995. A declaration on a bill of exchange against the acceptor, alleged an endorsement by the drawer to the H. Company, and by the company to the plaintiff. Plea, traversing the endorsement by the company. It was proved that the bill had been endorsed in blank by the drawers, and afterwards delivered by them to the company. It was endorsed by two directors "per proc. of the company" to the plaintiff. By the deed of settlement, and resolutions which were duly registered, the directors had no power to endorse the bill. Held, that whether or not the company was bound, the endorsement being sufficient to transfer the property, and right of suit on the bill, the allegation in the declaration was proved. SMITH US. JOHNSON, 3 Hurlstone & Norman's (English) Reports, 222.

996. Action by endorsee against drawer of a bill of exchange. Plea, that the defendant endorsed the bill, and delivered it to W. to get discounted for the defendant, and pay him the proceeds; that the bill was never discounted for the defendant, nor was there any consideration for his endorsing it, or paying the amount thereof, and W., in fraud of the defendant, endorsed the bill to the plaintiff without consideration. At the trial the defendant proved that he endorsed the bill in blank, and delivered it to W. to get discounted for him, which W. promised to do, and bring him the money on the following morning. W. took away the bill, but never returned, and the defendant heard no more of it until payment was demanded by the plaintiff's attorney. Held, sufficient evidence of illegality to cast on the plaintiff the onus of proving consideration. HALL vs. FEATHERSTONE, 3 Hurlstone & Norman's (English) Reports, 284.

997. To a declaration by endorsee against acceptor of a bill of exchange for £300, the defendant pleaded, as to £272 2 shillings and seven pence, that before the endorsement or acceptance he applied to the drawer to advance him £300, which the drawer agreed to do, on his depositing certain canvas with him and accepting the bill, the drawer to have power of selling the canvas and applying the proceeds in payment of the bill, if not paid by the defendant when due; that the bill was accepted and the canvas deposited on the terms aforesaid; that after the bill was due, the drawer sold the canvas, and received the proceeds, £272 2s. 7d., and holds the same, and that the bill was endorsed by the drawer to the plaintiff after it became due, and subject to the equity of the proceeds of the sale of the canvas being applied to the payment of the bill, and without value. Held, by the court of Exchequer Chamber, (affirming the judgment of the court of Exchequer,) that the plea was good. HOLMES VS. KIDD, 3 Hurlstone & Norman's (English) Reports, 891.

1. A rail-road company, by the authority of the legislature, issued bonds, payable at a future time, with interest payable semi-annually, at the rate of seven per cent. The bonds became due and remained unpaid. Held, that the damages to which the holders were entitled for the detention of the principal after it, became due, were to be estimated at the contract rate of seven per cent., and not at the legal rate of interest, six per cent. BECKWITH US. TRUSTEES OF HARTFORD, PROVIDENCE AND FISHKILL RAIL-ROAD, 29 Connecticut Reports, 268.

II. ILLINOIS.

2. It is an error to allow compound interest. LEONARD VS. ADMINIS、 TRATOR OF VILLARS, 23 Illinois Reports, 377.

3. The interest laws of 1845 and 1849 are in pari materia, and should be so construed as that both may stand. The latter allows six instead of ten per cent. interest for money loaned, leaving the penalty provided in the fourth section of the former law in force, where more than ten per cent. is reserved for money loaned. KINSEY vs. NISLEY et al., 23 Illinois Reports, 505.

4. Where it is shown, under the act of 1849, that ten per cent. has been reserved on a contract, other than for loaned money, there is only a forfeiture of the over-charged interest. Ibid.

5. The defence of usury must be pleaded specially, otherwise it will be held to be waived. SMITH vs. WHITAKER, 23 Illinois Reports, 367.

6. Where it appears that A. and others gave their note to B., to satisfy a debt due from C., and that the note was usurious, any pretence that it was otherwise will not avail the payee. NICKERSON et al. vs. BABCOCK, 23 Illinois Reports, 561.

III. INDIANA.

7. A clause in the charter of a corporation authorizing the company to borrow money 66 on such terms as might be agreed upon between the parties," empowers them to borrow at a rate of interest beyond that established by the general law. MORRISON VS. THE EATON, &C., RailROAD COMPANY, 14 Tanner's (Indiana) Reports, 110.

8. A tender of the simple value of a specific article, after failure to deliver, is not sufficient; interest to the time of the tender should be included. HAMAR vs. DIMMICK, 4 Tanner's (Indiana) Reports, 105.

9. A. sold to B. two bonds of the Cincinnati and Chicago Rail-Road Company, of $500 each, payable on the first of May, 1859, at Cincinnati, in the State of Ohio, to JOHN MCLEAN, a citizen of that place, with ten per cent. interest; which, by the law of that State, was a legal rate of interest. A. guaranteed to B. the payment of the bonds according to their tenor. Subsequently, and before the maturity of the bonds, A. took them up, substituting his own agreement to pay to B. the principal and interest of the bonds, as by his guaranty he was already bound to do in case of default by the company. Held, that the bonds, being payable in Ohio, are, at common law, to be regarded as made in that State; and that our statute, which provides that rail-road companies may dispose of their bonds at such rate of interest as is allowed by the laws of the State where such contract is made, (Revised Statutes, 1852, vol. 1, page 417,) has not changed this rule as to rail-road companies. BUTLER et al. vs. EDGERTON, 14 Tanner's (Indiana) Reports. 15.

