Because of the inaccuracies and other limitations associated with the accountability and material control systems for nuclear material, the physical security systems must become increasingly responsible for making sure that nuclear material cannot be stolen. Accountability on plant basis The Commission imposes accountability constraints upon licensees on a total plant basis to assess the significance of total plant inventory discrepancies. Material unaccounted for within these constraints is attributed to measurement inaccuracies and accepted as normal processing occurrences. The facilities, however, comprise individual process operations, referred to as material balance areas. material balance areas are intended to localize nuclear material losses or thefts. Because accountability constraints The are imposed on an entire plant basis, a problem associated with an individual material balance area may not be isolated since nuclear material losses and gains experienced elsewhere in the plant may cancel it out. The Commission should change its procedures and monitor the accounting of special nuclear material by individual material balance area. PROTECTING SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL Physical security controls and procedures that the Commission requires its licensees to adopt include such measures as --armed guards; --alarmed fences and vaults; --electronic detection devices; --liaison with local law enforcement authorities; and --access and exit controls. Physical security requirements were significantly upgraded in November 1973 and even since that time, many additional improvements have been implemented. GAO found specific shortcomings in the physical security systems used at the three licensees visited, these included some items of noncompliance that the Commission inspectors also identified. Weaknesses included: --security alarms that were improperly tested; --unclear requirements as to where armed guards should be placed; --poor personnel search and access control practices; and --a lack of emergency lighting at certain key security areas. In commenting on this report, Commission officials informed GAO that all noncompliance items have been corrected. Increasing threat of terrorism While threats of terrorism are not uncommon to any industry or institution, the nuclear industry is particularly vulnerable. It is difficult to predict the exact dimensions, nature, and level of sophistication of the terrorist threat to nuclear facilities, however, recent Commission studies suggest that the probable threat has increased and that security systems at commercial fuel processing facilities should be upgraded. The Commission is considering increasing the minimum threat level that security systems are designed to protect against. The Commission should require security systems be upgraded to protect against an increased threat level. Guards authority limited The Commission has not clearly defined the authority of private guards to use firearms in protecting special nuclear material, due in part to individual State laws. which restrict the use of such weapons by private guard forces. For the most part, State laws allow the use of deadly force only in cases involving an imminent threat to life. The rights of guards are no greater than those of private citizens. Commission regulations require that guards responding to a possible special nuclear material threat determine if a threat really exists, assess its extent, and act to neutralize the threat, either by themselves or by calling for assistance from the local law enforcement authorities. The regulations, however, do not specifically address the issue of when a guard can legally use a firearm to protect special nuclear material. By interposing themselves between special nuclear material and an adversary, actual circumstances may justify the guards using firearms in self-defense. However, circumstances may also be encountered where the use of firearms is necessary 21-467 O 78 10 to protect the material but because personal danger is not evident, guards may not be explicity authorized to use fire arms. The Energy Research and Development Administration rules governing the use of firearms contrast sharply with the Commission's regulations. discharge their firearms if needed, killing the person or Agency guards are authorized to persons being fired upon if such action is necessary to prevent special nuclear material from being stolen. The Commission believes that its regulations provide for effective guard response within the limits of the law. The text of the Commission's comments and GAO's evaluation are contained in appendix II. GAO believes that restrictions on the use of firearms by guards at commercial licensed facilities diminishes their ability to protect special nuclear material. The Commission should seek Federal and/or State legislative authority, as appropriate, to allow guards at licensed facilities to use firearms to prevent the theft of special nuclear material if such action is the minimum amount of force necessary. Security clearances needed The keystone to a good security system is reliable and trustworthy employees. stration and its predecessor agency, the Atomic Energy The Energy Research and Development AdminiCommission, have for many years required personnel background investigations and security clearances of its employees and those of its contractors. The Commission, on the other hand, does not require employees of commercial fuel processers to undergo security clearances even though many have access to special nuclear material or have critical safeguard responsibilities. At one of the licensees GAO visited, a