sonification of human qualities and states of mind,' and it will be seen what ample opportunity the Stoics had for recognising everywhere in nature and in the world of man divine agencies and powers, and, consequently, Gods in the wider sense of the term.2 When once it had been allowed that the name of God might be diverted from the Being to whom it properly belonged and applied, in a derivative sense, to what is impersonal and a mere. deification of Hercules, Bacchus, Romulus, &c., continues: Quorum cum remanerent animi atque æternitate fruerentur, Dii rite sunt habiti, cum et optimi essent et æterni. Diog. vii. 151. This is done in Plut. Plac. i. 6, 9. Belief in the Gods, it is there said, is held in three forms -the physical, the mythical, and the form established by law. All the Gods belong to seven classes: (1) τὸ ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων και METEάpWV: the observation of the stars, and their regularity of movement, the changes of season, &c., has conducted many to faith; and, accordingly, heaven and earth, sun and moon, have been honoured. (2 and 3) rò ßλáñтоV kal peλour: beneficent Beings are Zeus, Here. Hermes, Demeter; baleful Beings are the Erinnyes, Ares, &e. (4 and 5) πράγματα, such as Ἐλπὶς, Δίκη, Εὐνομία; and πάθη, such as ̓́Ερως, Αφροδίτη, Πόθος. (6) τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πεπλασμένον, such as the Gods invented by Hesiod for the purpose of his genealogies Coios, Hyperion, &c. (7) Men who are honoured for their services to mankind-Hercules, the Dioscuri, Dionysus. This list only contains those Beings who have received divine honours, not those to whom such honours are due; and hence it includes beings whom the Stoics can never have regarded as Gods, such as the baleful Gods and emotions. On the other hand, they could raise no objection to the worship of personified virtues. In the above list, the Gods of the elements, such as Here, are grouped, together with the Gods of fruits, under the category of useful. Another grouping was that followed by Dionysius, who, according to Tertullian (Ad Nat. ii. 2), divided Gods into three classes: the visible-the sun and moon, for instance; the invisible, or powers of nature-Neptune and the elements; and those facti, or deified men. 2 Plut. Com. Not. 31, 5: ảλλà Χρύσιππος καὶ Κλεάνθης, ἐμπεπληκότες, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τῷ λόγῳ θεῶν τὸν οὐρανὸν, τὴν γῆν, τὸν ἀέρα, τὴν θάλατταν, οὐδένα των τοσούτων ἄφθαρτον οὐδ ̓ ἀΐδιον ἀπολeλolmaσi λ μóvov toû Aids, eis ὃν πάντας καταναλίσκουσι τοὺς Aλous. CHAP. XIII. CHAP. (4) Doc trine of demons. manifestation of divine power, the door was opened to everything; and, with such concessions, the Stoic system could graft into itself even the most exceptional forms of polytheism. With the worship of heroes is also connected the doctrine of demons. The soul, according to the Stoic view already set forth, is of divine origin, a part of and emanation from God. Or, distinguishing more accurately in the soul one part from the rest, to reason, as the governing part, this honour only belongs. Now, since reason alone protects man from evil, and conducts him to happiness-this, too, was the popular belief-reason may be described as the guardian spirit, or demon, in man. Not only by the younger members of the Stoic School-by Posidonius, Seneca, Epictetus, and Antonius-are the popular notions of demons, as by Plato aforetime,2 explained in this sense, but the same method is Conf. Wachsmuth, Die Ansichten der Stoiker über Mantik und Dämonen. 2 Tim. 90, A. Posid. in Galen. Hipp. et Plat. v. 6: τὸ δὴ τῶν παθῶν αἴτιον, τουτέστι τῆς τε ἀνομολογίας καὶ τοῦ κακοδαίμονος βίου, τὸ μὴ κατὰ πᾶν ἕπεσθαι τῷ ἐν αὑτῷ δαίμονι συγγενεῖ τε ὄντι καὶ τὴν ὁμοίαν φύσιν ἔχοντι τῷ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον διοικοῦντι, τῷ δὲ χείρονι καὶ ζῷώδει ποτὲ συνεκκλίνοντας φέρεσθαι. Sen. Ep. 41, 2: Sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator et custos. His prout a nobis tractatus est, ita nos ipse tractat. Εp. 31, 11: Quid aliud voces hunc 3 [animus rectus] quam Deum in corpore humano hospitantem? Epict. Diss. i. 14, 12: èπíтрожOV [ὁ Ζεὺς] ἑκάστῳ παρέστησε τὸν ἑκάστου δαίμονα, καὶ παρέδωκε φυ λάσσειν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦτον ἀκοίμητον καὶ ἀπαραλόγιστον. Ηθ who retires within himself is not alone, ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς ἔνδον ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ὑμέτερος δαίμων ἐστί. Το him each one has taken an oath of allegiance, as a soldier has to his sovereign, but ἐκεῖ μὲν ὀμνύουσιν, αὐτοῦ μὴ προτιμήσειν ἕτερον· ἐνтavea d'avтoùs ǎnávτwv; so that, consequently, the demon is lost in the auros within. M. Aurel. v. 27 : δ δαίμων, ὃν ἑκάστῳ προστάτην καὶ ἡγεμόνα ὁ Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν, pursued by Chrysippus, who made evdaμovia, or happiness, consist in a harmony of the demon in man (which, in this case, can only be his own will. and understanding) with the will of God.' Little were the Stoics aware that, by such explanations, they were attributing to popular notions a meaning wholly foreign to them. But it does not therefore follow that they shared the popular belief in guardian spirits. Their system, however, left room for believing that, besides the human soul and the spirits of the stars, other rational souls might exist, having a definite work to perform in the world, subject to the law of general necessity, and knit into the chain. of causes and effects. Nay, more, such beings might even seem to them necessary for the completeness of the universe.3 What reason have we, then, to express doubt, when we are told that the Stoics believed in the existence of demons, playing a part in man and caring for him? 4 Is there anything ἀπόσπασμα ἑαυτοῦ. οὗτος δέ ἐστιν ¿ÉKÁσTOV VOUS кaì λóyos. ii. 13 and 17; iii. 3; v. 10; viii. 45. See the passage quoted from Diog. vii. 88, on p. 214, note 1. 2 In this sense, the words of Sen. Ep. 110, 1, must be understood : Sepone in praesentia quæ quibusdam placent, unicuique nostrum pedagogum dari Deum, non quidem ordinarium, sed hunc inferioris notæ . . . ita tamen hoc seponas volo, ut memineris, majores nostros, qui crediderunt, Stoicos fuisse: singulis enim et genium et Junonem dederunt. 3 Conf. Sert. Math. ix. 86. Amongst other things, it is there Diog. vii. 151: paol d' elvai CHAP. XIII. CHAP. B. The Allegorising Spirit. (1) Allegorical interpretation of myths. extraordinary from a Stoic platform, in holding that some of these demons are by nature inclined to do harm, and that these evil spirits are used by God for the punishment of the wicked,' especially when in any system of necessity such demons could only work, like powers of nature, conformably with the laws of the universe, and without disturbing those laws, occupying the same ground as lightning, earthquakes, and drought? And yet the language of Chrysippus, when speaking of evil demons who neglect the duties entrusted to them, sounds as though it were only figurative and tentative language, not really meant. Besides, the later Stoics made themselves merry over the Jewish and Christian notions of demons and demoniacal possession.3 Yet, even without accepting demons, there were not wanting in the Stoic system objects to which the popular beliefs could be referred, if it was necessary to find in these beliefs some deeper meaning. Not to be mortal. Plac. i. 8, 2: Θαλῆς, Plut. Quæst. Rom. 51: xa0- ἀλλὰ καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Ξενοκράτης s Tertull. Test. An. 3, after speaking of demons, adds: Aliqui Chrysippi sectator illudit ea, but that these beliefs were often so distorted in the process of accommodation as to be no longer recognisable; and a regular code of interpretation became necessary, by means of which a philosophic mind might see its own thoughts in the utterances of commonplace thinkers. By the Stoics, as by their Jewish and Christian followers, this code of interpretation was found in the method of allegorical interpretation-a method which now received a most extended application, in order to bridge over the gulf between the older types of culture and the more modern.' Zeno, and more particularly Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and their successors, sought to discover The Stoics are not the first who resorted to allegorical explanations of myths. Just as formerly, before philosophy had broken away from mythology, a Pherecydes, an Empedocles, the Pythagoreans had, whether consciously or unconsciously, veiled their thoughts in the language of legend, even Plato using a veil of poetry, so, now that the breach between the two was open, many attempts were made to conceal it, and individual beliefs were being represented as the real meaning of popular beliefs. The original framers were supposed to have had an eye to this meaning. Thus a twofold method of treating the myths resulted-that by natural explanation, and that by allegorical interpretation. The former method referred them to facts of history, the latter to general truths, whether moral or scientific; and both methods agreed in looking for a hidden meaning, besides the literal one. |