ν. with enquiries referring only to precision of expres- CHAP. sion. Dialectic was defined, in short, as the science or art of speaking well.' Now, since speaking well consists in saying what is becoming and true,2 dialectic is used to express the knowledge of what is true or false, or what is neither one nor the other,3 correctness of expression being considered inseparable from correctness of thought. Words and thoughts are, according to (2) Words implied by Seneca, little differing, except in the position of the chief parts, from that of Aristotle. A fourth part is added to the three others by Diog. 43--on Delivery είναι δ ̓ αὐτῆς τὴν διαίρεσιν εἴς τε τὴν εὕρεσιν καὶ εἰς τὴν φάσιν, καὶ εἰς τάξιν καὶ εἰς τὴν ὑπόκρισιν. Diogenes also claims for the Stoics the Aristotelian distinction between three ways of speaking - συμβουλευτικός, δικα νικός, ἐγκωμιαστικός —and four parts in a speech: προοίμιον, διήγησις, τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιδίκους, ἐπίλογος. Definitions of διήγησις and παράδειγμα are given from Zeno by the anonymous author in Spengel, Rhet. Gr. i. 434, 23; 447,11. The same author (Ibid. 454, 4) says that, according to Chrysippus, the ἐπίλογος must be μονομερής. The Stoie definition of rhetoric has been already given. Another — τέχνη περὶ κόσμου καὶ εἰρημένου λόγου τάξιν —is attributed to Chrysippus by Plut. Sto. Rep. 28, 1. Cic. Fin. iv. 3, 7, observes, in reference to the Stoic rhetoric, and in particular to that of Chrysippus, that, si quis obmutescere concupierit, nihil aliud legere debeat that it dealt in nothing but words, being withal scanty in expressions, and confined to subtleties. 1 Alex. Aphr. Top. 3: οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ὁριζόμενοι τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ εὖ λέγειν ὁρίζονται, τὸ δὲ εὖ λέγειν ἐν τῷ ἀληθῆ καὶ προσήκοντα λέγειν εἶναι τιθέμενοι, τοῦτο δὲ ἴδιον ἡγούμενοι του φιλοσόφου, κατὰ τῆς τελεωτάτης φιλοσοφίας φέρουσιν αὐτὸ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μόνος ὁ φιλόσοφος κατ' αὐτοὺς διαλεκτικός. Aristotle had used the term dialectic in another sense, but with Plato it expressed the mode of procedure peculiar to a philosopher. * See Anon. Prolegg. ad Hermog. Rhet. Gr. vii. 8 : οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δὲ τὸ εὖ λέγειν ἔλεγον τὸ ἀληθῆ λέγειν. 3 Diog. 42: ὅθεν καὶ οὕτως αὐτὴν [τὴν διαλεκτικὴν] ὁρίζονται, ἐπιστήμην ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων. The same in Posidonius, in Sert. Math. xi. 187, and in Suid. Διαλεκτική. οὐδε τέρων is probably added, because dialectic deals not only with judgments, but with conceptions and interrogations. 68. Conf. Diog. and thoughts. СНАР. their view, the very same things regarded under different aspects. The same idea (λóyos), which is a thought as long as it resides within the breast, is a word as soon as it comes forth. Accordingly, dialectic consists of two main divisions, those divisions treating respectively of expression and the means of expression, or of thoughts and words.2 Both divisions, again, have several subdivisions,3 This is the meaning of the S.ader. The Stoies alone can Tov, and the heavenly Hermes (διάκτορος) representing the προΦορικόν. The distinction passed from the Stoics to others, like Plut. Solert. An. 19, 1; Galen, Protrept. i. 1. * Diog. 43: τὴν διαλεκτικὴν διαιρεῖσθαι εἴς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν σημαινομένων καὶ τῆς φωνῆς τόπον. Ibid. 62 : τυγχάνει δ' αὕτη, ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππός φησι, περὶ σημαίνοντα καὶ σημαινόμενα. Seneca : διαλεκτικὴ in duas partes dividitur, in verba et significationes, i.e. in res, quae dicuntur, et vocabula, quibus dicuntur. The distinction between τὸ σημαῖνον and τὸ σημαινόμενον, το which τὸ τυγχάνον (the real object) must be added as a third, will be hereafter discussed in another place. A much narrower conception of dialectic, and more nearly approaching to that of the Peripatetics, is to be found in the definition given by Sert. Pyrrh. ii. 213. The division there given is also found in the Platonist d'eine us, Isag. e. 3, as Fabricius pointed out. It appears, therefore, not to belong to the Stole School, but, at most, to a few of its later members. * Senec continues: Ingens deinde sequitur utriusque divisio, without, however, giving it. V. which are only imperfectly