becomes the soul of a living creature, after birth, by the action of the outer air. This view led to the further hypothesis that the seat of the soul must be in the breast, not in the brain; since not only breath and warm blood, but also the voice, the immediate expression of thought, comes from the breast.2 CHAP. IX. Nor is this further hypothesis out of harmony (2) Divisions of the with the notions generally entertained as to the soul. nature of man. Plato and Aristotle had already fixed on the heart as the central organ of the lower powers, having assigned the brain to reason, with the view of distinguishing the rational from the mere animal soul. When, therefore, the Stoics assimilated man's rational activity to the activity of the senses, deducing both from one and the same Мета 1 Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 1 and 8; C. Not. 46, 2. De Primo Frig. 2, 5: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα λέ. Yovov ev Toîs owμaσi τwv Врepŵv τῇ περιψύξει στομοῦσθαι καὶ Báλλov EK Qúσews yevéolai Yuxhv. Similarly, Plotin. Enn. iv. 7, 8; Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. c. 21; Tertull. De An. c. 25. Plutarch (Plac. v. 16, 2; 17, 1; 24, 1) draws attention to the inconsistency of saying that the animal soul, which is warmer and rarer than the vegetable soul, has been developed out of it by cooling and condensation. 2 On this point, the Stoics were not altogether agreed. Some (not all, as Plut. Pl. Phil. iv. 21, 5, asserts) made the brain the seat of the soul, in proof of which they appealed to the story of the birth of Pallas. Sext. Math. ix. 119; Diog. in Phædr. Fragm. De Nat. De. col. 6. Conf. Krische Forschungen, i. 488, and Chrysip. 3 Aristotle had assigned no reason. CHAT. IX. source, it was natural that they would depart from Aristotle's view. Accordingly, the various parts of the soul were supposed to discharge themselves from their centre in the heart into the several organs, in the form of atmospheric currents. Seven such parts were enumerated, besides the dominant part, or reason, which was also called yeμovikov, Siaνοητικὸν, λογιστικὸν, οι λογισμός. These seven parts consist of the five senses, the power of reproduction, and the power of speech; and, following out their view of the close relation of speech and thought, great importance was attached to the power of speech. At the same time, the Stoics upheld the oneness of the soul's being with greater vigour than either Plato or Aristotle had done. Reason, or τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, is with them the primary power, of which all other powers are only parts, or derivative powers.3 Even feeling and desire are 2 1 Plut. Plac. iv. 4, 2. Ibid. c. 21: The Stoics consider the hyeμOVIKOV to be the highest part of the soul; it begets the parraría, σvykaтabéσeis, aloehσeis, and opμαλ, and is by them called λογιστ uós; from it the seven divisions of the soul reach to the body, like the arms of a cuttle-fish, and are therefore collectively defined as πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ (μέχρις ὀφθαλμῶν, ὤτων, μυκτήρων, γλώττης, ἐπιφανείας, παρυστάτων, φάρυγγος γλώττης καὶ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων). Galen, 1. c. iii. 1; Diog. 110 and 157 ; Porphyr. and Iamblich. in Stob. i. 836, and 874, and 878; Chalcid. in Tim. 307; Nicomachus, in Iambl. Theol. Arith. p. 50. But there was no universal agreement among the Stoics on this subject. According to Tert. De An. 14, Zeno only admitted three divisions of the soul, whilst some among the later Stoics enumerated as many as ten; Panætius only held six, and Posidonius went still further away from the view current among the Stoics. The remarks of Stob. i. 828, probably refer to the Peripatetic Aristo. 2 Conf. Cleanth. Hymn. 4: ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμὲν τῆς μίμημα λαχόντες μοῦνοι, ὅσα ζώει τε καὶ ἕρπει θνητό ἐπὶ γαῖαν. Chrys. in Galen, 1. c. iii. 1: ταύτης οὖν [τῆς ψυχῆς] τῶν μερῶν derived from it, in direct contradiction to the teaching of Plato and Aristotle; and this power was declared to be the seat of personal identity, a point on which former philosophers had refrained from expressing an opinion.2 ἑκάστῳ διατεταγμένον [ων] μορίῳ, τὸ διῆκον αὐτῆς εἰς τὴν τραχεῖαν ἀρτηρίαν φωνην εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἰς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὄψιν, κ.τ.λ. καὶ τὸ εἰς ὄρχεις, ἕτερόν τιν' ἔχον τοιοῦτον λόγον, σπερματικὸν, εἰς ὃ δὲ συμβαίνει πάντα ταῦτα, ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ εἶναι, μέρος ὂν αὐτῆς τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. Plut. Plac. iv. 4, 2: τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἀφ' οὗ ταῦτα πάντα ἐπιτέτακται διὰ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων προσφερῶς ταῖς τοῦ πολύποδος πλεκτάναις. Conf. Sext. Math. ix. 102. Alex. Aphr. (De An. 146) therefore denies the Stoical assertion, that the ψυχική δύναμις is only one, and that every activity of the soul is only the action of the πὼς ἔχον ἡγεμονικόν. Tertullian, De An. 14, says, speaking quite after the manner of a Stoic: Hujusmodi autem non tam partes animæ habebuntur, quam vires et efficacia et operæ non enim membra sunt substantiæ animalis, sed ingenia. Iambl. in Stob. i. 874: The powers of the soul bear, according to the Stoics, the same relation to the soul that qualities have to the substance; and their difference is partly