of the other commanders we have no mention. Three vessels were sent ahead to watch the movements of the Persians.* Off the island of Sciathus they were captured by a squadron of ten Persian vessels, which had in like manner been despatched by the Persian admiral to obtain intelligence. As soon as the Greeks at Artemisium heard of this disaster, and of the speedy approach of the whole Persian fleet, they were seized with a panic, such as had taken possession of the soldiers of Leonidas upon the advance of the land force of the Persians. But Eurybiades did not possess the same influence over his men as the Spartan king; and the whole fleet abandoned their position, and sailed up the channel between Euboea and the mainland to Chalcis, where the straits, being only forty yards across, might easily be defended by a few ships. This retreat was equivalent to an abandonment of the whole scheme of defence, as it gave the Persians full liberty to land troops in the rear of the defenders of Thermopylæ. But now a mightier power than that of man came forward, and saved the Greeks in spite of themselves.

§ 17. The Persian admiral, having learnt from the ten ships sent on the look out at the coast was clear, set sail from the gulf of Therma, and arrived in one day at almost the southern corner of Magnesia. Along the greater part of this coast the high and precipitous rocks of Mount Pelion line the water's edge; but there is an open beach for a short distance between the town of Casthanæa and the promontory of Sepias. Here the Persian admiral determined to pass the night; but owing to the vast number of his ships, only a small portion of them could be drawn up on shore; the remainder rode at anchor eight lines deep. In this position they were overtaken on the following morning by a sudden hurricane, which blew upon the shore with irresistible fury. The ships were torn from their anchorage, driven against one another, and dashed against the cliffs. For three days and three nights the tempest raged without intermission; and when on the fourth day calm at length returned, the shore was seen strewed for many miles with wrecks and corpses. At least four hundred ships of war were destroyed, together with a countless number of transports, stores, and treasures. The remainder of the fleet doubled the southern promontory of Magnesia, and cast anchor at Aphetæ at the entrance to the Pagasæan gulf.

§ 18. The news of this terrible disaster, which report had magnified into the entire destruction of the Persian fleet, revived the spirits of the Greeks at Chalcis. They now sailed back witn the utmost speed to their former station at Artemisium, which * See Appendix.

is opposite Aphetæ, at the distance of only a few miles. But great was their surprise at seeing that the Persians still possessed such an overwhelming number of ships. The sight again struck them with alarm; and they were on the point of returning to Chalcis, when the Eubœans sent one of their citizens to Themistocles, with an offer of thirty talents, on condition that he should induce the Greek commanders to remain and hazard a battle in defence of the island. There can be no doubt that Themistocles had already urged his associates in command to defend the Euboean strait against the enemy, and he therefore readily undertook the commission offered him by the Eubœans. In all periods of their history the Greeks seldom had sufficient principle to resist a bribe; and Themistocles was now enabled to accomplish by money what he had failed to do by argument. By giving five talents to the Spartan Eurybiades, three to the Corinthian Adimantus, and presents to the other commanders, he prevailed upon them to remain.

While the Greeks were thus brought with difficulty to face the enemy, the Persian fleet was animated with a very different spirit. They felt confident of victory, and their only fear was lest the Greeks should escape them. In order to prevent this, they sent a squadron of 200 ships, with instructions to sail round Euboea and cut off the retreat of the Greeks. Themistocles had now succeeded in inspiring his comrades with sufficient courage to sail forth and offer battle to the enemy. But being anxious to acquire some experience of the nautical evolutions of the enemy, before they ventured upon a decisive engagement, they waited till it was nearly dusk. Their ships were drawn up in a circle, with their sterns pointed inwards; and they seemed to be waiting the attack of the enemy, who began to close in upon them on every side. But suddenly, at a given signal, they rowed out in all directions, and attacked the enemy's ships, of which they took or disabled no fewer than thirty. The Persians were not prepared for such boldness, and were at first thrown into confusion; but they soon rallied, and began to inflict considerable damage upon the Greeks, when night put an end to the contest, and each fleet returned to its former station,-the Greeks to Artemisium, and the Persians to Aphetæ.

§ 19. This auspicious commencement raised the courage of the Greeks, and gave them greater confidence in their own strength. They were still further encouraged by the events of the following night. It seemed as if the gods had come to fight on their side. For, although it was the middle of summer, at which season rain rarely falls in Greece, another terrific storm burst upon the Persians. All night long it blew upon the coast

at Aphetæ, thus causing little inconvenience to the Greeks upon the opposite shore. The main body of the Persian fleet sustained considerable damage; and the squadron which was sailing round Euboea was completely destroyed. The greater part of the eastern side of this island is an unbroken line of precipitous rocks, with scarcely a ravine in which even a boat can be hauled up. The squadron was overtaken by the storm off one of the mest dangerous parts of the coast, called the Hollows," and was driven upon the rocks and broken to pieces.

