something like a threat of personal violence in case he should again be the bearer of such proposals; whilst to the Lacedæmonians they protested that no temptations, however great, should ever induce them to desert the common cause of Greece and freedom. In return for this disinterested conduct, all they asked was that a Peloponnesian army should be sent into Boeotia for the defence of the Attic frontier; a request which the Spartan envoys promised to fulfil.

No sooner, however, had they returned into their own country than this promise was completely forgotten. As on the former occasion, the Lacedæmonians covered their selfishness and indifference beneath the hypocritical garb of religion. The omens were unfavourable; the sun had been eclipsed at the moment when Cleombrotus, the Spartan king, was consulting the gods respecting the expedition; and, besides this, they were engaged in celebrating the festival of the Hyacinthia. But no omens or festivals had prevented them from resuming with unremitting diligence the labour of fortifying the isthmus, and the walls and battlements were now rapidly advancing towards completion.

§ 4. When Mardonius was informed that the Athenians had rejected his proposal, he immediately marched against Athens, accompanied by all his Grecian allies; and in May or June, B.C. 479, about ten months after the retreat of Xerxes, the Persians again occupied that city. With feelings of bitter indignation against their faithless allies, the Athenians saw themselves once more compelled to remove to Salamis. But even in this depressed condition, the naval force of the Athenians still rendered them formidable; and Mardonius took advantage of his situation to endeavour once more to win them to his alliance. Through a Hellespontine Greek, the same favourable conditions were again offered to them, but were again refused. One voice alone, that of the senator Lycidas, broke the unanimity of the assembly. But his opposition cost him his life. He and his family were stoned to death by the excited populace.

In this desperate condition the Athenians sent ambassadors to the Spartans to remonstrate against their breach of faith, and to implore them, before it was too late, to come forwards in the common cause of Greece. The ambassadors were also instructed to intimate that necessity might at length compel the Athenians to listen to the proposals of the enemy. This message, however, was very coolly received by the Lacedæmonians. For ten days no answer whatever was returned; and it can scarcely be doubted that the reply, which they at last thought fit to make, would have been a negative, but for a piece of advice

which opened their eyes to the consequences of their selfish policy. Chileos, a Tegean, a man whose wisdom they revered, and whom they consulted on this occasion, pointed out to them that their fortifications at the isthmus would prove of no avail in case the Athenians allied themselves to the Persians, and thus, by means of their fleet, opened a way into the heart of Peloponnesus. It is strange that the Lacedæmonians should have needed this admonition, which seems obvious enough; but selfishness is proverbially blind.

The conduct of the Spartans was as prompt as their change of resolution had been sudden. That very night 5000 citizens, each attended by seven Helots, were despatched to the frontiers: and these were shortly followed by 5000 Lacedæmonian Periœci, each attended by one light-armed Helot. Never before had the Spartans sent so large a force into the field. Their example was followed by other Peloponnesian cities; and the Athenian envoys returned to Salamis with the joyful news that a large army was preparing to march against the enemy, under the command of Pausanias, who acted as regent for Plistarchus, the infant son of Leonidas.

§ 5. Mardonius, on learning the approach of the Lacedæmonians, abandoned Attica, and proceeded by the pass of Decelea, across Mount Parnes into Boeotia, a country more adapted to the operations of cavalry, in which his strength principally lay. Whilst he still entertained a hope that the Athenians might be induced to join his arms, he had refrained from committing any depredations on their territory; but finding this expectation vain, he employed the last days of his stay in burning and devastating all that had been spared by the army of Xerxes. After crossing the frontiers of Boeotia, and marching a day or two along the Asopus, he finally took up a position on the left bank of that river, and not far from the town of Platea. Here he caused a camp to be constructed of ten furlongs square, and fortified with barricades and towers. The situation was well selected, since he had the friendly and well fortified city of Thebes in his rear, and was thus in no danger of falling short of provisions. Yet the disposition of his army was far from being sanguine. With the ex

ception of the Thebans and Boeotians, his Grecian allies were become lukewarm or wavering; and even among the Persians themselves, the disastrous flight of their monarch in the preceding year had naturally damped all hopes of the successful issue of a campaign which was now to be conducted with far inferior forces.

Meanwhile, the Lacedæmonian force collected at the isthmus was receiving reinforcements from the various states of Pelo

ponnesus. On its march through Megara it was joined by 3000 Megarians; and at Eleusis received its final accession of 8000 Athenian and 600 Platean Hoplites, who had crossed over from Salamis under the command of Aristides. The Grecian army now consisted of 38,700 heavy-armed men, attended by Helots and light-armed troops to the number of nearly 70,000; and, together with 1800 badly armed Thespians, formed a grand total of about 110,000 men. There were, however, no cavalry,

and but very few bowmen.

