44

118.

TOPICS VI.

Topics VI. 1, § 1.

In the criticism of Definition there are five parts. For (it may be objected) either (1) that it is not true to apply the definition generally to that which bears the name (of the thing defined)'; (for the definition of man ought to be true of every man); or (2) that, though there exists a genus, the definer has not referred the subject to its genus, or not to its proper genus (for he ought to place it in its genus and add the differentiæ; for the genus, more than any other part of the definition, seems to signify the substance of the thing defined); or (3) that the words used are not peculiar 3 (for the definition ought to be peculiar, as has before been said); or (4) if, after fulfilling all the above-mentioned requirements, he has not defined or stated the essence of the thing defined. Besides the above, there yet remains the case (5) where he has indeed defined, but has not defined well.4

1 The definition given does not apply to all the things denoted by the name.

2 The differentia is generally an adjective; the genus being a substantive is more able to convey the idea of substance, e.g. in 'Man is a rational animal,' it is the word 'animal' which conveys the idea of substance.

3 ίδιος. The definition ought to be convertible with the thing defined, e.g. if rational animal is a proper definition of man, all rational animals must be men.

According to Aristotle, there are four kinds of (so-called)

Topics VI. 1, § 4.

Of bad definition there are two parts, firstly, the use 119. of obscure language (for the definer ought to use the clearest possible language, since it is for the sake of giving information that the definition is rendered); secondly, if he has said more than is needed; for all that is super-added in the definition is superfluous. Each of the above in its turn is divided into several parts.

Topics VI. 2, § 1.

There is one head of obscure definition, when the term 120.

Then

Definition, which are not definition at all (1, 2, 3, 4).
there is the definition, which is definition, but is badly expressed
(5). This is subdivided into two heads (a) that of obscure (five
different kinds), and (B) that of superfluous (four different kinds).
This is shown in the following table;—

121.

122.

used is equivocal1 with something else; e.g. Generation is a bringing into being; or Health is a symmetry2 of hot and cold. For bringing and symmetry are equivocal, so that it is not clear which of the things signified by the ambiguous phrase he intends to speak of. So, too, if the definiend has several senses, and the definer speaks without distinguishing them; for it is not clear which is the sense that he has defined, and it is possible to raise a quibble on the ground that the definition does not apply to all the objects defined.

Topics VI. 2, § 3.

6

There is another (head of obscure definition) if he has expressed the definition in metaphor, e.g. if he has described science as unchangeable,' or the earth as a "nurse,' or temperance as a ‘harmony.' For everything is obscure that is expressed in metaphor.

names; for

1 Aristotle (Cat. 1, 1) defines dμávvμa as words which have a common name, and a different meaning. But he does not always distinguish very accurately between the name and the thing signified; we have, therefore, not adhered closely to his definition; but have used the word equivocal, which is applied not to two things with a common name, but to the common name itself.

2 The idea of equal proportion was a very favourite one with the Greeks, especially with Plato and Aristotle. Plato, through the mouth of Socrates, describes Justice, in the Republic, as a harmɔny of the parts of the soul. Aristotle, in the Nichomachean Ethics, says that virtue consists in a mean.

3 Keiμéva óvóμara, ordinary or established names, answering to the kúpia óvóμaтa in Aristotle's Poetics, where (21. 5) he says, λéyw κύριον (ὔνομα) ᾧ χρῶνται ἕκαστοι.

6

6

6

instance, Plato' calls the eye Brow-shaded,' or the spider Putrid-biter,' 2 or the marrow Bone-begotten.' For everything is obscure which is not usual.

6

But some things have been said neither equivocally, nor metaphorically, nor yet literally, as that Law is a measure or image of the things naturally just,' but such expressions as these are worse than metaphor. For metaphor does make the thing signified in some degree known through its likeness, for everyone who uses a metaphor does so on account of some likeness.3 But such an expression as the above does not make it known. For neither is there the likeness present to make law a measure or an image, nor has it been so used literally. So that if anyone says that law is literally a measure or image, he speaks falsely; for an image is a thing of which the origin is by imitation,* and this is not the case with. law; and if not literally, it is clear that he has spoken obscurely and worse than any of the things said in metaphor. So, too, if the

1 Probably the comic poet, Пλáтwv 8 kwμikós flourished circ. B.C. 427-389.

26 'That which causes putrefaction by its bite.'-(Liddell and Scott).

3 Cf. the definition of Metaphor given by Aristotle in the Poetics, 21. 7, where he says that it is ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορά, either by generalisation, by specialisation, from species to species, or by analogy.

4 This has reference to the etymology of elkov, which is from čaka. Aristotle is fond of grounding arguments upon etymologies, and often false ones; e.g. in the Nic. Ethics, that of dikaστýs from δίχα, ἀληθής from a privative and ληθή, σωφροσύνη from σώζειν and φρόνησις, μακάριον from χαίρειν. (V. 7. VI. v. 8. VI. v. 5. VII. 12. 2.) Vide Plato's Cratylus, for a plentiful store of such fanciful deriva

123.

124.

definition of the contrary be not evident from what is said; for definitions well rendered make known the contrary definitions also. Or if, when spoken by itself, it were not clear of what it is the definition, but it were like the works of the ancient painters, the several subjects of which were not recognised unless the names were inscribed.

Topics VI. 3, § 1.

But in considering whether the definer has said too much in his definition, one should first examine whether he has used any term which belongs to everything;1 either generally to everything which exists, or to everything which falls under the same genus as the thing defined. For this must have been said superfluously. For the genus ought to distinguish the thing from other genera, and the differentia from any of the species included in the same genus.

Topics VI. 3, § 2.

Or if the additional term be peculiar, but when this is taken away, the rest of the sentence is both peculiar, and expresses the substance.

For instance, the definitions, Man is an animal that breathes; Man is a rational being, having existence; are bad in the latter case, because all things have existence, in the former because all animals, under which genus Man falls, breathe.

2 For instance, in the definition, 'Man is a rational animal capable of learning grammar;' if we take away the 'capable of learning grammar,' the definition that still remains is both peculiar, and expresses the substance of the thing defined. The meaning of the last clause seems to be that we must take care to have a noun to give an idea of substance; cf. (118), where we read that the genus seems especially to signify the substance of the thing defined.'