The tidings of this second disaster to the Persian fleet reached the Greeks on the following day; and while they were congratulating themselves upon the visible interposition of the gods in their favor, they were animated to still greater confidence by the arrival of fifty-three fresh Athenian ships. With this reinforcement they sailed out in the afternoon, and destroyed some Cilician ships at their moorings; but the Persian fleet had suffered too much from the storm in the preceding night to engage in battle.

§ 20. Indignant at these insults, and dreading the anger of Xerxes, the Persians prepared to make a grand attack upon the following day. Accordingly, about noon they sailed towards Artemisium in the form of a crescent. The Greeks kept near the shore, that they might not be surrounded, and to prevent the Persians from bringing their whole fleet into action. The battle raged furiously the whole day, and each side fought with determined valour. The Egyptians distinguished themselves most among the Persians, and the Athenians among the Greeks. Both parties suffered severely; and though the Persians lost a greater number of ships and men, yet so many of the Greek vessels were disabled that they found it would be impossible to renew the combat.

Under these circumstances the Greek commanders saw that it would be necessary to retreat; and their determination was hastened by the intelligence which they now received, that Leonidas and his companions had fallen, and that Xerxes was master of the pass of Thermopylæ. They forthwith sailed up the Eubœan channel, the Corinthians leading the van and the

Athenians bringing up the rear. At the various landing-places along the coast Themistocles set up inscriptions, calling upon the Ionians not to fight against their fathers. He did this in the hopes either of detaching some of the Ionians from the Persians, or at any rate of making them objects of suspicion to Xerxes, and thus preventing the monarch from employing them in any important service. Having sailed through the Eubœan strait, the fleet doubled the promontory of Sunium, and did not stop till it reached the island of Salamis.

A Greek Warrior. From an Ancient Vase.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS.

§ 1. Results of the battle of Thermopylæ. § 2. Alarm and flight of the Athenians. 3. March of the Persians and attempt upon Delphi. §4. Taking of Athens and arrival of the Persian fleet. § 5. Dissensions and debates of the Greeks. § 6. Stratagem of Themistocles. Arrival of Aristides. § 7. Position of the hostile fleets. Preparations for the combat. 8. Battle of Salamis. § 9. Defeat and flight of Xerxes. 10. Pursuit of the Greeks. § 11. Homeward march of Xerxes. 12. The Greeks celebrate their victory. § 13. Carthaginian expedition to Sicily. Defeat and death of Hamilcar.

§ 1. THE apathy of the Lacedæmonians in neglecting to provide a sufficient defence against the advancing host of Xerxes seems altogether unaccountable; nor is it easy to understand why the Athenians themselves did not send a single troop to aid in defending Thermopyla. The heroic and long sustained resistance of the handful of men who perished in that pass, as well as the previous battle of Marathon, clearly proves that a moderately numerous force, together with ordinary military precautions, would have sufficed to arrest the onward march of the Persians. But the small body to which that duty was assigned was altogether inadequate to the occasion. The forcing of the pass

K*

annihilated the chief defence of southern Greece. Many of the Grecian states which before were wavering now declared for the invader, and sent contingents to his army; whilst his fleet was also strengthened by reinforcements from Carystus, and the Cyclades.

The Athenians were now threatened with inevitable destruc tion. The Peloponnesians had utterly neglected their promise of assembling a force in Boeotia for the protection of Attica; and there was consequently nothing to prevent the Persians from marching straight to Athens. The isolated position of the Peloponnesians had probably influenced them in their selfish policy; at all events, on the news of the defeat at Thermopylæ, they abandoned Attica and the adjoining states to their fate, whilst they strained every nerve to secure themselves by fortifying the isthmus of Corinth. It is true that in this selfish proceeding they overlooked the fact that their large extent of coast could not be thus secured from the descent of the Persian fleet. But after all, the greatest as well as the most pressing danger arose from the army of Xerxes. At sea, the Greeks and the Barbarians were much more nearly matched; and if the multitudinous land-forces of the Persian monarch were once arrested in their progress, and compelled to retreat, there was perhaps little reason to dread that his fleet, composed mostly of auxiliaries, would be able to make any permanent impression on the Peloponnesus, or indeed to remain upon the coast of Greece.

§ 2. The Athenians, relying upon the march of a Peloponnesian army into Boeotia, had taken no measures for the security of their families and property, and beheld with terror and dismay the barbarian host in full march towards their city. Fortunately, the Grecian fleet, on retiring from Artemisium, had stopped at Salamis on its way to Trozen, where it had been ordered to re-assemble; and, at the entreaties of the Athenians, Eurybiades consented to remain for a time at Salamis, and to assist the Athenian citizens in transporting their families and effects. It was thus by accident, and not from any preconcerted military plan, that Salamis became the station of the Grecian fleet.

In six days, it was calculated Xerxes would be at Athens—a short space to remove the population of a whole city; but fear and necessity work wonders. Before it had elapsed, all who were willing to abandon their homes had been safely transported, some to Ægina, the greater part to Trazen, where they met with a hospitable reception; but many could not be induced to proceed farther than Salamis. It was necessary for Themistocles