68 69. Prior Analytics II. 26, § 1. Objection is a proposition contrary2 to a proposition. It differs from the proposition as a premiss (Ts πроτάσews) in that objection may be particular, but the premiss cannot be particular at all, or at any rate not in universal syllogisms. Prior Analytics II. 27, §§ 1-6. Now Probability and Sign are not the same thing, for Probability is a probable proposition; for what is known as a rule to happen or not to happen, to exist or not to exist, in such and such a way, is Probability; for instance, ‘That the jealous hate,' or 'That the objects of love feel affection.' 4 Sign3 tends to be a demonstrative premiss, either to individual cases; whilst Example, adducing a few instances only, incidentally shows an universal proposition to be true, and forthwith applies it to the case in hand. The one is the natural proceJure of a philosopher, the other of an orator. Hence Example is called ἐπαγωγὴ ῥητορική in Rhet. I. 2, 8. For a description of the various kinds of evσTamis see Poste's Posterior Analytics, pp. 28, 29. They are attacks made upon an argument, by calling in question the truth of the premiss or premisses. Aristotle here uses Tpóτaσis first in its wider sense of ‘proposition' than in the narrower sense of premiss'; so causing great confusion. 2' Contrary' here cannot be opposed to contradictory, since you destroy an argument no less by proving the contradictory to one of its premisses, than the contrary; and Aristotle expressly says that an evoTaσis may be particular, whilst he is doubtful whether a premiss can be so, strictly speaking. 3Sign' corresponds pretty closely to what we call circumstantial evidence.' Aristotle, as a test of the cogency of the enthymeme arising from the onμeîov, reduces it to a syllogism, and tries whether it obeys the syllogistic laws. 4 Boúλeraι elvai, professes or pretends to be, would fain be, is The sign is taken in three several figures, either as in necessary or probable; for if when A exists, B exists; or if when A has happened either before or after, B has happened also; then A is a sign of the happening or existence of B. An Enthymeme1 is a syllogism drawn from probabilities or signs. ways like the middle in the the first figure, or as in the second, or as in the third. For instance, to prove a woman to be pregnant because she has milk, is by the first figure, for having milk is the middle term. Let A be pregnant,' B 'having milk,' and C the 'woman.' But to prove that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good, is by the third figure. Let A be 'good,' B 'the wise,' C 'Pittacus.' 'It is true then to predicate both A and B of C, only the one (predicate) is not mentioned, as it is well known, but the 6 naturally inclined to be. Trendelenburg translates this clause : Signum autem id agit, ut propositio sit, quæ demonstrare possit, vel necessaria, vel hominum opinione probata.' · ἐνθύμημα from ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, to consider, closely corresponding to our word consideration.' Aristotle always uses it consistently with his definition here, as a rhetorical argument; an inference drawn from probable premisses, or from circumstantial evidence, not pretending to the rank of a demonstration. Later authors used the term in various senses (v. Cic. Top. 13, Quintil. 5, 10, &c.); but the common account that it is a syllogism with one premiss omitted is much later' (L. and S. sub voce), and we may add, totally distinct from its Aristotelian sense. As Trendelenburg remarks, 'enthymematis nomen si qui inde ducunt, quod propositio vel assumptio èv Ovu, animo retineatur: quum ab origine Græca tum ab Aristotelis usu discedunt.' 2 The syllogism is in Barbara, and will stand thus: All women with milk (B) are pregnant (A), This woman (C) has milk (B); .. She is pregnant. other is taken.1 The inference that a woman is pregnant because she is pale, professes to be by the second figure, for since paleness attends pregnant women, and it accompanies this woman, they suppose it proved that she is pregnant. Let paleness be A, being pregnant B, and the woman C.2 If only one premiss be expressed, it is simply a sign, but if the other also be assumed in addition, it is a syllogism; e.g. that Pittacus is liberal, for the ambitious are liberal, and Pittacus is ambitious.3 Or again that the wise are good, for Pittacus is good, and he is also wise. In this way, then, syllogisms are produced, only that the one by the first figure is unimpeachable if it be true (for it is universal), whilst that by the third figure is impeachable, even if the conclusion be true, through the inference not being universal or applicable to the subject.5 For it does not follow if Pittacus is 'The argument as at first stated: 'Pittacus is good, therefore wise men are good,' is an enthymeme in the modern sense of the word, that is to say, one of the premisses is suppressed dià tò eldéval, as Aristotle puts it. Expanded into syllogistic form, the example becomes : Pittacus is good, .. Wise men are good; which is an illegitimate mood of the third figure, containing an illicit process of the minor. 2 Pregnant women (B) are pale (A), .. She is pregnant; which is an illegitimate mood in the second figure, containing an undistributed middle. A legitimate syllogism in barbara. 4 ἄλυτος. λύειν is the ordinary Aristotelian expression for finding a flaw in an argument. The premisses Pittacus is wise,' 'Pittacus is good,' though good, that the other wise men are so also. But the instance by the second figure is always and in every way impeachable, for a syllogism never arises when the terms are so disposed, for it does not follow if pregnant women are pale, and this woman is pale, that she is pregnant. There will then be truth in the signs in all cases, but they have the above-mentioned varieties. they do not warrant the universal conclusion applying to the subject 'all good men,' yet do warrant a particular conclusion, 'some good man is wise;' whereas the premisses of the second-figure example: Pregnant women are pale, This woman is pale, warrant no conclusion whatever. One of the premisses in the second figure must be negative, otherwise there is necessarily an undistributed middle. 38 TOPICS I.1 Topics I. 4, §§ 1, 2. 105. Now every proposition and every problem2 declares either Genus, or Property,3 or Accident; for Diffe ITà TOTIKά, from TÓTо-loci communes: concerning commonplaces; giving general directions for conversation, debate, &c., and the method of drawing conclusions in probable matter, the art thereof being dialectic: cf. Top. I. 1, 1, where dialectic is described as μέθοδος ἀφ' ἧς δυνησόμεθα συλλογίζεσθαι περὶ παντὸς τοῦ προτεθέντος προβλήματος ἐξ ἐνδόξων καὶ αὐτοὶ λόγον ὑπέχοντες μηθὲν ἐροῦμεν ὑπεναντίον. 2 Vide (106). 3 Property (dov) is here to be understood in its logical sense of an attribute peculiar to the subject. * Vide Mansel's Aldrich, Appendix, note A, for a valuable account of the predicables. For the relation between the predicables and the categories, see note 1, page 2. The doctrine of the predicables was largely expanded and altered by Porphyry and the schoolmen, and by them so closely associated with realist theories, that it is impossible satisfactorily to translate their teaching into nominalist language, as Mill attempts to do in his Logic (Bk. I. ch. vii.). The whole arrangement of the predicables, and the meaning which we are to attach to them, hinges upon the phrase TÒ Tí hv elval, or essence. This expression, which we find thoroughly established in Aristotle, and assumed not to require explanation, is fully discussed in Excursus I. to Vol. IV. of Schwegler's Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles. It seems to have arisen from the question τί ἐστί (τινι) εἶναι, ΟΙ, τὸ εἶναι ; “ what is the being of such and such a thing?' the dative being a possessive dative, and the whole phrase equivalent to τί ἐστί (τις); This τί ἐστιν εἶναι must have gradually lost its interrogative force and been treated as one word signifying the ‘essence,' and as such requiring the article. The imperfect tense,' says Schwegler, 'probably refers back from the individual and material instances to the general ideal; die Form |