such actions and actions admittedly immoral there is no real difference. This remark applies, in particular, to Zeno's language on unnatural vice.' It was not, therefore, in opposition to the older Stoics, or in denial of their maxim, that love is permitted to a wise man,2 that the younger Stoics condemned most explicitly any and every form of unchastity, and, in particular, the worst form of all, unnatural vice. In the same way, the language permitting marriage between those nearest of kin, when examined, is very much gentler than it seems. His words (Sext. Math. xi. 190; Pyrrh. iii. 245; Plut. Qu. Con. iii. 6, 1, 6) are as follows: διαμηρίζειν δὲ μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἧσσον παιδικὰ ἢ μὴ παιδικὰ μηδὲ θήλεα ἢ ἄρσενα· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλα παιδικοῖς ἢ μὴ παιδικοῖς οὐδὲ θηλείαις ἢ ἄῤῥεσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ πρέπει τε καὶ πρέποντα ἐστι; and: διαμεμήρικας τὸν ἐρώμενον; οὐκ ἔγωγε πότερον οὖν ἐπεθύμησας αὐτὸν διαμηρίσαι; καὶ μάλα. ἀλλὰ ἐπεθύunoas napaoxeîv σoi avтdy † ¿poβήθης κελεῦσαι; μὰ Δί'. ἀλλ' ἐκέλευσας; καὶ μάλα. εἶτ ̓ οὐχ ὑπηρέτησέ σοι ; οὐ γάρ. The form of expression is certainly very Cynic-like, but the meaning is not what Sextus supposes. Zeno's object is not to justify unnatural vice, but to show that those who allow any form of unchastity cannot forbid this form, and that the wish and the attempt are morally on a par with the deed. 2 See the following note. Musonius, in Stob. Serm. 6, 61 (conf. Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 68): Ne amores quidem sanctos alienos a sapiente esse volunt. According to Diog. vii. 129, Stob. ii. 238, love is really directed to beauty Conf. Orig. c. Cels. iv. 45: CHAP. XII. XII. CHAP. And Zeno's proposition for a community of wives may be fairly laid to the charge of Plato, and excused by all the charitable excuses of which Plato is allowed the benefit.' Still, taking the most unprejudiced view of the Stoic propositions, there remains enough to raise an extreme aversion to them, unless they could, without difficulty, be deduced from the fundamental principles of their system. A moral theory which makes such a sharp distinction between what is without and what is within, which regards the latter alone as essential, the former as altogether indifferent, which attaches no value to anything except virtuous intention, and places the highest value in being independent of everything-such a moral theory must of necessity prove wanting, whenever it is the business of morality to use the senses as instruments for expressing the mind. Such a theory can never raise natural impulses to the sphere of free will. Its prominent feature is, that it allowed less to the senses than naturally belonged to them; but there was a danger connected therewith. In particular cases, in which intentions are not so obvious, and declare external actions, in- διεφθαρμένου, καὶ ζητοῦσιν εἰ καθηκόντως ὁ πατὴρ συνελεύσεται τῇ θυγατρὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ ἀπολέσθαι τὸ πᾶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος. 1 How strictly he respected chastity and modesty in women is proved by the fragment, preserved by Clem. Pædag. iii. 253, c, respecting the dress and conduet of maidens. the moral importance of actions would often be ignored, and those actions would be treated as indifferent. CHAP. XII. The same observation will have to be made with B. Social relations. regard to other positions which the Stoics laid down in reference to social relations. But yet it was not their intention to detach man from his natural relation to other men. On the contrary, they held that the further man carries in himself the work of moral improvement, the stronger he will feel the impulse to society. By the idea of society, two relativelyopposite tendencies were introduced into their ethics. -one towards individual independence, the other in the direction of an ordered social life. The former tendency is the earlier one, and continues throughout to predominate; still, the latter was not surreptitiously introduced-nay, more, it was the logical result of the Stoic principles, and to the eye of an Epicurean must have seemed a distinctive feature of Stoicism. In attributing absolute value only to rational thought and will, Stoicism had declared man to be independent of everything external, and, consequently, of his fellow-men. But since this value only attaches to rational thought and intention, the freedom of the individual at once involves the recognition of the community, and brings with it the requirement that everyone must subordinate his own ends to the ends and needs of the community. Rational conduct and thought can only, then, be said to exist when the conduct of the individual is in harmony with general law; and this is the same for all rational beings. All (1) Origin and use of society. (a) Origin claims. of social CHAP. XII. rational beings must therefore aim at the same end, and recognise themselves subject to the same law." All must feel themselves portions of one connected whole. Man must not live for himself, but for society. The connection between the individual and society was clearly described by the Stoics. The desire for society, they hold, is immediately involved in reason. By the aid of reason, man feels that he is a part of a whole, and, consequently, that he is pledged to subordinate his own interests to the interests of the whole. Like has always an attraction for like; and this remark holds true of everything endowed with reason, since the rational soul is in all cases identical. From the consciousness of this unity, the desire for society at once arises in individuals endowed with reason. They are all in the service of reason; there is, therefore, for all but one right course and one law, and they all contribute to the general welfare 1 Cic. Fin. iii. 19, 64: Mundum 2 M. Aurel. ix. 9; xii. 30. Sen. judicat aliquod esse commune jus 3 Cic. Legg. 12, 33: Quibus enim ratio a natura data est, iisdem etiam recta ratio data est: ergo et lex, quæ est recta ratio in jubendo et vetando: si lex, jus quoque. At omnibus ratio. Jus igitur datum est omnibus. Ibid. 7, 23: Est igitur . . . prima homini cum Deo rationis societas. Inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta ratio communis est. Quæ cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati homines cum Diis putandi sumus. Inter quos porro est communio legis, inter eos communio juris est. Quibus autem hæc sunt inter eos communia, et civitatis ejusdem habendi sunt. Ps. Plut. V. Hom. 119: The Stoics teach ἕνα μὲν εἶναι τὸν in obeying this law. The wise man, as a Stoic expresses it, is never a private man.1 At other times, social relations were explained by the theory of final causes. Whilst everything else exists only for the sake of what is endowed with reason, individual beings endowed with reason exist for the sake of each other. Their social connection is therefore a direct natural command.3 Towards animals, we never stand in a position to exercise justice, nor yet towards ourselves. Justice can only be exercised towards other men and towards God.5 On the combination of individuals and their mutual support rests all their power over nature. A single man by himself would be the most helpless of creatures.6 The consciousness of this connection between all rational beings finds ample expression in Marcus Aurelius, the last of the Stoics. The possession of reason is, with him, at once love of society (vi. 14; κόσμον, συμπολιτεύεσθαι δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους, δικαιοσύνης μετέχοντας φύσει. Cic. Tusc. iv. 23, 51. 2 Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 67; Off. i. 7, 22; Sen. Clement. i. 3, 2; Benef. vii. 1, 7; M. Aurel. v. 16, 30; vii. 55; viii. 59; ix. 1; xi. 18; Diog. vii. 129; Sert. Math. ix. 131. Hence, according to Cic. Fin. iii. 21, 69, not only wpexhuara and Bλάuuara, but expnothμara and δυσχρηστήματα are common to all men. According to Plut. Sto. Rep. 16, Chrysippus denied that a man could wrong himself. If, in other passages, he seems to assert Towards the Gods, man 6 Sen. Benef. iv. 18. CHAP. XII. |