CHAP. (5) The highest good as Law. more emphatically, however, than by any isolated expressions is this negative view of morality apparent in the Stoic ethics. The doctrine of the apathy of the wise man is alone enough to prove that freedom from disturbances, an unconditional assurance, and self-control, are the points on which these philosophers lay especial value, as constituting the happiness of the virtuous man. The Good, in as far as it is based on the general arrangement of the world, to which individuals are subordinate, appears to man in the character of Law. But, inasmuch as this law is to man the law of his own nature, the Good becomes the natural object of man's desire, and corresponds with natural impulse. Moral philosophers were already familiar with the notion that the Good and Law are identical; it was reserved for the Stoics to insist on this notion with peculiar zeal; and it was on this point that Stoicism subsequently came into contact, partly with Roman jurisprudence, partly with the ethics of the Jews and Christians. Moreover, as the Stoics considered that the Reason which governs the world is the general Law of all beings, so they recognised in the moral demand for reason the positive and negative aspects of the Law of God. ut malis tibi placere, quam po- See Krische, Forschungen, 2 νόμος, according to the Stoie definition (Stob. Ecl. ii. 190, 204; Human law Floril. 44, 12)=λbyos ¿plòs πpooτακτικὸς μὲν τῶν ποιητέον, ἀπὸ αγορευτικὸς δὲ τῶν οὐ ποιητέον. It is therefore σπουδαῖόν τι oι άσο Tetov, something of moral value, imposing duties on man. The ultimate source of this λόγος must be looked for in the λóyos comes into existence when man becomes aware of the divine law, and recognises its claims on him.' The law of right and morality is therefore a binding injunction, absolutely imperative on every rational being. No man can feel himself to be a rational being without, at the same time, feeling himself pledged to be moral. Obedience to this law is imposed upon man, not only by external authority, but by virtue of his own nature. The good is an object deserving of pursuit-the natural object of man's desire; on the other hand, evil is that against which his nature revolts. The former arouses his desire (ópun), the latter his aversion (ảþopμý);5 anď Kowds, the divine or world reason. The general law is, according to Diog. vii. 888 ôplòs λóyos dià πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Act. It is the ratio summa insita in natura, quæ jubet ea quæ facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria (Cic. Legg. i. 6, 18). According to Cic. Legg. ii. 4, 8 and 10, it is no human creature, sed æternum quiddam, quod universum mundum regeret imperandi prohibendique sapientia, the mens omnia ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis Dei, the ratio recta summi Jovis (conf. Fin. iv. 5, 11, and Lact. Inst. vi. 8). It is, accordingly (Plato, Gorg. 484, B), Távтwv βασιλεὺς θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων. 1 Cic. Leg. i. 6, 18; ii. 4, 8; 5, 11. As Stob. ii. 184, expresses it, δίκαιον is φύσει καὶ μὴ θέσει. This is proved by Cic. Legg. i. 12, 33, in a chain-argument clearly borrowed from the Stoics: Quibus ratio a natura data est, iisdem etiam recta ratio data est.. The good alone, or virtue, is Spun is defined by Stob. ii. 160, as φορὰ ψυχῆς ἐπί τι; ἀφορμὴ, CHAP. X. CHAP. B. Emo tions and virtue. (1) The emotions. (a) Their nature. thus the demands of morality are at once a natural impulse of a reasonable being, and, at the same. time, an object towards which his desires are by nature impelled.' However simple this state of things may be to a purely rational being, it must be remembered that man is not purely rational. He has, therefore, irrational as well as rational impulses. He is not ας φορὰ διανοίας από τινος. A further distinction is there made between the impulses of reasonable beings and beings devoid of reason. It is only in the case of reasonable beings that it can be said that impulse is called forth by the idea of a thing as something which has to be done (φαντασία ὁρμητικὴ τοῦ καθηκόντος). Moreover, the further remarks only apply to the case of reasonable beings; for instance, that every impulse contains an affirmative judgment in itself (συγKaтάleris), and also involves KIνητικόν ; that συγκατάθεσις applies to particular propositions (those in which truth and falsehood consist), whereas ópun applies to κατηγορήματα (i. e. etivities expressed by verbs), since every impulse and every desire aims at the possession of a good. Ορμὴ λογικὴ is defined to be φορὰ διανοίας ἐπί τι τῶν ἐν τῷ πράττειν, and is also called оpμǹ практiкh. If the φορά διανοίας refers to something future, the ὁρμὴ becomes an ὄρεξις. Among the varieties of ὁρμὴ πρακτική, Stob. enumerates πρόθεσις, ἐπιβολὴ, παρασκευή, ἐγχείρησις, αἵρεσις, πρόθεσις, βούλησις, θέλησις, the definitions of which he gives. It appears, therefore, that activities of feeling and will are included in the conception of opuǹ, as will be subsequently seen more in detail. 