ing to Epicurus, is not the state of the body, but the state of the mind. Bodily pleasure is of short duration, and has much of a disturbing character about it; mental enjoyments are alone pure and incorruptible. Mental sufferings, too, are proportionately more severe than those of the body, since the body only feels the pangs of the moment, whilst the soul feels the torments of the past and the future.1 In a life of limited duration the pleasures of the flesh never reach their end. Only intelligence, by consoling us for the limited nature of our bodily existence, can produce a life complete in itself, and not standing in need of unlimited duration.2 At the same time, the Epicureans, if they are consistent with their principles, cannot deny that bodily pleasure is the earlier form, and likewise the ultimate source, of all pleasure, and neither Epicurus nor his favourite pupil Metrodorus shrunk from making this admission; Epicurus declaring that he could not form a conception of the good apart from enjoyments 3 of the senses; Metrodorus asserting that everything ... 1 Diog. 137: тi пρds тoùs KUρηναϊκοὺς διαφέρεται. οἱ μὲν γὰρ χείρους τὰς σωματικὰς ἀλγηδόνας λέγουσι τῶν ψυχικῶν ¿ dè τὰς ψυχικάς. τὴν γοῦν σάρκα διὰ τὸ παρὸν μόνον χειμάζειν, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν καὶ διὰ τὸ παρελθὸν καὶ τὸ παρὸν καὶ τὸ μέλλον. οὕτως οὖν καὶ μείζονας ἡδονὰς εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς. Plut. 1. c. 3, 10: Cic. Tusc. ν. 33, 96. The Epicureans designated bodily pleasure by ἥδεσθαι, neutral by χαίρειν. Plut. 1. c. 5, 1. 2 Diog. 145. Epicurus appears to have first used σάρξ to express the body in contrast to the soul, owμa, in his system, including the soul. See Diog. 137; 140; 144; Metrodor. in Plut. Colot. 31, 2. Diog. x. 6, from Epicurus περὶ τέλους: οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἔχω τί νοήσω τἀγαθὸν ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονὰς, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς δι' ἀφροδισίων καὶ τὰς δι' ἀκροαμάτων καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφῆς. Cic. Tusc. iii. 18, 41. CHAP. XIX. (2) Rea sons for rising superior to the senses. СНАР. good has reference to the belly.' Nevertheless, the Epicureans did not feel themselves thereby necessitated to yield to the body the preference which they claimed for goods of the soul. Nor, indeed, had the Stoics, notwithstanding the grossness in their theory of knowledge, ever abated their demand for a knowledge of conceptions, or ceased to subordinate the senses to reason, notwithstanding their founding moral teaching on nature. But mental pleasures and pains have lost with the Epicureans their peculiar character. Their only distinction from pleasures of the body consists in the addition of memory, or hope, or fear2 to the present feeling of pleasure or pain; and their greater importance is simply ascribed to their greater force or duration when compared with the feelings which momentarily impress the senses. As a counterpoise to bodily pains the remembrance of philosophic discourses is mentioned ;4 but properly speaking mental pleasures and pains are not different from other pleasures in kind, but only in degree, being stronger and more enduring. 1 Plut. 1. c. 16, 9: ὡς καὶ ἐχάρην καὶ ἐθρασυνάμην ὅτε ἔμαθον παρ' Επικούρου ὀρθῶς γαστρὶ χαρίSeola; and: Teрl Yaσтéρa yàp, & φυσιολόγε Τιμόκρατες, τὸ ἀγαθόν. 2 Epic. in Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 4, 10: τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις. Ibid. 5, 1: τὸ μὲν ἡδόμενον τῆς σαρκὸς τῷ χαίροντι τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπερειδόντες, αὖθις δ ̓ ἐκ τοῦ χαίροντος εἰς τὸ ἡδόμενον τῇ ἐλπίδι τελευτώντας. 3 Conf. Cic. Fin. i. 17, 55: Animi autem voluptas et dolores nasci fatemur e corporis voluptatibus et doloribus; it is only a misapprehension on the part of several Epicureans to deny this fact. In his last letter (Diog. 22), after describing his painful illness, Epicurus continues: àVTIπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγενότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμῃ. Accordingly Epicurus allows that we have no cause for rejecting gross and carnal pleasures if they can liberate us from the fear of higher powers, of death, and of sufferings; and the only consolation he can offer in pain is of the most uncertain kind. The most violent pains either do not last long, or they put an end to our existence; and the less violent ought to be endured since they do not exclude a counterbalancing pleasure. Hence victory over the impression of the moment must be secured, not so much by a mental force stemming the tide of feeling, as by a proper adjustment of the condition and actions of the senses. 