made) one by a conjunction. And every enunciative sentence must be formed by a verb, or by an inflection of a verb.

Interpretation 5, § 5.

A simple enunciation is a vocal utterance having a meaning which conveys the belonging, or not belonging, of some predicate, according to the division which we have made of the tenses.1

Interpretation 6, § 1.

Now, affirmation is the enunciation of something as belonging to something. Negation is the enunciation of something as wanting to something. And since we can enunciate as not belonging what really belongs, and as belonging what does not belong, and as belonging what does belong, and as not belonging what does not belong, and respecting times other than the present in the same way; it follows that whatever is affirmed can also be denied, and whatever is denied can also be affirmed. So that it is plain that every affirmation has a negation opposed to it, and every negation an affirmation. And let us call this contradiction; viz. the affirmation and negation that are opposed to one another.

And I say that those propositions are opposed to one another which affirm and deny the same thing of the same thing,2 not equivocally, nor with any other

i.e. in past, present, or future time.

2 Literally, 'that the (proposition) of the same thing about the same thing is opposed.'

31.

32.

33.

such limitation which we further lay down to meet the captiousness of sophists.

Interpretation 7, §§ 6, 7.

1

I say, then, that an affirmation is contradictorily opposed to a negation, the one with a universal signification to the one signifying that the same thing is not universal. For instance, All men are white,' 'Some men are not white,' 'No man is white,' 'Some men are white.' But the opposition is contrary, when the one makes an universal affirmation, the other an universal negation; for instance, 'All men are white,' 'No men are white;' 'All men are just,' 'No men are just.' These, then, cannot be true together, but their contradictories 2 can sometimes be true of the same thing at once, e.g. 'Some men are not white,''Some men are white.'

1 τῷ αὐτῷ ὅτι οὐ καθόλου. This means τῇ τὸ αὐτὸ σημαινούσῃ, κ.τ.λ. Aristotle's style is habitually concise, and sometimes crabbed; cf. ἐν ἀρχῇ ( (64) and passim) for ἐν ἀρχῇ προκειμένον, &c.

2 åνTIKELμévos is used by Aristotle in two distinct senses: (a) The generic sense of any kind of 'opposition,' including both contrary and contradictory, as in (63), &c.; (B) The specific and more unusual sense of ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικειμένος (contradictory), as it is sometimes expressed in full: cf. his definition of it in Prior. Anal. II. 8. 2 : λέγω δ ̓ ἀντικεῖσθαι μὲν τὸ παντὶ τῷ οὐ παντὶ καὶ τὸ τινὶ τῷ ουὐενὶ, ἐναντίως δὲ τὸ παντὶ τῷ οὐδενὶ καὶ τὸ τινὶ τῷ οὐ τινὶ ὑπάρχειν. We find both uses below in (63). Similarly, Aristotle divides totov into opos and toov, Top. I. 4, 2. It should be borne in mind that in his time there was no fixed logical terminology, but that he was creating one; and even in the present day the language of logic seems to be singularly vague and equivocal.

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PRIOR ANALYTICS I.1

Prior Analytics I. 1, §§ 2, 3.

སྐས་

A premiss, then, is a sentence which affirms or denies something of something. It may be either universal or particular or indefinite. By 'universal' I mean with a predicate belonging to the whole or to none; by 'particular,' with one belonging or not belonging to some, or not belonging to all; and by indefinite,' with a predicate belonging or not belonging without the mark of universal or particular; for instance, 'The science of opposites is the same,' or 'Pleasure is not a good thing. Now the demonstrative proposition differs from the dialectical, in that the demonstrative is an assumption of one of a pair of contradictories2 (for he that demonstrates does not offer a choice, but assumes), whilst the dialectical proposition is a choice offered of the contradictories.

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1 Tà ávaλutiká, Aristotle's treatises on Logic, wherein reasoning is resolved (avaλów) into its simplest forms' (Liddell and Scott). The Prior Analytics are mainly concerned with deductive reasoning and the laws of the syllogism; the Posterior Analytics deal rather with induction, and constitute the part of Aristotle which comes nearest to Bacon and to modern philosophy. The Prior Analytics are 'prior both in natural order and in common arrangement, perhaps also in date of composition.

2 avrípaσis is here used, as defined by Aristotle in (32), viz. the pair of opposed propositions, not as in modern logic, the relation between them.

36.

37.

Prior Analytics I. 1, §§ 5-8.

I call that a' term ' into which the premiss is broken up: to wit, both the predicate and that of which it is predicated, with or without the sign of existence or non-existence.

A Syllogism is a form of speech in which certain assumptions are made, and something different from the premisses necessarily follows from these being (true). And by follows from these being (true) I mean follows because of them; and by follows because of them' I mean needs the addition of no extraneous

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term to make it necessarily true. I call that a perfect syllogism, then, which requires nothing else besides the premisses assumed, to make the necessity of the conclusion manifest; and an imperfect syllogism that which requires the addition either of one or of more propositions which-though they are necessary through the terms laid down in the premisses-have yet not been assumed in the premisses.

Now for one thing to be continued (as a part) in something else as a whole,' and for the latter to be predicated of all the former, is the same thing.

We call it to be predicated of all' when it is not possible to take any one of the things denoted of the subject, of which the other term shall not be affirmed; and so also with 'predicated of none.'

· ἐν ὅλῳ εἶναι ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ. cf. (39) which shows clearly that ἕτερον is meant to be the subject and oλ érépy the predicate. The subject is contained in the predicate extensively; vide Trendelenburg (note on § 24), who quotes for this use of ἐν: ὁ τίς ἄνθρωπος ἐν εἴδει μὲν vлáрxeι тη ȧvůрάл (Сat. 5. 2); also Physics IV. 3. 3.

Prior Analytics I. 2, § 1.

Since every proposition conveys either belonging (simply), or belonging of necessity, or the possibility of belonging; and of these some are affirmative and others negative under each mode; and again of the affirmative and negative propositions, some are universal and others particular, and others indefinite; the negative proposition, in the case of belonging universally, is necessarily convertible in its terms; e.g. : if no pleasure is good, neither will any good thing be a pleasure. The affirmative proposition must be convertible, not indeed universally but particularly; as, if every pleasure be good, some good thing will also be a pleasure. Of the particular propositions, the affirmative must be convertible particularly (for if some pleasure be good, some good thing will also be a pleasure); but the negative need not, for it does not follow, if man' does not belong to some animal,' that animal' does not belong to some man. 2

1

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Prior Analytics I. 4, §§ 2, 3.

When three terms are so related to one another that the last (i.e. the minor) is contained in the middle as a whole, and the middle is or is not contained in the first (i.e. the major) as a whole, there must be a per

1i.e. So that the converse proposition is particular; thus A and

I are both converted év μépei, A ‘per accidens,' and I simply.

2 The false conversion here indicated would be 'Some animals are not men .. some men are not animals.' O cannot be converted except by 'contra-position or negation;' thus, 'Some animals are not men,' ... 'Some not-men are animals.'

3 ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ πρώτῳ. Vide note on (37).

38.

39.