set, a member of the Palmerston administration, and Sir John Pakington, a member of the Derby cabinet. A change of Ministry took place in that year, and Sir John Pakington succeeded the Duke.

After much negotiation the Admiralty Board, of which Sir John Pakington was the head, gave Captain Cole permission to build a vessel on his turret principle. It was agreed that she should be built by Messrs. Laird, of Birkenhead, and that they should be responsible for the ship as an effective sea-going man-of-war.'

Of course, after she had gone down, everybody was ready to repudiate all responsibility for the vessel. The following extracts, however, from the Lords' Report of 1871 on the Admiralty, distinctly show that the Boards over which the Duke of Somerset and Sir John Pakington presided sanctioned the building of theCaptain':

'Duke of Somerset.—Are you not aware that the Naval Lords at the former Board of Admiralty all objected to the Captain ?"

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'Lord John Hay.-No; I am not aware of it. I should like to refresh my memory upon the subject; but I have a notion that they did not all object.

'Duke of Somerset.-You think that some of them were in favour of a sea-going vessel with a low free-board?

"Lord John Hay.—No; I think they were in favour of the vessel being built.

Duke of Somerset.-They were in favour of the vessel being tried?

Lord John Hay.—Yes; I think your Grace was in favour of it also.

Duke of Somerset.-They were in favour of the vessel being tried; but they thought it an experiment which was hazardous, and that it was a question which could be settled only by actual trial.

Lord John Hay.-I am not sure that the feeling was that there was absolute danger. I think we were at that time to a certain extent influenced by seeing a vessel which came over from America which had a very much lower free-board, and

which answered extremely well in rough weather. Therefore, I doubt very much whether the idea of absolute danger was the thing. It was rather a question of whether we were not being persuaded into spending a lot of money upon a vessel which might not answer; but I may be wrong. I am quite willing to accept your Grace's own recollection.

Duke of Somerset.-The only decision that was come to by that Board was that the vessel should be built, provided that she was a good sea-going vessel. That was the order given.

'Lord John Hay.-Yes, I think so. I am not aware that the details were at all gone into until we went out of office. It was entirely done by the Government who followed, who of course were wholly responsible for the manner in which the vessel was built, so far as responsibility could be attached to the Admiralty.'i

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Firmly, but courteously, Lord John Hay refreshes the Duke's memory respecting the early history of the 'Captain.' It is clear from his own statements, that His Grace was the First Lord of the Admiralty who gave the original order for the construction of the vessel, and that the order was subsequently ratified and carried into execution by Sir John Pakington, and yet the Duke discourses glibly about their ships that cannot swim.' It is a capital phrase for an afterdinner speech at an agricultural 'demonstration,' when beer, wine, and contagious fervour have obscured the otherwise clear political insight of the assembled farmers. Pronounced with due emphasis by a county member, the phrase would be sure to elicit much thumping of fists on the table and much jingling of glasses. But there are a few people left in England who like to test grave accusations of this sort by reference to facts. The Duke had only an indistinct recollection of them, for his interest in the 'Captain' was merely official. There was, however, one of his successors who had more than an official interest-one whose gallant son perished in that wild night when the fierce inexorable waves of the Atlantic swallowed up the hapless ship. A First Report, p. 115.

Lord might not remember all the incidents of the miserable story. A heart-broken father would not forget them.

The disasters of the Agincourt' and' Megæra' were less tragical. The 'Agincourt' struck on the Pearl rock near Gibraltar in July 1871. She was ultimately got off without loss of life. The accident was due to gross carelessness on the part of the officers of the squadron to which she belonged. But these officers were in no sense protégés of the present Government. They were gentlemen of high standing and reputation in their profession, who had risen through its various grades under a great number of administrations. Later in the summer the intelligence reached England that the Megæra,' an iron ship conveying troops and stores to Australia, had been run ashore in a sinking condition on the Isle of S. Paul, to save the lives of the crew and soldiers. A hole was discovered in the ship's bottom, where the iron plates had become thin. Mr. Goschen, who succeeded Mr. Childers as First Lord of the Admiralty, quoted in the House of Commons, on August 7, the report on the vessel given by the assistant-constructor before she proceeded to sea:—

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I beg leave to state that the Megæra, having undergone repair at Sheerness, is reported to be complete. She is a good sea-boat, and although more than twenty years old, is sound and strong. Her boilers are, however, only good for one year's service.