known to us. The part CHAP. of dialectic dealing with the means of expression, which was generally placed before the part dealing with the ideas expressed,2 included, according to the Stoics, not only the theory of the voice and of utterance, but also the theories of poetry and music, these arts being ranked under the head of sound on purely external considerations.3 The teaching of the Stoics on this part of dialectic consisted solely of a series of definitions, differences, and divisions; and has so little philosophical value, that it need not detain our attention longer. Two parts only of the Stoic logic There is much which is open to doubt in Petersen's attempt (Phil. Chrys. Fund. 221) to settle these divisions. At the very beginning, his referring the words of Sext. Math. viii. 11, to the parts of logic is unhappy. Nicolai (De Logic. Chrys. Lib. 21) has acted with greater caution, but even much of what he says is doubtful. 2 Diog. 55. 3 Diog. 44: elvai dè Tĥs dia. λεκτικῆς ἴδιον τόπον καὶ τὸν προειρημένον περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς φωνῆς, ἐν deíkvurai ʼn évypáμμatos own καὶ τίνα τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη, καὶ περὶ σολοικισμοῦ καὶ βαρβαρισμοῦ καὶ ποιημάτων καὶ ἀμφιβολιῶν καὶ περὶ ἐμμελοῦς φωνῆς καὶ περὶ μου σικῆς καὶ περὶ ὅρων κατά τινας καὶ διαιρέσεων καὶ λέξεων. * Further particulars may be This part of dialectic began with CHAP. V. B. Theory of knowledge. (1) General character of this theory. possess for us any real interest-the part which discusses the theory of knowledge, and that part of dialectic which treats of ideas, which in the main agrees with our formal logic. The Stoic theory of knowledge turns about the enquiry after a criterion or standard by which what is true in our notions may be distinguished from what is false. Since every kind of knowledge, no matter what be its object, must be tested by this standard, it follows that the standard cannot be sought in the object of our notions, but, on the contrary, must be sought in their form. The enquiry after a standard becomes therefore identical with another the enquiry as to what kind of notions supply a knowledge that may be depended upon, or what activity of the power of forming conceptions carries in itself a pledge of its own truthfulness. It is impossible to answer these questions without investigating the origin, the various kinds, and the value and importance of our notions; and hence the called oroxea by Chrysippus ever, observes (in Varro, L. Lat. ix. 1) that the same things bear different names, and vice versâ, and (in Gell. N. A. xi. 12, 1) that every word has several meanings. See Simpl. Cat. 8, . Five advantages and two disadvantages of speech are enumerated Diog. 59; Sext. Math. i. 210; and poetry (Diog. 60), various kinds of amphibolia (Diog. 62; Galen, De Soph. P. Dict. c. 4), the formation of conceptions, and division, are treated of. problem proposed to the Stoics is reduced to asking how, by an analysis of our notions, a universally valid standard might be obtained, by which their truth might be tested. Whether this enquiry was pursued by the older Stoics in all its comprehensiveness is a point on which we have no information. Boëthus, whose views on this subject were attacked by Chrysippus, had assumed the existence of several standards, such as Reason, Perception, Desire, Knowledge. Others, in the vaguest manner, had spoken of Right Reason (ópeòs Móyos) as being the standard of truth.' Hence it may be inferred that before the time of Chrysippus the Stoics had no distinctly developed theory of knowledge. But nevertheless there are expressions of Zeno and Cleanthes still extant which prove that the essential parts of the later theories were already held by these philosophers,2 although it is no doubt true that it first received that scientific form in which alone it is known to us at the hands of Chrysippus. The influence of this theory of knowledge appears mainly in three particulars:-(1) In the importance attached by the Stoics to the impressions of the Diog. vii. 54. 2 The statements of Zeno and Cleanthes, for instance, in reference to pararía, prove that these Stoics deduced their theory of knowledge from general principles respecting notions. They therefore started from the data supplied by the senses. A pas sage in Zeno, explaining the re- |