security clearance screening program would have prevented a guard from being employed who had a criminal record under another name, including a 20-year sentence for bank robbery. While employed at the licensee, the guard was arrested for alleged involvement in a bank robbery and shooting incident. adopted a security clearance program for its employees and The Commission has has published, for public comment, a proposal to require employees of its licensees to be cleared. The Commission, should require a personnel security clearance program for licensees processing significant quantities of special nuclear material. NEED TO CONSIDER RESTRUCTURING While the Commission and the Energy Research and Development Administration both rely on interacting systems of physical security and material control and accountability to achieve nuclear safeguards, they sometimes have different procedures and different requirements. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's accountability regulations are more formal and detailed while the Energy Research and Development Administration's physical security requirements are stronger. There is no clear cut indication of which agency's requirements in total are stronger or more effective. Nuclear facilities having similar safeguard needs may have different levels of control and protection and correspondingly present different degrees of vulnerability. There are highly desirable elements of both systems. The best in both systems should be incorporated into an optimum set of national safeguards regulations for consistent and uniform protection. A prior GAO report entitled "Shortcomings in the Systems Used to Control and Protect Highly Dangerous Nuclear Material" (Classified Secret/Restricted Data) discussed problems with the systems used by the Energy Research and Development Administration to account for and protect special nuclear material at the facilities it sponsors. The Energy Research and Development Administration had identified improvements needed in the physical security systems of its facilities including the need for additional guards, alarms, doorway detectors, night vision devices and improved communications equipment. In view of the inaccuracies and other limitations associated with the systems used to account for special nuclear material, the physical security systems must be made increasingly responsible for making sure that nuclear material cannot be stolen. GAO recommended that the Administrator emphasize to the Congress the need for providing additional funds to correct identified physical security deficiencies and, in the interim, give top priority to reprogramming available funds to make the needed physical security improvements. Although this and the prior GAO report focus on safeguarding special nulcear materials, the concept of an optimum safeguards program administered by an independent organization applies equally to the broader issue of assuring that the health and safety of the public is adequately protected from the hazards of nuclear power. The appropriateness of a single Government agency responsible for both promoting and regulating the use of nuclear power has been questioned for almost two decades. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 realigned these responsibilities by separating the Atomic Energy Commission into the Energy Research and Development Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The first to promote nuclear development and the second to regulate the industry. The act, was only partially successful. It was designed, in part, to eliminate the conflict of interest inherent within the former Atomic Energy Commission and to provide the public with a higher degree of confidence that special nulcear materials were protected and that there would be no undue risk to the public health or safety. However, the act did not give the Commission responsibility to regulate the Energy Research and Development Administration's nuclear facilities. As a result, this agency is responsible for building an adequate level of safeguards into its programs as they are developed and operated. To minimize the risk to the public of subordinating regulatory to promotional functions, to maximize objectivity and impartiality, and to increase public confidence in the safe operation of nuclear facilities, GAO believes it is necessary to assure an independent determination is made that Federal and commercial nuclear facilities are being operated in the best interests of the security, health, and safety of the Nation. In GAO's view there are three alternative methods to achieve this objective. One alternative is to give the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the authority and responsibility for establishing policies, standards, and requirements with oversight responsibility for all Energy Research and Development Administration nuclear facilities. A drawback to giving the Commission oversight over Energy Research and Development Administration facilities engaged in the nuclear weapons program is that the number of persons with knowledge of plant layouts, nuclear stockpiles, and, perhaps, how nuclear weapons are made may increase. However, the increase could be minimized by (1) transferring the agency personnel currently inspecting the weapon facilities to the Commission and (2) establishing within the Commission a small group responsible for review of the weapons facilities with access to national security information on a "need to know" basis. If the Commission is given oversight responsibility, GAO envisions it would start at the point special nuclear material is first produced and continue through the weapon |