ties touching on issues sensitive to the public cannot operate in a vacuum, and views from all interested parties contribute to the formulation and implementation of sound safeguards programs.

In our review of the GAO reports we find the current NRC actions to upgrade safeguards in fuel facilities, transportation and reactors. are consistent with most of the GAO's recommendations.

In reviewing GAO's draft report concerning safeguarding of nuclear materials, we commented on the recommendations in that draft. There are two matters which I would like to address briefly.

The first is the draft recommendation that the NRC specify the authority and rights of licensees' guards in protecting special nuclear material and to work with State and local jurisdictions to obtain the authority needed to allow the guards to use a maximum degree of force in countering attempts at stealing nuclear materials. The issue of the use of force is extremely complex and has been a matter of continuing concern to the NRC.

The authority and capabilities of non-Federal guards at nuclear facilities received intensive and thorough consideration in the Security Agency study provided to the Congress by the NRC in accordance with the Energy Reorganization Act. The NRC believes that State law is the authority that governs a private guard's privilege to use force in the protection of property, and that no regulation or other instruction in this area from us can override or overrule the law of a State in which an incident occurs.

Thus, in practical terms, we feel that work with State and local jurisdictions to obtain the authority needed to use an appropriate degree of force should give emphasis to the drafting of model legislation.

Recently the Commission published for public comment proposed changes in the regulations in 10 CFR part 73, to codify the policy statement contained in a March 11, 1976, mailgram from NRC to licensees.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Gossick, I believe at this point it would be appropriate that the document referred to be inserted at the appropriate place in the record.

Without objection, that may be done.

You may proceed.

Mr. GOSSICK. These changes were published for comment on February 10, 1977-42 FR 8382-and will provide regulatory instructions for effective guard response within the limits of the law. This policy is also codified in new rules in 10 CFR part 73.55 dealing with the physical protection of power reactors. In short, we believe these rules define as clearly as is now possible the safeguards measures expected from a security guard.

A second GAO draft recommendation on which we commented is one calling for NRC to be given regulatory safeguards authority over the civil activities of the Energy Research and Development Administration. We believe that the implementation of this recommendation would entail a considerable number of complications and problems.

It would, for example, require a greatly expanded scope of NRC involvement with ERDA facilities which conceivably could include licensing, inspection, and enforcement with a commensurate need for

increased resources. Issues that would arise in undertaking such an arrangement would include the question of how to treat health and safety considerations, whether regulatory responsibility could be limited only to safeguards, and whether licensing authority would be included. To implement the recommendation would, of course, require legislation.

NRC and ERDA are working intensively in close coordination to upgrade safeguards incomparable fashion. For example, a recent Commission decision to significantly upgrade the safeguards at nuclear fuel facilities was the result of a joint task force on safeguards made up of NRC and ERDA staff personnel, and is being implemented with the concurrence and cooperation of ERDA. Senior operating officials work together constantly on problems of achieving comparable safeguards, and there is a formal Safeguards Liaison Board established by the two agencies which deals with comparability as its top priority matter. We understand the final GAO report contains further recommendations in this regard which we have not had a chance to consider. We will, of course, be commenting on the final GAO report, and the views of the NRC will be submitted to the cognizant congressional committees.

Mr. DINGELL. At this point, Mr. Gossick, I am sure that copies of that have been made available to you, have they not?

Mr. GOSSICK. Yes; sir. We received them over the weekend.

Mr. DINGELL. And also to General Starbird and to the ERDA folks. Gentlemen, you are specifically requested to review these matters and to make comments-I don't care where else—but to this committee also, in specific detail.

Mr. GoSSICK. Yes; sir.

Mr. DINGELL. The Chair would very much appreciate having those at your earliest reasonable convenience.

The legislation authorizing your two agencies is before the Congress and has been referred to this committee sequentially or will be, so that we can see to it that these matters are properly before this committee as we go into matters now under consideration.

You may proceed, Mr. Cossick.

