Land Friedrich von Hardenberg.

325 years, has so often made individual and social life a miserable failure More than this, it opens a door of deliverance from the weary strife and effort of our being, gives us a Personal Ruler and Friend, and offers help, and hope, and peace to the veriest slave of circumstance, the weakest child of man.

ART. II.-1.-NOVALIS Schriften. Herausgegeben von LUDWIG TIECK und FRIEDRICH SCHLEGEL. Erster und Zweiter Theil. Berlin.

1839.

2. NOVALIS Schriften.

Herausgegeben von L. TIECK und ED.

VON BÜLOW. Dritter Theil. 1846.

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FRIEDRICH VON HARDENBERG, better known to the publie by his nom de plume of Novalis, and whose works occupy an important position in the development of subjective mysticism in Germany, was born of Moravian parents, in the Duchy of Mansfeld, May 2nd, 1772idadong one tolton quivi-1979 suc

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The peculiar influences of his quiet and religious home, and of the liberal and somewhat heterogeneous education which he received, contributed greatly to form his rare and rather inconsistent character. His father, the Baron von Hardenberg, was the owner of much landed property in the neighbourhood of Mansfeld, a member of the Herrnhut community, and an active, energetic, unwearied man, whose character, was greatly distinguished by the Saxon element of strength, He was clear and vigorous in his thoughts, independent and zealous in his creed; a man who was little influenced by the rationalistic and neologian controversies of his times, but who passed safely through the conflicting theories of that stormy period, swerving neither to the right hand nor to the left, but seeking to perform with his might the simple duty which lay before him. The mother of Novalis was a conscientious, pious creature, calm and somewhat dreamy in her temperament. She was one of those women to whose moral strength domestic seclusion appears to be favourable; who, untouched by the contagion of the world's slow stain, are able to accomplish vast ends by insensible means; whose deep loye of the beautiful, and boundless human sympathy, remain unperverted through the petty cares of life, as in the freshness of continual youth; and who, without metaphysical restlessness or the jargon of theological pedantry, are able to keep up the worship of God in its vital simplicity, winning daily veneration and confidence through those indefinable traits of character, whose attraction is far superior to the

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captivations of physical grace. The mightiest agencies of society are often those which are most imperceptible. The powerful divining rod of human love will sometimes bend over hidden treasures which would otherwise reninin concealed for ever. Too the influence of his father, Hardenberg owed the practical!! element, the healthy enjoyment of existence, the desire for universal knowledge, and the interest in minute details, which w singularly characterized him through life. But to the love of that silent mother was appointed the higher office of linking his sympathies from a child with that which was unseen and spiritual, and of teaching him that there was a higher wisdom above the lessons of the world, or (as he would himselfor have expressed it) that there were inward facts which outweigh seeming reality.tomone ad un

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The childhood of Hardenberg was not distinguished by that startling precocity which animates the infant prodigies of our days. He was accounted a slow boy, sickly in body, and averse to noisy sports, tardy in his perceptions, deficient! in his memory, and remarkable for nothing, amongst the other children, but the passionate bond of affection which united him to the quiet mother, to whose side he would creep in the deepening twilight, listening to spiritual songs from her lips whose life was in itself a perpetual hymn. The merry, united family, which was afterwards destined to suffer so bitterly from the encroachments of affliction and death, consisted at this time of no less than eleven children. Nine of the little band, three sisters and six brothers, were younger than Friedrich. One, the eldest sister, was associated with Novalis int his studies, in order that by her quicker intellect and girlish sympathy she might stimulate his sluggish faculties. This pres caution, however, was not necessary long. At nine years of age, Friedrich was seized with a severe illness, when, as the German biographer expresses it, his spirit awoke.' Like Sir Walter Scott, under similar circumstances, the couch of the little invalid was covered with volumes of poetry, fiction, and history. His new eagerness for information by far surpassed his previous indifference to knowledge. His memory was stored with facts of all kinds; but his love of solitude and reflection were only intensified by illness. He refused to make friends. His mother and his brothers and sisters constituted the whole world for him. Throughout his life his ardour in the pursuit of wisdom, and his lofty ideal of good, incapacitated him for companionship with ordinary men.

After Friedrich's recovery, to invigorate his weakened constitution, it was arranged that he should pass a year with an

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Metaphysical Excitement in Germany.