1 Stob. ii. 116 : πάντας γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ οἱονεὶ τὸ τῶν ἡμιαμβειαίων λόγον ἔχειν κατὰ τὸν Κλεάνθην, ὅθεν ἀτελεῖς μὲν ὄντας είναι φαύλους, τελειωθέντας δὲ OTоvdalovs. Diog. 89: The soul rests on the harmony of life with itself; extraneous influences corrupt it, ἐπεὶ ἡ φύσις ἀφορμὰς δίδωσιν ἀδιαστρόφους. Sen. Ep. 108, 8: Facile est auditorem concitare ad cupiditatem recti: omnibus enim natura fundamenta dedit semenque virtutis. 2 The one point, according to Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 34, which distinguishes man from God is, that God is absolutely rational and by nature good and wise. 3 Chrysippus (in Galen. De Hippo. et Plat. iv. 2): Tò λoyıkÒV ζῷον ἀκολουθητικὸν φύσει ἐστὶ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ὡς ἂν ἡγεμόνα πρακτικόν· πολλάκις μέντοι καὶ ἄλλως φέρεται ἐπί τινα καὶ από τινων ἀπειθῶς τῷ λόγῳ ὠθούμενον ἐπὶ πλεῖον, κ.τ.λ. From this, it appears that Chrysippus definition of spun (in Plut. Sto. 1 originally virtuous, but he becomes virtuous by overcoming his emotions. Emotion or passion is a movement of mind contrary to reason and nature, an impulse transgressing the right mean.2 The Peripatetic notion, that certain emotions are in accordance with nature, was stoutly denied by the Stoics.3 The seat of the emotions-and, indeed, of all impulses and every activity of the soul-is in man's reason, the yeμovikóv.1 Emotion is that state of the йyεμovikov in which it is hurried into what Rep. 11, 6 = τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος προστακτικὸς αὐτῷ τοῦ ποιεῖν) must not be understood to imply that man has only rational, and no irrational impulses. Chrysippus, in the passage quoted, must either be referring to that impulse which is peculiar to man, and is according to his nature; or else Aoyos must be taken in its more extended meaning of notion or idea, for all impulses are based on judgments; and it is clear, from Cic. Fin. iii. 7, 23 ('as our limbs are given to us for a definite purpose, so opun is given for some definite object, and not for every kind of use'), that spun is not in itself rational, but first becomes rational by the direction given to it by man. The term emotion is used to express áeos, although the terms of modern psychology are more or less inadequate to express the ancient ideas. 2 Diog. vii. 110: čσTi dè autò τὸ πάθος κατὰ Ζήνωνα ἡ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις ή ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα. The same de finitions are found in Stob. ii. 36, with this difference, that areONS τῷ αἱροῦντι λόγῳ stands in place 3 Cic. Acad. i. 10, 39: Cumque • Chrysippus, in Galen. iii. 7; CHAP. X. CHAP. is contrary to nature by the force of impulse. Like virtue, emotion is due to a change which takes place in the ἡγεμονικόν, not to the effect of a separate extraneous force.' Imagination, therefore, alone calls it into being, as it does impulse in general. All emotions arise from a fault in judgment, from a false notion of good and evil, and may therefore be called, in so many words, judgments or opinions : 2 -avarice, for instance, is a wrong opinion as to the value of money,3 fear is a wrong opinion as regards future, trouble as regards present ills. Still, as appears from the general view of the Stoics respecting impulses, these statements are not 1 Plut. Virt. Mor. 3: λέγεσθαι δὲ [τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν] ἄλογον, ὅταν τῷ πλεονάζοντι τῆς ὁρμῆς ἰσχυρῷ γενομένῳ καὶ κρατήσαντι πρός τι τῶν ἀτόπων παρὰ τὸν αἱροῦντα λόγον ἐκφέρηται· καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάθος, κ.τ.λ. * Diog. vii. 111 : δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς τὰ πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ περὶ παθῶν. Plut. Virt. Mor. c. 3: τὸ πάθος εἶναι λόγον πονηρὸν καὶ ἀκόλαστον ἐκ φαύλης καὶ διημαρτημένης κρίσεως σφοδρότητα καὶ ῥώμην προσλαβόντα. Stob. ii. 168: ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν ἐπὶ δόξας αὐτὰ λέγουσιν εἶναι, παραλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν δόξαν ἀντὶ τῆς ἀσθενοῦς ὑπολήψεως. Conf. Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 14: Sed omnes perturbationes judicio censent feri et opinione opinationem autem volunt esse imbecillam assensionem. Id. iii. 11, 24: Est ergo causa omnis in opinione, nec vero agritudinis solum sed etiam reliquarum omnium perturbationum ? Fin. iii. 10, 35 : Perturbationes autem nulla natura vi commoventur; Cic. Tusc. iii. 11, 25; iv. 7, 14. Posidon. (in Galen. iv. 7): Chrysippus defined apprehension (άση) as δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ παρουσίας. 5 Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 15 : Sed quæ judicia quasque opiniones pertur bationum esse dixi, non in eis perturbationes solum positas esse dicunt, verum illa etiam, quæ eficiuntur perturbationibus, ut ægritudo quasi morsum quendam doloris efficiat: metus recessum quendam animi et fugam: laetitia profusam hilaritatem, libido effrenatam appetentiam. Galen. Hipp. et Plat. iv. 3 : (Ζήνωνι καὶ πολλοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν Στωϊκῶν) οἱ οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ ταύταις ἀλόγους συ στολὰς καὶ ταπεινώσεις καὶ δείξεις [? δήξεις] ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ διαχύσεις ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη. Plut. Virt. Mor. 10 : τὰς |