2 CHAP. XIX. In no other way can the necessity of virtue be (3) Virtue. established in the Epicurean system. Agreeing with the strictest moral philosophers so far as to hold that virtue can be as little separated from happiness as happiness from virtue,3 having even the testimony of opponents as to the purity and strictness. of his moral teaching, which in its results differed in no wise from that of the Stoics; Epicurus, never 1 Diog. 142; Cic. Fin. ii. 7, 21. 2 Diog. 140; 133; Cic. Fin. i. 15, 49; Plut. Aud. Po. 14; M. Aurel. vii. 33, 64. Diog. 140: ovк čσTIV ĥdéws ζῇν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ διKalws ǎvev Toû déws. Cic. Tusc. v. 9, 26; Fin. i. 16, 50; 19, 62; Sen. Ep. 85, 18. Sen. Vit. Be. 13, 1: In ea quidem ipse sententia sum, sancta Epicurum et recta præcipere, et si propius accesseris tristia: vo luptas enim illa ad parvum et CHAP. XIX. " theless, holds a position strongly differing from that of the Stoics as to the grounds on which his moral theory is based. To demand virtue for its own sake seemed to him a mere phantom of the imagination. Those only who make pleasure their aim have a real object in life. Only a conditional value belongs to virtue as a means to happiness; or, as it is otherwise expressed,3 Not virtue taken by itself renders a man happy, but the pleasure arising from the exercise of virtue. This pleasure the Epicurean system does not seek in the consciousness of duty fulfilled, or of the possession of virtue, but in the freedom from disturbances, fears, and dangers, which follows as a consequence necessarily produced by virtue. Wisdom and intelligence contribute to happiness by liberating us from the fear of the Gods and death, by making us independent of immoderate passions and vain desires, by teaching us to bear pain as something subordinate and passing, and by pointing the way to a more cheerful and natural life.* Epic. in Plut. Adv. Col. 17, 3: ἐγὼ δ' ἐφ' ἡδονὰς συνεχεῖς παρακαλῶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρετὰς, κενὰς καὶ ματαίας καὶ ταραχώδεις ἐχούσας τῶν κάρπων τὰς ἐλπίδας. * Diog. 138 : διὰ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς δεῖν αἱρεῖσθαι οὐ δι' αὑτάς· ὥσπερ τὴν ἰατρικὴν διὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν, καθά φησι καὶ Διογένης. Cic. Fin. i. 13, 42: Istæ enim vestræ eximi puleræque virtutes nisi voluptatem efficerent, quis eas aut laudabiles aut expetendas arbitraretur? ut enim medicorum scientiam non ipsius artis sed bonæ valetudinis causa probamus, &c. . . .; sic sapientia, quæ ars vivendi putanda est, non expeteretur si nihil efficeret; nune expetitur quod est tanquam artifex conquirendre et comparanda voluptates. Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b: [ἡ ἀρετὴ] περὶ τὴν ἐκλογήν ἐστι τῶν ἡδέων κατ' Ἐπίκουρον. 3 Sen. Ep. 85, 18: Epicurus quoque judicat, cum virtutem habeat beatum esse, sed ipsam virtutem non satis esse ad beatam vitam, quia beatum efficiat voluptas quæ ex virtute est, non ipsa virtus. Diog. 132; Cic. Fin. i. 13, 43; 19, 62. Self-control aids in that it points out the attitude to CHAP. XIX. The same claims were advanced by Epicurus on C. The behalf of his wise man as the Stoics had urged on be- wise man half of theirs. Not only was a control over pain attributed to him, in nothing inferior to the Stoic 1 Cic. Fin. i. 13, 47. 2 Cic. 1. c. 13, 49. Diog. 120: τὴν δὲ ἀνδρείαν φύσει μὴ γίνεσθαι, λογισμῷ δὲ τοῦ συμφέροντος. 3 Cic. Fin. i. 16, 50; Diog. 144; Plut. N. P. Sua. Viv. 6, 1; Sen. Ep. 97, 13 and 15. Lucr. v. 1152: The criminal can never rest, and often in delirium or sleep betrays himself. Epicurus, however, refused to answer the question, Whether the wise man would do what is forbidden, if he could be Philodemus, De Rhet. Vol. |