Mr. GOSSICK. The NRC has a number of actions underway to enhance safeguards. On February 24, 1977, effective new rules for the physical protection of nuclear powerplants against sabotage were published. There new protection requirements will be implemented in an orderly fashion with many security program features implemented by May 25, 1977.

On March 17, 1977, we published for comment in the Federal Register proposed rules to require clearances for persons having access to or control over special nuclear material. These clearance requirements would apply to persons in the fuel cycle industry, transportation, and power reactors.

In July, 1976, ERDA and NRC began reviewing recommendations of a joint ERDA-NRC task force on safeguards for nuclear fuel facilities. The unclassified report of that task force was released to the public in February, 1977. ERDA and NRC are in general agreement concerning recommendations of the joint task force report. Accordingly, the Commission has decided to undertake a general program to upgrade safeguards at such facilities.

The Commission decided to go beyond the recommendations of the task force by accelerating the upgrading of safeguards against theft by external attack and by extending the scope of the upgrading program to cover nuclear materials in transportation as well as in nuclear fuel facilities.

The first phase of this program will strengthen safeguards against terrorist attack. Over the longer term the program will strengthen safeguards against theft or sabotage by internal conspiracy. Public rulemaking is expected to commence sometime this summer.

Shortly, the Commission intends to publish for public comment a proposed change to the regulations in 10 CFR parts 50, 70, and 73, which would require licensees to develop and implement safeguards contingency plans. Such plans, which would necessarily be intimately related to or combined within physical security plans, are intended to insure that each licensee's responses to safeguards contingencies are preplanned and carried out in a structured, predictable, nonemotional manner and coordinated with law enforcement or Federal agency

responses.

In 1976, the material control and accounting systems at licensee fuel cycle plants were significantly upgraded through implementation of improved fundamental nuclear material controls, which included new controls within plants to localize losses, improved validation procedures, limitations on the accumulation of scrap, and procedures to provide current knowledge of the location and quantities of containers of special nuclear material.

In addition, a task force has been conducting a comprehensive review of the functions and capabilities of material control and accounting in the overall safeguards systems in order to establish the framework and path for the future. We expect recommendations from the task force in the near future.

In closing, I would like to remind the subcommittee again that recently announced Presidential decisions not to support or encourage reprocessing and plutonium recycle and to defer commercialization of plutonium breeder technology do not eliminate the need for safeguards. Nuclear materials and existing fuel cycle facilities such as those fabricating high enriched uranium for the naval reactors program must still be safeguarded against diversion or sabotage. Power reactors must also be assured adequate protection. Accordingly, we expect our efforts in this developing field to continue.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. As you know, we have provided detailed responses to a number of questions from the subcommittee. I and senior staff members of the NRC will be pleased to answer any further questions you may have.

[The proposed change to 10 CFR part 73 follows:]

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[10 CFR Part 73]

PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS

Guard Force Response to an Alarm

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has under consideration amendments to its regulations in 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Ma

terials" which would clarify the responsibilities of the onsite guards for the protection of special nuclear material from theft and licensed plants from industrial sabotage, and would assure uniformity in the application of regulatory requirements in this important area.

The present regulations require that, in response to an alarm, guards determine if a threat exists and, if so, assess the level of threat, call for assistance from local law enforcement authorities, and initiate measures against the threat. There has been some misunderstanding by licensees concerning the relative priority of the need for personal action by guards and the need to obtain assistance from local authorities.

The proposed amendment would eliminate this misunderstanding. It would establish that the onsite security force's first priority is to assess the level of a threat and convey the nature of that threat to the proper law enforcement authorities, in accord with prearranged security plans. The proposed amendment would also establish that the second priority is to take action to protect special nuclear material from theft and the plant from sabotage. In such instances, the security force would be expected to take appropriate delaying action while awaiting assistance. It is also made clear that the use of deadly force by guards should not exceed normally justifiable limits.

