CHAP. (3) The state of progress. this end, still it can hardly take such a modest estimate of its own success as to allow that there is no real distinction between a zealous student and a bigotted despiser of philosophy. It was therefore natural that the Stoics, notwithstanding their own assertions, found themselves compelled to recognise differences among the bad and differences among the good. In harmony with the system these differences were made to depend upon the greater or less difficulty of healing the vice, or, in the case of the good, upon qualities morally indifferent. It was also natural that they should so nearly identify the state of роко-or progress towards wisdom, the only really existing state-with wisdom that it could hardly be distinguished therefrom. If there is a stage of progress at which a man is free from all emotions, discharges all his duties, knows all that is necessary, and is even secure against the danger of relapse, such a stage cannot be distin 1 Stob. Ecl. ii. 236: Yown dè ὄντων τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων εἶναί τινας ἐν αὐτοῖς διαφορὰς, καθόσον τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπὸ σκληρᾶς καὶ δυσιάτου διαθέσεως γίγνεται, τὰ δ ̓ οὔ, καὶ τῶν σπουδαίων γε ἄλλους ἄλλων προτρεπτικωτέρους γίγνεσθαι καὶ πιστικωτέρους ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀγχινουστέρους, κατὰ τὰ μέσα τὰ ἐμπεριλαμβανόμενα τῶν ἐπιτάσεων συμBaivovo@v, i.e. virtuous men are not all equally secure. These differences of degree do not, however, apply to wisdom, which admits of no increase. See Cic. Fin. iv. 20, 56. 2 Stob. Serm. 7, 21: 8 8'' ἄκρον, φησὶ [Χρύσιππος] προκόπο των ἅπαντα πάντως ἀποδίδωσι τὰ καθήκοντα καὶ οὐδὲν παραλείπει· τὸν δὲ τούτου βίον οὐκ εἶναί πω φησὶν εὐδαίμονα ἀλλ ̓ ἐπιγίγνεσθαι αὐτῷ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὅταν αἱ μέσαι πράξεις αὗται προσλάβωσι τὸ βέ βαιον καὶ ἑκτικὸν καὶ ἰδίαν πῆξίν τινα λάβωσιν. Chrysippus was probably the author of the dirision of progressers into three classes, which is discussed by Sen. Ep. 75, 8. Those who have reached the highest stage, omnes jam affectus et vitia posuerunt, quæ erant complectenda didicerunt, sed illis adhuc inexperta fiducia est. Bonum suum nondum in usu habent. Jam tamen guished from wisdom, either by its want of experience or by the absence of a clear knowledge of oneself. For has it not been frequently asserted that happiness is not increased by length of time, and that the wise man is at first not conscious of his wisdom? If, however, the highest stage of approximation to wisdom is supposed still to fall short of wisdom, because it is not sure of its continuance, and is not free from mental diseases, though it may be from emotions,' how, it may be asked, do these passing emotions differ from the mental affections which are found in the wise man? Is there any real distinction between them? If the progressing candidate has attained to freedom from diseased mental states, is the danger of a relapse very great? Besides, the Stoics were by no means agreed that the really wise man is free from all danger. Cleanthes held, with the Cynics, that virtue could never be lost; Chrysippus believed that, in certain cases, it was defectible. in illa quæ fugerunt recidere non possunt, jam ibi sunt unde non est retro lapsus, sed hoc illis de se nondum liquet et . . . scire se nesciunt. Sen. Ep. 75, 10: Quidam hoc proficientium genus de quo locutus sum ita complectuntur, ut illos dicant jam effugisse morbos animi, affectus nondum, et adhuc in lubrico stare, quia nemo sit extra periculum malitiæ nisi qui totam cam excussit. The same view is upheld by Sen. Ep. 72, 6. Diog. vii. 127: Thy apеThν Χρύσιππος μὲν ἀποβλητὴν, Κλε After all this admission is άνθης δὲ ἀναπόβλητον· ὁ μὲν, ἀπο- CHAP. XI. СНАР. XI. only one among many traits which prove that the Stoics were obliged to abate from the original severity of their demands. with the whole rational life (Ao- the negative by Diog. vii. 118, though not without some modifying clauses. Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b, also combats the view that the wise man will act virtuously when in a frenzy. CHAPTER XII. APPLIED MORAL SCIENCE. ALL that has been hitherto stated in reference to the end and the conditions of moral action had regard to general principles only. The further questionwhether the mere exposition of principles is enough, whether the practical application of these principles to circumstances of life does not also form part of moral science-was a question about which the Stoic School was not unanimous. Aristo, on this as on other points a Cynic, was of opinion that this whole branch of moral science was useless and unnecessary: the philosopher must confine himself exclusively to things which have a practical value, the fundamental points of morality. Within the Stoic School, however, this view did not gain much support. Even Cleanthes, otherwise agreeing with Aristo, would not deny the Further particulars have been already given. Seneca (Ep. 95, 1) calls the subject of applied ethics, which Aristo rejected, parænetice, or pars præceptiva. Sextus speaks of two τόποι παραινετικός and a ὑποθετικός. Both terms, however, appear to denote the same thing; for noBETIKOS is defined by Muson. in Stob. Floril. 117, 8, as mapaive- CHAP. CHAP. value of an application of theory to details, provided the connection of these details with general principles is not lost sight of. Nor can there be any doubt that, after the time of Chrysippus, details engrossed much of the attention of the Stoic philosophers. Posidonius enumerates, as belonging to the province of the theory of morals, precept, exhortation, and advice. His teacher, Panatius, discussed the practical side of morality 2 in three books on duties, which formed the groundwork of Cicero's wellknown treatise.3 The division of ethics attributed to Diogenes, and by him referred to Chrysippus, leaves a place for such discussions; and, not to mention the opposition of Aristo, which supposes the existence of applied moral science, the example of a fellowstudent Persæus, whose precepts for a banquet have been already referred to, proves how early practical ethics had obtained a footing within the Stoic School. Moreover, the elaborate theory of virtue propounded 1 Sen. Ep. 94, 4: Cleanthes utilem quidem judicat et hanc partem, sed imbecillam nisi ab universo fluit, nisi decreta ipsa philosophie et capita cognovit. * See Cic. Off. i. 2, 7; 3, 9; iii. 2,7. Cicero himself said that ho chiefly followed Panatius (Tel Tŵv kabηsóvтwv), not as a mere translator, but correctione quadam adhibita. Cic. Off. i. 3, 7: Omnis de officio duplex est quæstio: unum genus est, quod pertinet ad finem bonorum: alterum, quod positum est in preceptis, quibus in omnes partes usas vitæ conformari pos sit. He would devote his attention to officia, quorum præcepta traduntur. Cicero then goes fully into particulars. He treats of amusement and occupation (i. 29, 103); of the peculiar duties of the young and the old, of officials, citizens, foreigners (i. 34); of outward appearance, gait, conversation (i. 36); of the means of winning others (ii. 6, 21). Panaætius must have given a similar treatment to the subject. Particularly in the portions treating weρl tŵv kadŋkórtwy and περὶ προτροπῶν τε καὶ ἀποτροπῶν. |