη, as the univer καὶ ὑποκείμενον οι οὐσία κοινή. see p. 98. note 2. Sert. Math. x. 312: ἐξ ἀποίον μὲν οὖν καὶ ἑνὸς σώματος τὴν τῶν ὅλων ὑπεστήσαντο γένεσιν οἱ Σταϊκοί, ἀρχὴ γὰρ τῶν ὄντων κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐστιν ἡ ἄποιος ὕλη καὶ δι' ὅλων τρεπτή, μεταβαλλούσης TE ταύτης γίνεται τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεία, πῦρ, κ.τ.λ. Plut. C. Not. 48. 2: λn kal' avv Bhoyos obra nal Emoios. M. Aurel. Σελ. 30: μία ουσία κοινὴ, και διείρ γηται ἰδίως ποιοῖς σώμασι μυρίοις. Diog. 187: τὰ δὴ τέτταρα στοιχεία εἶναι ὁμοῦ τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ἔλην. • Plut. Sto. Rep. 43. space is, according to the Stoics, something derivative, the consequence of tension;' tension keeping the different particles apart in one or the other particular way. Just as some modern physiologists construct nature by putting together a sum of forces of attraction and repulsion, so the Stoics refer nature to two forces, or speaking more accurately, to a double kind of motion-expansion and condensation. Expansion works outwardly, condensation inwardly; condensation produces being, or what is synonymous with it, matter; expansion gives rise to the attributes of things. Whilst, therefore, they assert that everything really existing must be material, they still distinguish in what is material two component parts -the part which is acted upon, and the part which acts, or in other words matter and force.3 1 Simpl. Cat. 67, e (Schol. 74, 2, 10): τὸ τοίνυν σχῆμα οἱ Στωϊκαὶ τὴν τάσιν παρέχεσθαι λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ τὴν μεταξὺ τῶν σημείων διάστασιν. διὸ καὶ εὐθεῖαν ὁρίζονται γραμμὴν τὴν εἰς ἄκρον τεταμένην. • Simpl. Cat. 68, ε: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκαὶ δύναμιν, ἢ μᾶλλον κίνησιν τὴν μανωτικὴν καὶ πυκνοστικὴν τίθενται, τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ ἔσω, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω· καὶ τὴν μὲν τοῦ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ποιὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν αἰτίαν. Nemes, Nat. Hom. c. 2: εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν, καθάπερ οἱ Στωϊκοί, τονικήν τινα εἶναι κίνησιν περὶ τὰ σώματα, εἰς τὸ ἔσω ἅμα καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔξω κινουμένην, καὶ τὴν μὲν εἰς τὸ ἔξω με γεθῶν καὶ ποιότητων ἀποτελεστι κὴν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ εἰς τὸ ἔσω ἑνώσεως καὶ οὐσίας. This remark is confirmed by Censorinus, and by the language of Plutarch (Def. * Diog. vii. 134: δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς Math. ix. 11; οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς τους CHAP! VL |