10. The reservation of ten per cent. interest on the bonds, being valid and not usurious by the laws of Ohio, the guaranty of A. was also valid; and the agreement sued on being merely substituted as a security, was not tainted with usury. Ibid.

11. In reality, the instrument sued on amounts only to an agreement to pay a given sum of money, being the amount of the principal and interest of the bonds. Ibid.

12. Our statute fixing the legal rate of interest, &c., (1 Revised Statutes, 1852, pages 343, 344,) was not intended to inhibit a party from having two prices for his property-one a cash price, and the other a time price; but if a price is agreed upon, and time is given, no greater rate of interest than the statute allows can legally be contracted for. BORUM vs. FOUTS et al., 14 Tanner's (Indiana) Reports, 50.

13. Under our statute, usury or illegal interest may exist without the actual loan of money. Ibid.

14. Where a mortgagor appears to the action to foreclose, and pleads usury in the transaction, his vendee of the mortgaged premises, with his consent, may assume the same defence. Ibid.

15. An amount added to a note, in consideration of forbearance, must be regarded as interest, though the parties may not so understand it. REED US. HELM, 14 Tanner's (Indiana) Reports, 428.

16. An action of foreclosure will lie upon a mortgage for interest due upon the notes secured thereby, though no part of the principal is due. SMART VS. MCKAY et al., 16 Harrison's (Indiana) Reports, 45.

17. A. executed to B. his two promissory notes, "bearing ten per cent. interest yearly from date." After the death of A., his executors and the payees of the notes called upon two persons to compute the amount then due upon the notes, and the supposed balance having been ascertained, a part of the amount was paid by the executors, and a note executed by them for the residue. Suit by the executors, alleging a mistake in the computation, and to recover an excess alleged to have been paid by them over the sum actually due. Held, that a failure to pay the interest annually, even if it could have been required before the notes fell due, did not authorize a compounding of the interest, unless an agreement had been made to pay interest on the interest. GRIMES vs. BLAKE, EXECUTOR, &c., 16 Harrison's (Indiana) Reports, 160.

18. Suit upon two notes, made in Ohio, and payable with ten per cent. interest. Judgment for the amount of the notes, with the stipulated interest. Held, that as the notes were payable generally, they were payable everywhere, and not specially at the place of residence of the makers. ENGLER et al. vs. ELLIS et al.. 16 Harrison's (Indiana) Reports,

475.

19. If the notes were payable in this State, they would still be good for the stipulated interest, unless that rate was prohibited by the law of Ohio, which was not made to appear. Ibid.

20. Where an answer, setting up usury, professes to answer the whole cause of action, when it in fact shows a bar to a part only, it is bad. MOORMAN et al. vs. BARTON, 16 Harrison's (Indiana) Reports, 39.

21. Where a new contract is entered into for the payment of a precedent debt, upon which interest has accrued, and by the new contract usury is taken or reserved, the "principal" which the creditor may recover under our usury law (1 Revised Statutes, section 4, page 344) is the amount of the principal of the precedent debt, with legal interest thereon, up to the time of making the usurious contract. PRATT et al. vs. WALLBRIDGE, 16 Harrison's (Indiana) Reports, 147.

22. A plea setting up usury in the new contract, in bar not only of the illegal interest taken or reserved thereon, but of the legal interest which had accrued upon the precedent debt, is bad. because the facts are pleaded in bar of too much. Ibid.

23. A plea of usury must specify the particulars of the contract upon which the usurious interest is alleged to have been taken or reserved. ENGLER et al. vs. COLLINS, 16 Harrison's (Indiana) Reports, 189.

24. A plea of usury, which purports to answer the whole cause of action, when the facts pleaded are a bar to a part only of the claim, is bad on demurrer. MOORMAN et al. vs. BARTON, 16 Harrison's (Indiana) Reports, 206.

25. An agreement to extend the time of payment of a promissory note, in consideration of usurious interest, is not binding, and will not discharge a surety. BROWN vs. HARNESS, 16 Harrison's (Indiana) Reports, 248.

26. If the maker of a promissory note, tainted with usury, procures a third person to pay the note for him, and gives to such person a new note for the amount thus paid, he cannot, in a suit upon such note, set up the usury in the original note. PENCE VS. CHRISTMAN, 14 Tanner's (Indiana) Reports, 257.

IV. MASSACHUSETTS.

27. In an action for the balance of a legacy, the amount due is to be stated by making annual rests, adding the interest each year to the principal, and deducting the payments made during the year, and making the residue a new capital. MILLER vs. Congdon, 14 Gray's (Massachusetts) Reports, 114.

NEW-HAMPSHIRE.

the

28. Where the defendant pleaded usury, and prayed a deduction of three times the amount, in the mode prescribed by the statute, and upon a denial of all usury by the plaintiff under oath, judgment was rendered against the defendant. Held, that this finding was conclusive upon fact of usury, and that it was not open to the defendant to prove it upon the general issue, to show want of consideration to the extent of the unlawful interest. DIVOLL vs. ATWOOD, 4 Chandler's (New-Hampshire) Reports, 443.

29. In a writ of entry on a mortgage, the defendant may reduce the amount of the conditional judgment by a deduction of three times the unlawful interest reserved or taken. Ibid.

30. His plea in such case may be with a general verification, with a view to an issue as at common law; or with a special verification under the statute, in which case the oath of the defendant must be tendered.