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uncle in the neighbourhood of Brunswick. In the companionship of this man, he had the advantage of intercourse with a cultivated mind. In the well-chosen library and collection of art which he how beheld, the child received his first training in the principles of esthetic beauty. Nor could he do otherwise than profit by the conversation of the learned men who daily resorted to the house, and in whose genial society he was at once introduced to the aristocracy of intellect, and contracted that goût pour l'esprit, for which he was afterwards remarkablege dordy tsd: Die Wide a mod solita

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The time drew near when Friedrich was expected to prepare. for the University. In the year 1789, he spent some months in a gymnasium at Eisleberg, where he was instructed in classics and mathematics, under the superintendence of the learned Jani. This appears to have been the only instruction he received in a public school, preparatory to his debut in the academical world. In the autumn of 1790 he went to Jena; then, with his second brother Erasmus, he repaired to Leipzig, and completed his university career at Wittenberg, in the year1794. It would, however, be impossible to form a correct idea of the peculiar philosophy which Novalis afterwards advocated, without analysing the various influences which acted upon his susceptible spirit at this important turning-point of life. Never were the systems of philosophers held in higher estimation, and never was the metaphysical world more agitated by conflicting theories, than during the brief period of the residence of Hardenberg at Jena. The season of indifference, when the dogmatical system of Wolf had been allowed full sway, had been succeeded by the reaction of an independent eclecticism, which discouraged party spirit, and lent a willing ear to the varied disquisitions of English and French philosophers. The splitting of metaphysical straws, or the letting down nets of hypothesis into the seas of immensity, was now the favourite recreation of the youth in Germany. The newest theories of the latest philosophical system afforded a pleasant seasoning to stimulate the taste for the abstract and logical inquiries of mathematical science. The Critique of Pure Reason, which was published by Kant in the year 1781, had, for many years, been neglected and misunderstood. But the taste for shallow and popular discussions had suddenly disappeared, the revolution in thinking had begun, and, in spite of its heaviness of detail, and obscurity of style, the master-work of the age was now studied and investigated with eagerness. The new philosophy, as it was called, had obtained an almost magical influence. The Essays of Locke, Leibnitz, and David Hume,

were almost forgotten, while Kant, Emmanuel Kant alone, was the idol of the day—when, on a sudden, the pleasant equilibrium of acknowledged truth was disturbed, as by an electric shock, and the star of Gottlieb Fichte made its appearance above the horizon. To comprehend the relative historical positions of Kant and Fichte, we must trace the development of Kant's system of philosophy from its earliest germ. Kant himself acknowledged that his whole theory grew out of the assumptions of David Hume. Hume took his position upon a single but important idea in metaphysics, the connexion of cause and effect. He affirmed the existence of simple antecedents and consequences, but denied the à priori necessity of causation arguing that it was not possible to perceive how, because some thing existed, something also must necessarily exist; or to prove that, because two things take place, the one after, or in succession of, the other, therefore they take place, the one in consequence of, or in connexion with, the other.

As far as mere empiricism went, Hume was undoubtedly right. But Kant accused him of not taking into consideration the whole of his problem. He would have said, Hume reasons rightly as far as he goes. He has proved beyond contradiction, HIDEG that it is impossible for experience to think of such a connexion, out of its own ideas; for it contains necessity. But someth something has been overlooked by Hume; and that is the element which the mind supplies. TIDOWOYA 867.

Here we have the germinating seed of Kant's entire theory Instead of endeavouring, like other writers, to refute Hume by appealing triumphantly to the common sense of mankind, he admitted that even an unbiassed understanding could not be cited as an oracle, when we can produce no rational arguments to justify its claim; and therefore endeavoured to intrench himself upon a totally new groundwork, which should be impregnable for ever against the assaults of scepticism. In this fundamental position he endeavoured to reconstruct philosophy. The consideration of the deficiencies in the system of Hume led directly in his mind to the suggestion of the subjective theory. But the great error and defect in the philosophy of Kant consisted in his not giving objective validity to the subjective laws. Had he only allowed an outward existence of things answering to our conception of them, all the scepticism of Hume would have been met and refuted, and all the errors and mistakes of Fichte and others would have been averted. Conceptions are beliefs also. It was the great effort of Cousin to insist on the actual importance of our own ideas; and it is surprising that Kant, who took for granted the truth of our sense-perceptions, should have

in the metaphysical world, was at first greatly increased by the assumption that Kant himself was the author of it. In fact, Kant had pushed his theories so far, that Fichte's system was a natural consequence of them. He had left no ground for an objective element in his philosophy, and ultra-idealism was an unavoidable growth of his own teaching.

All the wild theories of Fichte were professedly based on the Kantian metaphysics. But Kant, said the new philosopher, had not been rigorous or logical enough in his statement of his views. Kant's empirical element, even as far as it went, according to Fichte, had merely been taken for granted, without any reason being assigned for it. Therefore the reality of our sense-perceptions was merely a hypothesis, altogether lying out of the region of strict scientific truth. Fichte's object was to reduce all philosophy to the ground of what we can be said actually to know: hence the whole world was brought down to the subjective element, since all that we could be said to be immediately conscious of, were states and processes of our thinking