[CV No. 70589. January 28, 2010]

BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM (PHILS.) INC., plaintiffappellee, vs. HEIDE O. JULATON, defendant-appellant.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; REPLEVIN; THE RECOVERY OF A COMPANY CAR ISSUED TO AN EMPLOYEE IS NOT A LABOR DISPUTE AND DOES NOT FALL UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE LABOR ARBITER AND THE NLRC BUT THAT OF THE REGULAR COURTS; THE CASE OF SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. VS. ASTORGA, INSTRUCTIVE TO THE CASE AT BAR:-The recovery of a company car issued to defendant-appellant, by reason of her employment as sales representative of plaintiff-appellee, does not fall under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the NLRC but that of the regular courts, Said issue had been passed upon and settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Smart Communications, Inc. vs. Astorga: SMART's demand for payment of the market value of the car or in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employeeemployer relations. As such, the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. In Basaya, Jr. v. Militante, this Court, in upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC over the replevin suit, explained: Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession in the plaintiff. The primary relief sought therein is the return of the property in specie wrongfully detained by another person. It is an ordinary statutory proceeding to adjudicate rights to the title or possession of personal property. The question of whether or not a party has the right of possession over the property involved and if so, whether or not the adverse party has wrongfully taken and detained said property as to require its return to plaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of a labor tribunal and beyond the field of specialization of Labor Arbiters.*** The labor dispute involved is not intertwined with the issue in the

Replevin Case. The respective issues

raised in each forum can be resolved independently on the other. In fact in 18 November 1986, the NLRC in the case before it had issued an Injunctive Writ enjoining the petitioners from blocking the free ingress and egress to the Vessel and ordering the petitioners to disembark and vacate. That aspect of the controversy is properly settled under the Labor Code. So also with petitioners' right to picket. But

the determination of the question of who has the better right to take possession of the Vessel and whether petitioners can derive the charterer, as the legal possessor of the Vessel, of that right to possess is addressed to the competence of Civil Courts. In thus ruling, this Court is not sanctioning split jurisdiction but defining avenues of jurisdiction as laid down by pertinent laws." Clearly, applying in this ruling, the lower court has rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the complaint for replevin.

2. ID.; FORUM SHOPPING; FORUM SHOPPING EXISTS WHEN, AS A RESULT OF AN ADVERSE OPINION IN ONE FORUM, A PARTY SEEKS A FAVORABLE OPINION (OTHER THAN BY APPEAL OR CERTIORARI) IN ANOTHER, OR WHEN HE INSTITUTES TWO OR MORE ACTIONS OR PROCEEDINGS GROUNDED ON THE SAME CAUSE, ON THE GAMBLE THAT ONE OR THE OTHER COURT WOULD MAKE A FAVORABLE DISPOSITION.-Defendant-appellant alleges that plaintiff-appellee violated the rule on non-forum shopping since there is already another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, that is, there already a labor case filed before the arbitration branch of the NLRC. Her claim holds no water. Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different court and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially, the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different for a upon the same issues.

3. ID.; ID.; THERE IS NO FORUM SHOPPING IF THE TWO (2) CASES WERE FILED SEPARATELY BY THE TWO (2) DIFFERENT PARTIES IN DIFFERENT COURTS OR TRIBUNALS.-There is forum shopping when the same party files several cases in different courts to rule on the same or related issues or causes. It does not apply, if the two (2) cases were separately filed by the two (2) different parties, in different courts or tribunals, such as what

happened in this case. The labor case was filed by defendant-appellant while the replevin case was filed by plaintiff-appellee.

4. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; ATTORNEY'S FEES; REFUSAL TO SURRENDER A COMPANYISSUE CAR TO COMPEL PAYMENT OF ACCRUED COMMISSION INCENTIVE, NOT CONSTITUTING BAD FAITH.Generally, no attorney's fees may be recovered except when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest; or where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim. In this case, while defendant-appellant refused to surrender the car the refusal was not tainted with gross and evident bad faith since she merely did so to compel plaintiffappellee to pay her accrued commission incentive of P70,000.00 which is a valid and demandable claim. In fact, plaintiff-appellee eventually paid the same.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHERE THE AWARDS FOR MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES ARE ELIMINATED, SO MUST THE AWARD FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES.-The RTC

