BAR.-See ESTOPPEL, 12.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES.

1. In an action by the holders of certain promissory notes against an indorser who denied the genuineness of the indorsements, a deed of trust executed by the drawer of the notes, for the purpose of pr>tecting and saving harmless the defendant as indorser, was held admissible as evidence of his ratification of the indorsements of such notes as corresponded with those described in the deed of trust. Woodruff vs. Munroe, 33 Md., 146.

2. A promise by an indorser to pay a draft subsequent to its dishonor, is presumptive evidence that the draft had been presented for payment in due time, and dishonored, and that he had received due notice thereof. This presumption, however, is one of fact for the jury, and not an absolute conclusion to be drawn by the Court. It is prima facie only, and liable to be rebutted. Lewis Bros. vs. Brehme, 33 Md., 412.

3. W. made and delivered sundry negotiable promissory notes, and, at the same time, to secure their payment, executed to the payee a mortgage upon real estate, which was duly recorded. The notes and mortgage came by indorsement to the hands of S., by whom they were surrendered to W., who gave him, in lieu thereof, a new note, secured by a mortgage upon other property. W. afterward, and before the maturity of the notes thus lifted, through the agency of D. & C., caused them again to be negotiated for value, to other parties, who received them in good faith, and without notice of prior transactions. The mortgage given to secure them remained uncancelled on record. W. afterward made and delivered to D. & C. sundry other negotiable notes, and to secure their payment gave a mortgage upon the premises covered by the first mortgage. A portion of these notes were subsequently assigned for value, to F. Held: 1. That, as against the holders and indorsers of the notes which had been re-negotiated, W. and his subsequent mortgagees were equitably estopped to claim that the lien of the first mortgage had been discharged by the transaction with S. 2. That the equitable lien held by F., under the last mortgage, must be postponed to that of the indorsers and holders of the notes secured by the first mortgage. Jordan et al. vs. Forlong, 19 (Critchfield,) Ohio, 89.

4. An action on a negotiable promissory note, indorsed by the payee in blank, may be brought in the name of any person who consents

thereto, although the note is the property of an insolvent bank in the hands of receivers. Baker vs. Stenchfield, 57 Me., 363.

5. A bill of exchange indorsed for accomodation, and delivered to the maker on the express condition that if it was not that day discounted by a particular bank, it was to be returned to the indorser or destroyed. Discount by that bank being refused, the bill was passed, with notice to the United States Marshal to pay executions, for the satisfaction of which the money was to be raised from the bank. Held, that there was no authority to so apply the bill. Hickerson vs. Raiguel, 2 Heiskell, (Tenn.,) 329.

6. A note for dollars, drawing interest from date, taken as a payment, is not presumed, in the absence of proof, to be taken at a discount, but at its nominal value. Lancaster vs. Arendell, 2 Heiskell, 434.

7. To charge the indorser of a promissory note, payable without interest, one day after sight, presentment to the maker and demand of payment must be made within a reasonable time after indorsement. The question of diligence in making presentment, etc., where there is no conflict of evidence, is a question of law.

The maker and indorser of a note in suit resided in the same city, and the payee three miles away. Several days after indorsement the payee was called out of the State, as a witness, and detained three weeks. The presentment, etc., was seventy-three days after the date of the indorsement. Held, that the indorser was discharged.-Alexander vs. Parsons, 3 Lansing, (N. Y.,) 333.

8. A draft signed by the secretary of an insurance company alone, is not binding on the company, where there was no evidence of any usage or law giving him authority to bind the company. First National Bank of Kansas City vs. Hogan, 47 Mo., 472.

9. It is no defense to an action on a promissory note, by an indorsee against the maker, that it was made without any consideration to the maker, or that it was understood between him and the payee, that the latter was to take care of it; and this, although the holder had, when he took the note, full notice of the circumstances under which it was made.-- Thatcher vs. W. R. Nat. Bank, 19 Mich., 196.

10. A "waiver of notice" by an indorser will not be construed to extend beyond the import of the terms used, and hence constitutes no excuse for the want of due presentment of the note to the maker for payment.-Voorhies vs. Atlee et al., 29 Iowa, 49, (Stiles). See, also, Rhodes vs. Seymour, 36 Conn., 1.

11. The obligations of a guarantor of a promissory note are, that he will pay the same if the maker fails to pay at maturity, and the holder shall use due diligence by suit to collect the same: 16.

12. Due diligence, in the absence of special circumstances, would, upon the failure of the maker to pay, require suit to be instituted against him by the holder at the fist regular term of court, in the defendant's venue, after maturity. It was accordingly held, that failure to bring such suit until after two terms had passed, showed such a want of diligence as that the warrantor was released: Voorhies vs. Atlee et al., 29 Iowa, 49.

13. In order to defeat the rights of a bona fide holder for value, of a promissory note which it is claimed was procured by fraud, it must be shown, either directly or by circumstances, that he had notice of such infirmity. Proof of such fact and circumstances as would have put a reasonable man upon inquiry in relation thereto, are not sufficient; and an instruction to that effect was held erroneous: Lake vs. Reed, 29 Iowa, 258.

