CHAP. demons. External causes, however, contribute to put people in a state of enthusiasm.2 The artificial gift of prophecy, or the art of divination, depends upon observation and guess-work.3 Observation would not indeed be necessary for one who could survey all causes in their effects on one another. Such a person would be able to deduce the whole series of events from the given causes. But God alone is able to do this. Hence men must gather the knowledge of future events from the indications by which their coming is announced.* These indications may be of every variety; and hence all possible forms of foretelling the future were allowed by the Stoics; the inspection of entrails, divination by lightning and other natural phenomena, by the flight of birds, and omens of every kind. Some idea of the mass of superstition According to Cic. Divin. i. 30, 64, Posidonius thought prophetic dreams were realised in one of three ways: uno, quod prævideat animus ipse per sese, quippe qui Deorum cognitione teneatur; altero, quod plenus aër sit immortalium animorum, in quibus tanquam insignitæ notæ veritatis appareant; tertio, quod ipsi Dii cum dormientibus colloquantur. Of these three modes, not the first only, but also the second, correspond with the Stoic hypotheses. Indeed, in Stob. Ecl. ii. 122, 238, μаVTIKh is defined: ἐπιστήμη θεωρητικὴ σημείων τῶν ànd Deŵr † daiμóvwv #pds åveрúπινον βίον συντεινόντων. Posidonius can only have spoken of Gods in condescension to popular = views; as a Stoic, he would only know of that connection with the soul of the universe which is referred to in the first mode. 2 Amongst such external helps, the Stoic in Cic. Divin. i. 50, 14; 36, 79, enumerates music, natural scenery, and vapour arising from the earth. But it is difficult to understand how, on Stoic principles, he can have attached value to oracles. Cic. i. 18, 34; 33, 72. Cicero, ii. 11, 26, enumerates the above-named varieties, after having previously treated them separately. Similarly, Ps. Plut. V. Hom. 212. Stob. Ecl. ii. 238, mentions tentatively, as varieties of μαντικὴ τό τε ὀνειροκριτικὸν, which the Stoics observed and encouraged, may be gathered from the first book of Cicero's treatise on divination. The explanation of these omens being a matter of skill, individuals in this, as in every other art, may often go wrong in their interpretation.1 To ensure against mistakes tradition is partly of use, establishing by manifold experiences the meaning of each omen; and the moral state of the prophet is quite as important for scientific divination as for the natural gift of prophecy. Purity of heart is one of the most essential conditions of prophetic success. In all these questions the moral tone of Stoic piety is preserved, and great pains were taken by the Stoics to bring their belief in prophecy into harmony with their philosophic view of the world. Nevertheless it is clear that success could neither be theirs in making this attempt, nor indeed in dealing with any other parts of the popular belief. Toiling with indefatigable zeal in an attempt so hopeless, they proved at least the sincerity of their wish to reconcile religion and philosophy. But not less did they disclose by these endeavours a misgiving that science, which had once come forward with so bold a face, was not sufficient in itself, but needed support from the traditions of religion, and from a belief καὶ τὸ οἰωνοσκοπικὸν, καὶ θυτικόν. Sext. Math. ix. 132, says: If there were no Gods, there would be no μαντικὴ nor θεοληπτική, ἀστρομαντική οι λογικὴ πρόῤῥησις δι' oveίpwv. Macrob. Somn. Scip. i. 3, gives a theory of dreams; but in how far it represents the views of the Stoics, it is impossible to 1 Cic. i. 55, 124; 56, 128. СНАР. XIII. CHAP. in divine revelations. Probably we shall not be far wrong in referring to this practical need the seeming vagaries of men like Chrysippus, who with the clearest intellectual powers could be blind to the folly of the methods they adopted in defending untenable and antiquated opinions. These vagaries show in Stoicism practical interests preponderating over science. They also establish the connection of Stoicism with Schools which doubted altogether the truth of the understanding, and thought to supplement it by divine revelations. Thus the Stoic theory of divination is the immediate forerunner of the Neopythagorean and Neoplatonic doctrine of revelation. 1 Cic. i. 53, 121: Ut igitur qui se tradet quiete præparato animo cum bonis cogitationibus tunc rebus ad tranquillitatem accommodatis, certa et vera cernit in somnis; sic castus animus purusque vigilantis et ad astrorum et ad avium reliquorumque signorum et ad extorum veritatem est paratior. CHAPTER XIV. THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY AS A WHOLE AND ITS HISTO- CHAP. XIV. HAVING now investigated the details of the Stoic system, we shall be in a position to estimate the Stoic philosophy as a whole, and the mutual relations of A. Inner its parts, and at the same time to review its his- of the Stoic connection torical antecedents. The characteristic features of system. the system consist in three points to which attention has been drawn at the very outset ;-a pre-eminently practical tendency, the shaping of practical considerations by the notions of the good and virtue, the use of logic and natural science as a scientific basis. Science, as we have seen, was not to the Stoics an end in itself, but only a means for producing a right moral attitude; all philosophical research standing directly or indirectly in the service of virtue. Both in its earlier as well as in the later days of its existence the Stoic School re-echoed this principle decidedly and exclusively, nor was it ever denied by Chrysippus, the chief representative of its science and learning. If it be then asked what is this right moral attitude, the Stoic replied: acting according to nature and reason, in short, virtue. Virtue, however, (1) Ethi cal side of Stoicism. СНАР. implies two things. On the one hand it implies the resignation of the individual to the universe, obedience to the universal law; on the other hand it involves the harmony of man with himself, the dominion of his higher over his lower nature, of reason over emotion, and the rising superior to every thing which does not belong to his true nature. Both aspects have a common ground. The law of morality is addressed to a reasonable being; and this law, as the law of man's reasonable nature, must be carried into execution by his own exertions. Still, in the Stoic Ethics two currents of thought may be clearly distinguished, which from time to time come into actual collision; the one requiring the individual to live for the common good and for society, the other impelling him to live for himself only, to emancipate himself from all that is not himself, and to console himself with the feeling of virtue. The first of these tendencies brings man to seek the society of others; the second enables him to dispense with it. From the former spring the virtues of justice, sociability, love of man; from the latter the inner freedom and happiness of the virtuous man. The former culminates in citizenship of the world; the latter in the self-sufficingness of the wise man. In as far as virtue includes everything that can be required of man, happiness depends on it alone; nothing is a good but virtue, nothing an evil but vice; all that does not fall in with our moral nature is indifferent. On the other hand, in as far as virtue is based on human nature, it stands on the same |