5.

6.

Categories 5, §§ 1, 2.

Substance, most properly, primarily and chiefly so called, is that which is neither said of any subject, nor contained in any subject, as the individual man, or the individual horse. The name 'Secondary Substances' is given to those species in which substances primarily so called are contained, both to the species themselves and to their genera. For instance, the individual man is contained in man as a species, and the genus of the species is animal; these then are called Secondary Substances, as both man and animal.

Categories 5, §§ 10-12.

Again, primary substances are especially called substances, on account of their being used as subjects of all other things, and having all other things predicated of them, or contained in them. As the primary substances are to all other things, so is species to genus; for the genera are predicated of the species, but the species are not convertible with the genera. So for these reasons also the species is more substance than the genus.

5

INTERPRETATION.1

Interpretation 1, §§ 3, 4.

Now as in the mind there is sometimes thought 22. without either truth or falsehood, and sometimes thought to which one or other of these must necessarily belong, so is it with the voice; for it is combination and division (of words) that falsehood and truth concern.2 Nouns then by themselves, and verbs resemble thought without combination or division; as man, or white, when nothing further is added; for so far we have neither falsehood nor truth. In proof of which even goat-stag3 has some signification, but one not yet either true or false, unless its existence or non-existence be added, either simply or with a limitation of time.4

1 épμnveía, i.e. the expression of thought by words. Whether we can think without the aid of language or not, language is necessary for us to express our thoughts, and is at least of great service in facilitating them; it is, then, necessary for the logician to treat of words and names.

2 Cf. Aristotle's description of truth and falsehood, Metaph. VIII. 10. 1: ἀληθεύει μὲν ὁ τὸ διῃρημένον οἰόμενος διαιρεῖσθαι, καὶ τὸ συγκειμένον συγκεῖσθαι, ἔψευσται δὲ ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων ἢ τὰ πράγματα.

Cf. Mill, vol. i. p. 20. 'I may say, for instance, "The Sun." The word has a meaning, and suggests that meaning to the mind of any one who is listening to me. But suppose I ask him, whether it is true whether he believes it? He can give no answer.

as yet nothing to believe or to disbelieve.'

There is

4 Such as, that it is or is not, was or was not, will be or will not

be, in existence.

23.

?

24.

Interpretation 2, § 1.

A noun,' then, is a vocal utterance which by convention has a certain signification without any idea of time, but no part of which, when taken by itself, has any signification. For instance, in the word Kάλππоs, the part ππоs, taken separately, has no signification in itself, as it has in the phrase κaλòs iππOS.2

Interpretation 2, § 2.

Now I say by convention,' because by nature there is no such thing as a noun, except when it

1 Cf. Poetics, 20, 8: dvoμa d' éotl pwvǹ ovvberǹ (with a conventional meaning) σημαντικὴ ἄνευ χρόνου, ἧς μέρος οὐδέν ἐστι καθ ̓ αὑτὸ σημαν TIKOV: a definition almost word for word the same as in the text.

As the object of names is not only to recall to ourselves some likeness, but also to signify that likeness to others, it is obviously necessary that they should have a conventional meaning, one, that is, generally agreed upon, in order that they may be understood.

2 Aristotle goes on to draw a distinction between simple and compound words : οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἁπλοῖς ὀνόμασιν, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐν τοῖς συμπεπλεγμένοις· ἐν ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέρος οὐδαμῶς σημαντ τικόν, ἐν δὲ τούτοις βούλεται μέν, ἀλλ' οὐδενὸς κεχωρισμένον, οἷον ἐν τῷ ἐπακτροκέλης τὸ κέλης οὐδὲν σημαίνει καθ ̓ ἑαυτό. The parts of the former, he says, are completely without meaning, ovdaμŵs onμAVTIKÁ, whilst in compound words we must suppose (for Aristotle's expression is rather obscure) that though the parts had originally a separate meaning, they do not retain it, but are fused into a new word meaning something quite different; e.g. KáλλTπos has nothing to do with καλὸς ἵππος.

3 Aristotle seems to be answering Plato, who in the Cratylus makes Socrates maintain at considerable length that names have a natural fitness, and must be false or true, in opposition to Hermogenes, who contends that they are conventional. The reference to the noises of animals shows that, according to Aristotle, sounds may express something, and yet not be nouns, unless that expression bears a conventional meaning.

becomes a symbol, since even inarticulate noises-such, for instance, as animals make-express something, and yet none of them are nouns.

Interpretation 2, § 3.

Again, not-man is not a noun; indeed, there is not even an established name to give it, since it is neither a sentence (Xóyos) nor a negation. But let us call it an indefinite noun, inasmuch as it is equally applicable to anything, whether existent or non-exist

ent.

Interpretation 3, § 1.

A verb 2 is that which carries with it a further signification of time, and of which no part by itself has any signification, and it is always a sign3 of the things stated of something else.

Interpretation 3, § 2.

Now, is not well, is not ill, I do not call verbs; for although they carry with them a further signification of time, and always belong to something, yet the variety has no established name. But let us call it

1 oùк-ǎvēρwтos, however, might by convention become a noun. 2 Cf. Poetics, 20, 9: ῥῆμα δὲ φωνὴ συνθετή, σημαντικὴ μετὰ χρόνου, ἧς οὐδὲν μέρος σημαίνει καθ ̓ αὑτό, which again is practically the same as this. τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον is not a very profound differentia for the verb, though as a matter of fact it is true in most languages.

That is to say, a verb cannot stand as a subject: it is always a sign of the predicate; in fact, with Aristotle, as with grammarians, a verb is predicate and copula in one. Verbal substantives, e.g. an infinitive, may be sometimes used as a subject: a verb proper,

never.

+ KATά TIVOS ÚTάpxel, i.e. are predicated of something.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

' indefinite verb,' since it is equally applicable to anything, whether existent or non-existent.

Interpretation 4, § 1.

A sentence is a vocal utterance which by convention has signification, some part of which, taken by itself, has signification, as an utterance, but not as an affirmation or a negation.

Interpretation 4, § 3.

Now every sentence has a meaning, though not as a natural instrument,' but, as I have said before, by convention. But not every sentence is enunciative, those only are in which truth or falsehood is present. But they are not present in all sentences; for instance, a prayer is a sentence, and yet it is neither true nor false. The others, then, let us pass over, as it is to rhetoric or poetry that their examination more properly belongs: it is the enunciative sentence that we have now to consider.

Interpretation 5, § 1.

The primary form of a single enunciative sentence 2 is affirmation; then comes negation: all the others (are

'It is not naturally inherent in the sentence or the words that compose the sentence that they should mean what they do; the signification comes merely from convention. This we see in the case of words that have changed their meaning. (Vide note 3, p. 6.)

2 This seems to be the meaning of εἷς πρῶτος λόγος ἀποφαντικός, though the order is remarkably awkward. Trendelenburg translates it, Est autem enunciatio per se una primum affirmatio, deinde negatio.' The succeeding clause seems to mean that several propositions may be combined into one sentence by means of conjunctions.