owing to the diffusion of the πνεύματα, of which they consist, in different parts of the body, partly to the union of several qualities in one subject-matter, the latter being necessary, for ἡγεμονικὸν to include φαντασία, συγκατάθεσις, ὁρμὴ, and λόγος, 1 Plut. Virt. Mort. c. 3, speaking of Zeno, Aristo, and Chrysippus: νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παθητικόν καὶ ἄλογον διαφορᾷ τινι καὶ φύσει ψυχῆς τοῦ λογικοῦ διακεκριμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς ψυ χῆς μέρος, ὃ δὴ καλοῦσι διάνοιαν καὶ ἡγεμονικὸν, διόλου τρεπόμενον καὶ μεταβάλλον ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς κατὰ ἕξιν ἢ διάθεσιν μετα βολαῖς κακίαν τε γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀρετ τὴν καὶ μηδὲν ἔχειν ἄλογον ἐν ἑαυτῷ. Plac. Phil. iv. 21, 1. Galen, 1. c. iv. 1: Chrysippus sometimes speaks as if he admitted a distinct δύναμις ἐπιθυμητικὴ οι θυμοειδής; at other times, as if he denied it. The latter is clearly his meaning. Ibid. v. 6 : ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος οὔθ ̓ ἕτερον εἶναι νομίζει τὸ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ λογιστικοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ἀφαιρεῖται τὰ πάθη. Iamb. in Stob. Ecl. i. 890; Diog. vii. 159. Orig. c. Cels. v. 47 : τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀρνουμένους τὸ τριμερὲς τῆς ψυχῆς. Posidonius (in Galen, 1. c. 6) endeavours to prove that Cleanthes held a different view, by a passage in which he contrasts @vuds with Aóyos-a passage, however, which is only a rhetorical flourish. 2 Chrys. (in Galen, ii. 2, 15: οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐγὼ λέγομεν κατὰ τοῦτο (the primary power in the breast) δεικνύντες αὑτοὺς ἐν τῷ ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν εἶναι. CHAP. IX. CHAP. The individual soul bears the same relation to the soul of the universe that a part does to the whole. The human soul is not only a part, as are all other living powers, of the universal power of life, but, the soul of because it possesses reason, it has a special relation B. The individual soul and the uni verse. ship to the Divine Being-a relationship which becomes closer in proportion as we allow greater play to the divine element in ourselves, i. e. to reason.2 On this very account, however, the soul cannot escape the law of the Divine Being, in the shape of general necessity, or destiny. It is a mere delusion to suppose that the soul possesses a freedom independent of the world's course. The human will, like everything else in the world, is bound into the indissoluble chain of natural causes, and that irrespec 1 Cleanthes, v. 4. Epictet. Diss. i. 14, 6: ai xal σuvapeis T θεῷ ἅτε αὐτοῦ μόρια οὖσαι καὶ ἀποσπάσματα. Id. ii. 8, 11. M. Aurel. ii. 4. v. 27, calls the soul μέρος ἀπόῤῥοια, ἀπόσπασμα θεοῦ; and, xii. 26, even calls the human νοῦς θεός. Sen. Ep. 41, 2: Sacer intra nos spiritus sedet . . . in unoquoque virorum bonorum, quis Deus incertum est, habitat Deus. 14. Εp. 66, 12: Ratio autem nihil aliud est quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa. Consequently, reason, thought, and virtue are of the same nature in the human soul as in the soul of the uni souls, as being parts of the divine mind, may be collectively regarded as one soul or reason. Marc. Aurel. ix. 8: els pèv Tà ăλoya Sâa μía Yuxǹ dinontai· εἰς δὲ τὰ λογικὰ μία λογικὴ ʊxǹ μeμépioτai. xii. 30: ἓν φῶς ἡλίου, κἂν διείρηται τοίχοις, ὄρεσιν, ἄλλοις μυρίοις· μία ουσία κοινὴ, κἂν διείργηται ἰδίως ποιοῖς σώμασι μυρίοις· μία ψυχὴ, κἂν φύσεσι διείρηται μυρίαις καὶ ἰδίαις Teрrypapaîs. This oneness, however, must, as the comparison shows, be understood in the sense of the Stoic realism: the universal soul, in the sense of etherial substance, is the element of which individual souls consist. In this sense, Sen. Ep. 31, 11, calls the animus rectus, bonus, magnus, a Deus in corpore humano hospitans. tively of our knowing by what causes the will is decided or not. Its freedom consists only in that it obeys the call of its own nature, instead of being determined by external causes; external circumstances only helping it to form its decisions. To these decisions, however, as determined by its own nature, the greatest value is attached. Not only are our actions due to them to such an extent that action can only be considered ours because of the soul's power of self-determination, but even our judgments are, as the Stoics thought, dependent on them. It is the soul itself which lends itself to truth or error: our convictions are quite as much in our power as our actions; both are alike the necessary result of our will. And just as the individual soul does not possess activity independently of the universal soul, no more can the individual soul escape the law of destiny. At the end of the world's course, the individual soul will be resolved into the primary substance, into the Divine Being. The only point about which the Stoics were undecided was, whether all souls would last until that time as separate souls, which was the view of Cleanthes, or whether, as Chrysippus held,' only the souls of the wise would survive. Diog. 156; Plut. N. P. Suav. Viv. 31, 2; Plac. iv. 7, 2; Aг. Didymus, in Eus. Præp. Ev. xv. 20, 3; Sen. Consol. ad Marc. c. 26, 7; Ep. 102, 22; 117, 6; Cic. Tusc. i. 31, 77. Seneca (ad Polyb. 9, 2; Ep. 65, 24; 71, 16; 36, 9) and M. Aurelius (iii. 3; vii. 32; viii. 25, 58) are only speaking СНАР. IX. |