14. Where the holder of a promissory note, issued without a stamp, but afterwards stamped without authority, received it with notice of these facts, they may be properly pleaded against him as a defense in an action on the note. The case of Blackwell vs. Denie, 23 Iowa, 63, distinguished from the present one: First National Bank of Centreville vs: Dougherty, 29 Iowa, 260.

15. An instrument, payable "in currency," is not negotiable at common law, nor under the statute (Rev. S., § 1797,) unless it is manifest from the terms of the instrument that such was the intent of the parties. The use of the words "order" or "bearer" will not alone manifest such intent: Following Rindskoff, Bros. & Co. vs. Barrett, 11 Iowa, 172; Huse vs. Humblin et al, 501, 29 Iowa.

16. Certificate of deposit in the following form: "Banking House of P. & S., Buffalo, February 20, 1969, J. McD. has deposited in this Bank $1,947.68, payable to order of himself in currency, on the return of this certificate, with six per cent. interest if left over one month. (Signed) P. & S." Held, that the instrument was not negotiable. Ib.

17. Indorsers of non-negotiable instruments are liable to indorsees thereof, without demand upon the maker and notice of non-payment: 1b.

18. The alteration of a promissory note in a material respect by any one of several makers thereof, assuming to have authority so to

do, and for the honest purpose of making it conform to the original intention of the parties, without the express, though with the implied, assent of the holder, will not prevent a recovery by the latter against all the makers in an action declaring upon the note as though in the form originally delivered: Murray vs. Graham et al., 520, 29 Iowa.

19. Where a negotiable note, and a mortgage securing it, given to a railroad company, were attached to its negotiable bond, which recited that they were transferred as security for, and should be transferrable only in connection with, the bond, this was an indorsement of the note, within the law merchant: Crosby vs. Roub, 16 Wis., 616, re-affirmed: Bange vs. Flint, 544, 25 Wis.

20. A promissory note was made and indorsed in blank in the State of New York, where it was payable. By the law of New York no agreement different from that which the law infers from a blank indorsement can be proved by parol. In a suit on the note against the indorser in this State, it was held that parol evidence of a special agreement, different from that implied by law, would be received: Downer vs. Cheesebrough, 39; 36 Conn.

BLANK INDORSEMENT.-See BILLS AND NOTES, 4; EVIDENCE, 2.

BOND.-See CONTRACT, 5; LIMITATIONS, 2.

BROKER.

1. The order of a customer to a broker to buy stock, deliverable at any time, at buyer's option, in sixty days, does not authorize the broker to buy the stock himself at thirty days. and deliver it to his customer at the end of sixty days at an increased price and interest, besides the usual commission; and a usage of brokers to do so is bad; nor is the exchange of bought and sold notes between the broker and his customer, nor the giving of his notes by the customer in payment for the stock, in ignorance of the broker's conduct, a ratification of his acts: Day vs. Holmes, 306, 103 Mass.

2. A broker, employed to purchase stock, contracted for it in his own name with J. S., who owned it at the time but had made a prior contract for its sale. The employer, for groundless reasons, repudiated the contract; but the broker having no knowledge of or reason to suspect the prior sale by J. S., paid for the stock when tendered to him. Hell, that the Gen. Sts., c. 105, § 6, making void contracts for the sale of stocks not owned by the seller, did not debar the bro

ker from recovering from his employer the amount so paid: Brown vs. Phelps, 313; 103 Mass.

3. The defendant in the month of March put into the hands of the plaintiff, a real estate broker, for sale, a house in a certain city street, at the price of $6,500, the plaintiff to receive a commission of one per cent. if he sold the house, the defendant to have the right to sell it himself without being liable to a commission, and the plaintiff not to advertise. The plaintiff entered the house on his books and in December and January following advertised houses for sale on that street. G., who lived on the street and was desirous of finding a house near by for a friend, saw the advertisement and went to the plaintiff's office and learned that the defendant's house was for sale. He informed his friend, and the latter went to the defendant and negotiated with him for it and finally purchased it. The purchaser did not see the plaintiff nor go to his office, and G.'s action in the matter was wholly voluntary. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to his commission: Lincoln vs. McClatchie, 136; 36 Conn.

CAVEAT EMPTOR.-See TRESPASS, 2.

CHAMPERTY.

An agreement between an attorney and client that the attorney shall receive as a contingent fee, a certain portion of the amount recovered against the other party, is not void as being champertous. The case of Boardman & Brown vs. Thompson, 25 Iowa; 487, distinguished from the present one: McDonald vs. The Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co., 170; 29 Iowa, (Stiles.)

CHANCERY JURISDICTION.

1. Suit was brought on a bill against maker and indorser, and judgment by default, the indorser having no knowledge of an unauthorized disposition of the bill, and believing that it had passed according to the condition on which it was to be used. Held, sufficient ground for relief in equity, there being no plea, demurrer or motion to dismiss. Hickerson vs. Raiguel, 2 Heiskell, 329.

2. A Court of Equity will set aside a verdict and judgment of the Circuit Court, had upon an issue devisavit vel non against a will, if it appear that such verdict and judgment were obtained by fraud. If, in such case, the will has already beea probated in common form, the court will reinstate such probate: Smith vs. Harrison, 2 Heiskell, (Tenn.,) 230.