As she was wanted for only a nine months' trip, this warranty seemed sufficient. It is true that there was a note of warning about the boilers; but the failure took place not in them but in the hull, which was reported to be sound and strong.'

·

The only reasonable inference from cases of this kind is, that the Admiralty, like all other large establishments, is served by fallible agents. The high-minded

men who have under successive Governments administered the vast department, have earnestly endeavoured to obtain thoroughly efficient subordinates, but it is not in human power to secure absolute exemption from errors. The officials who repaired and examined the 'Megæra' had served under several administrations, and were no more the servants of Mr. Childers or Mr. Goschen than of their predecessors. If the Admiralty cannot rely upon the reports of the experienced officers of the dockyards, where is reliance to be placed? Is the First Lord himself to examine the ships before they go to sea? It is simply preposterous to impute the error respecting the Megara' to the new system of Admiralty administration. The vessel was passed by gentlemen who were appointed long before Mr. Goschen or Mr. Childers accepted office.

About the reduction of Admiralty and Naval expenditure during the last few years there can be no dispute, whatever controversy there may be about sacrifice of efficiency. In a debate on the Admiralty, raised by Lord Henry Lennox on February 17, Mr. Gladstone said, referring to Mr. Childers:—

My right hon. friend came into office a little more than two years ago, and in the two Naval estimates which he prepared he has offered to the country relief of one million and threequarters of taxation, while at the same time it is our contention that he has done so-not by weakening-but by strengthening the condition of our Navy.1

In moving the Navy Estimates on March 27, 1871, Mr. Goschen stated the estimates to have been:

In 1868-9 11,157,000l.

1870-1 9,370,000l.

Reduction in two years 1,787,0007.

Mr. Childers came into office during the financial year

-1868-9. The last estimates moved by him, those of 1870–1, show a reduction of 1,787,000l. On the other hand, the estimates for 1871-2, moved by Mr. Goschen, show a rather serious increase of 385,000l., which, however, he attributed to temporary causes. In the item of shipbuilding alone there was an increase of 435,000l., but some other items were reduced. Of the Vote of Credit of 2,000,000l., to which frequent reference has been made in these pages, 600,000l. had been appropriated to the Navy. Nearly the whole of that sum of 600,0007. was employed in producing more ships, and in hastening towards completion the dockyard at Chatham. The following extracts from the speech will indicate the general policy of the last and the present years:—

It is difficult on these occasions to steer clear of two dangers -the being too reticent on the one hand, and the saying anything as to the possible aggressive intention of any foreign power on the other. But I may say this, that if I look to the powers from whom aggression might possibly come, I do not see that their dockyards are in such a position that they would be able suddenly to produce fleets which would sweep down upon us, and render necessary the enormous extension of our naval power. At this moment one of our greatest naval competitors is unfortunately-and I say that most sincerely-in such a position that, as regards our great fighting fleet, we, relatively speaking, cannot be said to have been stronger at any previous time. What is maritime power? We do not wish, I suppose, to have an ideal fleet; we do not wish to say what number of first-class ships we ought to have in the abstract. What we want to know is what our power ought to be in order to meet any combination of powers against us which may be considered possible or probable. I do not think it is possible for us to go too far in insisting upon absolute security. I am quite confident that the commercial classes of this country would support the Government in any expenditure which they may really think necessary to secure not only immunity from attack, but that confidence which the country ought to possess... The Committee will not forget the interesting statement made by the right hon. gentleman the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) as to the reduction effected in our ordinary