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and section 553 of Title 5 of the United States Code, notice is hereby given that adoption of the following amendment to 10 CFR Part 73 of the Code of Federal Regulations is contemplated. All interested persons who desire to submit written comments or suggestions with respect to the proposed amendment, or any other matter pertinent to the subject of this notice, should send them to the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch, by April 11, 1977. Copies of comments on the proposed amendment may be examined in the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

1. Paragraph (g) (2) of § 73.50 is amended to read as follows:

§ 74.50 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities.

(g) Response requirement.

*

(2) Upon detection of abnormal presence or activity of persons or vehicles within an isolation zone, a protected area, a material access area or a vital area, or upon evidence of intrusion into a protected area, a material access area or a vital area, the licensee security organization shall:

(i) Determine whether or not a threat exists,

(ii) Assess the extent of the threat, if any,

(iii) Inform local law enforcement agencies of the threat and request assistance, if necessary,

(iv) Require guards to interpose themselves between the special nuclear material and any person attempting entry for purposes of industrial sabotage or theft, and to intercept any person exiting with special nuclear material, and (v) Instruct guards to prevent or delay the theft or industrial sabotage by using a sufficient degree of force to counter that degree of force directed at them including the use of deadly force when there is reasonable belief it is necessary in self-defense or in the defense of others.

(Sec. 1611, Pub. L. 83-703, 68 Stat. 948, Pub. L. 93-377, 88 Stat. 475; Sec. 201, Pub. L. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1243 (42 U.S.C. 2201, 5841))

Dated at Washington, D.C. this 4th day of February, 1977.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

SAMUEL J. CHILK, Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 77-4165 Filed 2-9-77; 8:45 am]

Mr. DINGELL. The Chair thanks you for your assistance to the committee.

General Starbird.

STATEMENT OF ALFRED D. STARBIRD

Mr. STARBIRD. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have this chance to appear again before this committee. Mr. Fri, who is the Acting Administrator for ERDA, has asked me to express his regrets for being unable personally to attend. He is out of the country due to a prior important official commitment and could not cancel the arrangements. I have with me today several witnesses, because some of your questions lay outside of my primary field of activity in ERDA. The main. ones are Mr. Robert Allnutt, Acting Assistant Administrator for Administration, Dr. Doug Bauer of the Division of Nuclear Research and Applications; Mr. John Keto of the Office of Governmental Relations; Mr. Richard Kennedy, who is from the Division of Safety, Standards and Compliance; and Mr. Peter Brush, who is Assistant General Counsel.

Mr. DINGELL, Gentlemen, we welcome you all.

Mr. STARBIRD. I have a statement which is 91% pages long. I would like, with your permission, to drop out phrases and clauses as I read that statement and thereby shorten the time it will take. I think it can be easily followed. I would like to ask that the full statement be incorporated in the record.

Mr. DINGELL. That is entirely appropriate.

Without objection, your full statement will appear in the record, and you are recognized.

Mr. STARBIRD. Mr. Chairman, in your letter of April 18 you requested that Mr. Fri address seven specific matters. I shall, in my short statement, discuss those matters and then answer any questions the committee may have.

You asked that ERDA safeguards duties and responsibilities versus those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission be explained. Under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, ERDA retains responsibility for the safeguarding of special nuclear materials in the possession of ERDA activities. This involves protection against facility sabotage and theft of special nuclear material at 45 Government-owned facilities, differing greatly in mission and in their complexity. Many of these are involved in unique, highly complex operations. Among these are 11 laboratories, large uranium enrichment facilities, weapons material production facilities, weapons parts production and assembly facilities, a weapons test site and four reactor test sites. Included is the responsibility for protecting weapons, weapon components, and special nuclear material being shipped between facilities, and protection of restricted data and national security information involved in ERDA's activities.

ERDA is responsible for conducting a comprehensive safeguards technology and equipment development, test and evaluation program to meet ERDA's safeguards needs and nuclear energy development/ demonstration program.

Finally, ERDA is responsible for the design, development, procurement, and installation of safeguards systems for its facilities and for monitoring and assessing their effectiveness. ERDA field offices, and area offices colocated with the major facilities, carry out resident