granted plaintiff-appellee's claim for

attorney's fees even as it denied its claim for actual, moral and exemplary damages. However, in awarding attorney's fees, the RTC did not state the reason why plaintiffappellee is entitled thereto, other than its general statement that "the Court finds sufficient basis to award the same." It has been held that the award of attorney's fees must be based on findings of fact and of law and stated in the decision of the trial court. Moreover, no exemplary damages may be awarded in the absence of moral or actual damages and where the awards for moral and exemplary damages are eliminated, so must the award for attorney's fees. Considering that no evident bad faith could be attributed to defendant-appellant in refusing to surrender the car prior to the satisfaction of her plainly valid claim, coupled with the fact that the RTC itself plaintiff-appellee to be not entitled to moral and exemplary damages, the award of attorney's fees is clearly without basis and should perforce be deleted.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

After investigation, defendant-appellant was terminated. Consequently, plaintiff-appellee demanded from her to return the company properties, particularly the company-owned car, which were issued to her, but she refused to return the same. On February 10, 1999, plaintiff-appellee made its Final Demand for Return of Company Properties with a warning that her continuous refusal would compel them to take the necessary legal action. On March 31, 1991, counsel for plaintiff-appellee wrote a letter of demand to defendant-appellant.

Meanwhile, defendant-appellant filed a labor case before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission for illegal dismissal, damages, payment of backwages and payment of

accrued commission incentives.

On September 15, 1999, for failure of defendant-appellant to return the company car, plaintiff-appellee filed a Complaint for Replevin and Damages against the former. It also filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Replevin3 on October 6, 1999. In its Order dated October 8, 1999, the court a quo ordered the issuance of a Writ of Replevin and approved the Replevin Bond posted by plaintiff-appellee. On October 15, 1999, a Writ of Replevin was issued.10

The Writ of Replevin was served upon defendant-appellant on October 28, 1999 and the court's Sheriff took possession of the car subject of the writ, as evidenced by the Sheriff's Report11 dated November 4, 1999.

On November 26, 1999, defendantappellant filed a Motion to Dismiss12 alleging that the case should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section (b) and (e) of the 1997 Rules of

4 Letter dated December 11, 1998 (Exh. “B”),

pp. 13-14, Records

5 p. 17, Records

6 pp. 18-19, Records

Civil Procedure.13 According to defendantappellant, there is a pending labor case between them, wherein they agreed during the mandatory conference that upon payment of her accrued commission incentive of P70,000.00, she would return the subject car. However, since plaintiff-appellee continued to withhold her incentive, she refused to return the car as her leverage and assurance that her incentive would be paid.

On May 10, 2000, the lower court denied. the Motion to Dismiss.14 Defendant-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 15 which was denied in an Order16 dated November 7, 2000.

On January 31, 2001, the lower court issued a Notice of Pre-Trial17setting the Pre-Trial on February 26, 2001. On February 15, 2001, plaintiff-appellee filed its Pre-trial Brief.18 On February 16, 2001, the court a quo issued an Order19 reminding defendant-appellant to file her pre-trial brief at least three (3) days before the scheduled pre-trial on February 26, 2001.

At the hearing on February 26, 2001, defendant-appellant and her counsel failed to appear. She likewise failed to file her PreTrial Brief. Counsel for plaintiff-appellee prayed that they be allowed to present their evidence ex-parte, which was granted by the court in an Order20 issued on said date. On March 6, 2001, plaintiff-appellee presented its evidence ex-parte.

Subsequently, on March 23, 2001, the lower court rendered the assailed Decision.

13 Rule 16 MOTION TO DISMISS

SECTION 1. Grounds.-Within the time for all before an answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:

(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;

(c) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause.

14 Order, p. 224, Records

7

pp. 1-7, Records

Aggrieved, defendant-appellant filed this appeal.

The issues

In her appeal, defendant-appellant raises the following issues for this Court's consideration:

1. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60 taking cognizance of Civil Case No. 991679 has jurisdiction over the complaint where the matter therein are labor related, discussed in the mandatory conferences before the arbitration Branch of the NLRC where the labor complaint filed by appellant was then pending, treated and raised in the pleadings of the appellant in the pending labor case, and matters that necessarily involve the interpretation whether the appellant violated the covenant with the employer.