Having consulted the gods by sacrifices, which proved of a favourable nature, the Grecian army broke up from Eleusis, and directed its march over the ridge of Citharon. On descending its northern side, the Greeks came in sight of the Persian army drawn up in the valley of the Asopus. Pausanias, not caring to expose his troops to the attacks of the Persian cavalry on the plain, halted them on the slopes of the mountain, near Erythræ, where the ground was rugged and uneven. (See Plan, First Position). This position did not, however, altogether preserve them. Skilled in the use of the bow and of the javelin, the Persian horsemen, under the command of Masistius, repeatedly charged the Greeks, harassing them with flights of missiles, and taunting them with cowardice for not venturing down into the plain. The Megarians, especially, suffered severely until rescued by a body of 300 chosen Athenians, who succeeded in repulsing the Persian cavalry, and killing their leader, Masistius, a man tall in stature and of distinguished bravery. The Greeks celebrated their triumph by parading the corpse through the army

in a cart.

§ 6. This success encouraged Pausanias to quit the high ground and take up a position on the plain. Defiling from Erythræ in a westerly direction, and marching by Hysiæ, he formed his army in a line on the right bank of the Asopus. In this arrangement, the right wing, which extended to the fountain Gargaphia, was conceded, as the post of honor, to the Lacedæmonians; the occupation of the left, near the grove of the hero Androcrates, was disputed between the Tegeans and Athenians. The matter was referred to the whole body of the Lacedæmonian troops, who by acclamation declared the Athenians entitled to the preference.

On perceiving that the Greeks had changed their position, Mardonius drew up his army opposite to them, on the other side of the Asopus. (See Flan, Second Position). He himself, with the Persians and Medes, the flower of his army, took his post in the left wing, facing the Lacedæmonians on the Grecian right whilst the Greeks and Macedonians in the Persian service,

to the number, probably, of 50,000, were opposed to the Athenians on the left. The centre of Mardonius was composed of Bactrians, Indians, Sacæ, and other Asiatics and Egyptians; and his whole force probably amounted to about 300,000 men.

But though the armies were thus in presence, each was reluctant to commence the attack. The soothsayers on both sides, whose responses were probably dictated by the feeling prevalent among the commanders, declared that the sacrifices were unfavourable for any aggressive movement. For eight days the armies remained inactive, except that the Persians annoyed the Greeks at a distance with their missiles, and altogether prevented them from watering at the Asopus. On the eighth day

Mardonius, at the suggestion of the Theban leader Timagenidas, employed his cavalry in cutting off the supplies of the Greeks, and captured a train of 500 beasts of burthen, together with their escort, as they were defiling through one of the passes of Citharon. Artabazus, the second in command, advised Mardonius to continue this policy of harassing and wearing out the Greeks, without risking a general engagement; and also to endeavour, by means of bribes, to corrupt and disunite them That this latter step was feasible appears from what actually occurred among the Athenians. Several of the wealthier Hoplites serving in their ranks entered into a conspiracy to establish at Athens, under Persian supremacy, an oligarchy resembling that at Thebes. Fortunately, however, the plot was discovered and repressed by Aristides. But Mardonius was too impatient to await the success of such measures, which he considered as an imputation on the Persian arms; and, overruling the opinions of Artabazus and the rest of his officers, gave orders to prepare for a general attack.

§ 7. On the night after Mardonius had taken this resolution, Alexander, king of Macedon, leaving the Persian camp by stealth, rode up to the Athenian outposts, and desiring to speak with Aristides and the other generals, informed them of the intended attack on the morrow. I risk my life," he observed, "in conveying this intelligence; but I too am a Greek by descent, and with sorrow should I see Hellas enslaved by the Persians."

Aristides immediately communicated this news to Pausanias. On hearing it, the latter made a proposal savouring but little of the traditionary Spartan valour, namely, that the Athenians, who had had experience of the Persian mode of fighting, should change places with the Lacedæmonians in the line. The Athenians readily assented to this arrangement. Mardonius, however, on perceiving the change which had been made, effected a corresponding one in his own line. Hereupon Pausanias marched back to the Grecian right, and was again followed by Mardonius; so that the two armies remained in their original position.

Neither side, however, was inclined to venture a general attack. The fighting was confined to the Persian cavalry, which the Greeks had no adequate means of repelling. For some portion of the day it obtained possession of the fountain of Gargaphia, the only source from which the Greeks could procure their water, and succeeded in choking it up. It also intercepted the convoys of provisions proceeding to the Grecian camp. Under these circumstances, finding the ground untenable, Pausanias summoned a council of war, in which it was resolved to retreat