establishing a security agency within NPC to perform safeguard functions. This requirement had its origin in several earlier studies and in congressional hearings in which questions about the adequacy of safeguards were raised. During these hearings it was suggested that the importance of the public interest involved might call for direct Federal involvement in security forces. In February 1975, the NRC Commissioners established the broad objectives and scope for this assessment. They called for a conceptual analysis and comparison of a Federal guard force and a totally private force. For this study, NRC contracted with five private organizations and numerous consultants to supply information at a total cost of about $419,000. Four of the five study reports by these organizations related to security at facilities while the fifth discussed transportation of nuclear materials. The first study was done by the United States Marshals Service. Based upon research, discussions with private security officials, and visits to three nuclear sites, the report, dated October 1975, noted that guard forces at commercial nuclear facilities had --weak allegiance, --high turnover rate, --poor background checks, --poor supervision, --inferior equipment, --weak legal authority, --poor rapport with local police, --poor mobility, --no uniform standards for physical fitness, --low public confidence, and --little training. The second study was done by the International Research and Technology Corporation. In its report dated July, 1975, it concluded that nine guards would be needed to counter an attempted sabotage by several outside individuals with no inside help. This conclusion was based on the premise th.. the facility employed certain protective system equipment. Several of the facilities we visited were protected by this type of equipment but none was required to keep nine guards on at all times. The third study was done by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc. Its objective was to assess the capability of State and local law enforcement agencies to respond to certain hypothetical attacks and other criminal incidents throughout the United States. The study assessed the response capability of law enforcement agencies at 17 nuclear powerplants and concluded that State and local law enforcement agencies can supply sufficient manpower, but that deployment of manpower would be uncoordinated due to the lack of formal agreements between responding agencies. The study also concluded that most agencies lacked welltrained tactical teams and the necessary equipment (automatic weapons, long guns, body armor, etc.). The fourth report on guard forces was the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory study we mentioned on page 6. This report concluded that guard forces would have to be augmented in numbers, training, and equipment to be able to counter a threat level of several individuals. In spite of all the evidence from the four studies that existing guard forces were inadequate, the NRC study concluded in its August 1976 report to the Congress, that: "*** creation of a Federal guard force for * NRC can fulfill its responsibilities to assure adequate physical protection of licensed facilities and materials through stringently enforced regulations." Security guards have limited authority for using firearms NRC has not clearly defined the authority of private guards for using firearms to protect powerplants. The lack of specific firearm instructions is due, in part, to the local laws which place heavy restrictions on the use of weapons by private guard forces. For the most part, local laws allow the use of deadly force only in cases of selfdefense or in the defense of others. These laws do not allow the use of deadly force to protect property. The rights of guards in this matter are generally no greater than those of private citizens. The problems associated with the use of private guards has been recognized for several years. For example, an AEC memorandum in March 1974, stated, in part: "The Office of General Counsel has researched the point extensively and has taken the position law. In short, the AEC's official position should be to take a soft line regarding the use of firearms. This should turn into a nonissue In January 1975, a Committee on Safeguards Policy of the Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., also envisioned problems with private guards. Accordingly, they told NRC: "A dominant question relates to the right of According to NRC's Office of the Executive Legal Director and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in the Department of Justice, there are no Federal laws governing the actions of private guards in this regard. The problems of private guards and the use of firearms is not restricted to power plants but extends to privately owned facilities that possess quantities of so-called special nuclear material (types of material which can be used to make nuclear weapons). As part of another assignment we are addressing, among other things, problems arising in the use of firearms at different types of nuclear facilities. We expect to issue a report on the subject shortly. CHAPTER 3 WHY HAS THE NRC PROGRAM FOR SECURITY AT NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS FAILED? NPC has a two-pronged approach to assuring powerplant security. The first part is to require utilities to prepare plans which describe how the powerplants are to be protected. The second part is to inspect the powerplants to see that the security systems used are in compliance with the security plans. REQUIREMENTS FOR The first and most important assumption that requirements should be based on is the level and type of threat that powerplants are expected to protect against. That is, how many individuals armed with what weapons and knowledge should the security system be able to successfully counter. Instead, NRC has NRC has not made this assumption. suggested that utilities consult two documents 1/ which NRC believes provide an adequate basis for a physical security plan. These documents contain general advice on how to detect, deter, and protect a powerplant against intrusion by using armed guard forces, protective barriers, intrusion detection systems, and liaison with local law enforcement agencies. They do not specify any minimum threat level. Because these documents are general and do not specify a specific threat level, the utilities must exercise a lot of judgment in deciding on the characteristics and performance level of security systems. This decision is based in large part on how much importance the utility attaches to the issue of sabotage. At the powerplant which had a rather extensive security system, the security officer there said he had been able to convince management of the necessity for good security. 1/Regulatory Guide 1.17, "Protection of Nuclear Power NRC, of course, must review and approve these security plans. This approval is made by four individuals with backgrounds in engineering or physics; most are not trained in security. Moreover, there is no documentation supporting the basis for their approval of the security plans. The reviewers are not given any criteria or guidance for determining the acceptability of the plan, nor have they obtained any expertise from outside NRC. Moreover, these reviewers seldom visit the powerplant to see the security system or devices or to note any unique features of the powerplant and its surroundings. Because of NPC's failure to specify the minimum threat level or to give utilities and the reviewers any other guidance, approved security plans call for protection of vastly different degrees. NRC officials recognize these differences and blame the current general requirements for the situation. NRC is well aware of the need for improvements to the security requirements. In an October 16, 1974, report to AEC we concluded that (1) utilities needed specific guidance on the level of threat that their security systems must be prepared to handle and (2) performance criteria should be established for security systems. In an October 31, 1974, response, AEC said that our report did not reflect the impact of proposed regulations that were then under consideration. In November 1974, the proposed regulations for powerplant security were published for public comment. But as of February 1, 1977, they had still not been adopted. NRC told us that internal problems such as reorganizations and higher priority work had caused the delay. The proposed regulations are an improvement over the current situation because they would set a minimum sabotage threat level. That is, they are intended to require the security necessary to counter a sabotage force of (1) a determined, violent, external assault or attack by stealth of several persons that are well armed and well trained, and one knowledgeable insider and (2) an internal threat by an insider including an employee in any position. The proposed regulations also are more specific as to the types of security systems that should be provided. However, proposed regulations give the utilities latitude with regard to the security systems that should be installed. The regulations reserve for NRC the right to approve "measures for protection against industrial sabotage other than those required by this section if the applicant or licensee |