2. Whether or not the appellee violated the rule on non-forum shopping and whether the complaint was bound for dismissal under Paragraph e of the (sic) Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

3. Whether or not the award of Attorney's fees of P100,000.00 (sic) supported by preponderance of evidence.21

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious.

On the issue of jurisdiction

Defendant-appellant claims that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the complaint because the matter concerning the recovery of the service car is labor related.22

We disagree.

The recovery of a company car issued to defendant-appellant by reason of her employment as sales representative of plaintiff-appellee, does not fall under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the NLRC but that of the regular courts. Said issue had been passed upon and settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Smart Communications, Inc. vs. Astorga,23

*** SMART's demand for payment of the market value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the car. is not a labor, but a civil dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor and creditor

rather than employee-employer relations. As such, the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

In Basaya, Jr. v. Militante, this Court, in upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC over the replevin suit, explained:

Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession in the plaintiff. The primary relief sought therein is the return of the property is specie wrongfully detained by another person. It is an ordinary statutory proceeding to adjudicate rights to the title or possession of personal property. The question of whether or not a party has the right of possession over the property involved and if so, whether or not the adverse party has wrongfully taken and detained said property as to require its return to plaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of a labor tribunal and beyond the field of specialization of Labor Arbiters.

The labor dispute involved is not intertwined with the issue in the Replevin Case. The respective issues raised in each forum can be resolved independently on the other. In fact in 18 November 1986, the NLRC in the case before it had issued an Injunctive Writ enjoining the petitioners from blocking the free ingress and egress to the Vessel and ordering the petitioners to disembark and vacate. That aspect of the controversy is properly settled under the Labor Code. So also with petitioner's right to picket. But the determination of the question of who has the better right to take possession of the Vessel and whether petitioners can deprive the Charterer, as the legal possessor of the Vessel, of that right to possess is addressed to the competence of Civil Courts.

In thus ruling, this Court is not sanctioning split jurisdiction but defining avenues of jurisdiction as laid down by pertinent laws. (Underscoring Ours)

Clearly, applying this ruling, the lower court has rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the complaint for replevin. We quote with approval the ratiocination of the lower court:

The nature of the present action which is REPLEVIN WITH DAMAGES and the issues therein are not necessarily intertwined with the issues of the case pending before the Labor Arbiter as claimed by the defendant. The counterclaim that may be raised by the defendant is not considered as compulsory and this can be threshed out in a separate action before this court and the matter

has already been treated in the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss.

On the issue of forum-shopping

Defendant-appellant alleges that plaintiff appellee violated the rule on non-forum shopping since there is already another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, that is, there is already a labor case filed before the arbitration branch of the NLRC.

Forum

Her claim holds no water. shopping exists when as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other by appeal or certiorari), in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related cause's and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different for a upon the same issues.25

In other words, there is forum shopping when the same party files several cases in different courts to rule on the same or related issues or causes. It does not apply if the two (2) cases were separately filed by the two (2) different parties, in different courts or tribunals such as what happened in this case. The labor case was filed by defendant-appellant while the replevin case was filed by plaintiff-appellee.

In any event, it is already a settled that the recovery of the company car from a terminated employee is the proper subject of a replevin suit cognizable by the civil

24 Order dated November 7, 2000, p. 254, Records

25 Municipality of Taguig vs. Court of Appeals, 469 SCRA 588, 594, 595 (2005)

On the issue of attorney's fees

Generally, no attorney's fees may be recovered except when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;28 or where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim.29

refused to surrender the cars the refusal In this case, while defendant-appellant was not tainted with gross and evident bad faith since she merely did so to compel commission incentive of P70,000.00 which plaintiff-appellee to pay her accrued is a valid and demandable claim. In fact, plaintiff-appellee eventually paid the same.

Furthermore, the RTC granted plaintiffappellee's claim for attorney's fees even as it denied its claim for actual, moral and exemplary damages. However, in awarding attorney's fees the RTC did not state the reason why plaintiff-appellee is entitled thereto, other than, its general statement that "the Court finds sufficient basis to award the same.