DIVISIONS OF THROUGH RATES. See Through and Local Rates; Mileage Rates; Reasonable Rates. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE. See Practice: Evidence: Interstate Commerce Commission. DOMESTIC MERCHANDISE. New York Board of Trade and Transportation et al. v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company et al. EQUIPMENT. Rice, Robinson & Witherop . Western New York and Penn- Delaware State Grange, etc., v. New York, Philadelphia and Shamberg v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Com- Boston Fruit and Produce Exchange v. New York and New See Cars. ESTOPPEL. CONTRACTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES. Haddock. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company. EVIDENCE. PROOF REQUIRED.-When no evidence whatever is presented to sustain the allegations of a complaint which are denied by the answer, the case must be dismissed without prejudice. Leonard v. Union Pacific Railway Company. TO REBUT INTERFERENCE OF UNJUST DISCRIMINATION.-Course of dealing between parties may be shown, and circumstances showing good faith and absence of unfriendly spirit. Riddle, Dean & Co. v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company. PRESUMPTION.-If a railroad company avows a purpose to comply with the law, it must be assumed that it will do so and is doing so, until there is evi. dence that the purpose is not lived up to. Holbrook. St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railroad Company. CONSTRUCTION OF CLASSIFICATION.-Railway officials who have made a classification can not testify to their understanding of its construction. Hurlburt v. Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company. Hurlburt v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company. It is competent to prove by the testimony of witnesses in what sense terms of art or terms peculiar to any occupation or business are used by those engaged in such occupation or business. But when such terms are made use of in a classification sheet to designate the product of a particular employment, they are supposed to be used as understood in that employment, and it is not competent for railroad experts, when the meaning of the classification is in question, to testify in what sense they are uncerstood in transportation circles. (Ib.) PREFERENCE AND ADVANTAGE.-Without some proof of damage resulting to complainants, the advantage in rates as related to distance is not necessarily undue or unreasonable, no substantial difference in expense appearing to exist. Howell et al. v. New York, Lake Erie and Western Railroad Company et al. ADDITIONAL.-The Commission is not willing to determine the relative reasonableness of rates at any stations, and in a large extent of territory, upon the mere face of tariffs and without further proof. Spartanburg Board of Trade v. Richmond and Danville Railroad Where it is obvious that there are many parties interested as directly as is the complainant in the question before the Commission, opportunity will be given them to appear at the taking of evidence. (lb.) A case fully submitted without evidence ordered adjourned to a future day for the purpose of taking evidence on the principle above stated. (lb.) After decision a petition to open the case for further testimony and rehearing should indicate the nature of the new testimony and its purpose. In re Rice, Robinson & Witherop v. Western New York and WHAT IS SUFFICIENT.—In proceedings like these it is enough to show the rates actually charged, if there are or have been any such to certain shippers or consignees different from the published tariff rates, or the preferential facilities, if any such, furnished by the defendants to some shippers or consignees and not to others, or the comparative rates on the different commodities named in the complaints, and from and to designated points. Innumerable shipments, with all their minuteness of detail over the various lines that were made for many years before the act to regulate commerce took effect, as well as since that date, and the names of the consignors and consignees at so many different points, through these long periods of time, seem to be immaterial. It appears to be sufficient for all the purposes of these cases to show the rates published, the rates actually charged, and the facilities furnished from and to designated points since the act to regulate commerce went into effect, and for whatever light these may throw upon the question of the reasonableness and justness of the rates, if any, and the fairness of the facilities afforded by way of comparison, what these were for a reasonable time; for example, for a period of twelve months before the act to regulate commerce went into effect. Rice v. Cincinnati, Washington and Baltimore Railroad Company et al. Rice v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company. IN PENAL AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS —Difficulties in the way of obtaining evidence of violations of the statute discussed. Report of Interstate Commerce Commission. The settled principle that protects a man from giving compulsory evidence criminating himself is a shield under which offenses may frequently hide. The provision in the act that the claim that testimony may tend to criminate the witness shall not excuse him from testifying, but that his evidence shall not be used against him on the trial of any criminal proceeding does not entirely meet this difficulty. (Ib.) BY DEPOSITION.-Amendment of the act in regard to the attendance of witnesses and the taking of testimony by deposition recommended. (lb.) BY DEPOSITION.-Continued. Haddock v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company. See Books, Papers, and Documents; Carriers; Practice; Subpoenas duces tecum; Proof Burden of Proof; Preferences and Advantage; Depositions. CASES RETAINED FOR FURTHER SHOWING.-As to the other rail-carrier defendants in this proceeding, which are certain Southern and Southwestern railroads, it appears in a general way that there is water competition at Memphis, Vicksburg, New Orleans, Mobile, and Galveston, but upon this point the evidence is not sufficiently clear to enable the Commission to determine the extent to which this competition at each of these points is actual and whether it involves traffic important in amount; and the Commission therefore retains the case as to these defendants, and will hereafter notify the parties as to the time when and the place where all such further evidence will be heard upon these points that the parties may desire to offer. Rice v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fé Railroad Company et al. The reduced rates are, however, in many cases still considerably above the rates on the same articles from Norfolk, and the showing not being sufficient to enable the Commission to determine satisfactorily how far the lower Norfolk rates were justified by the differences in the conditions and circumstances, that subject is left for future consideration. Delaware State Grange, etc., v. New York, Philadelphia and EFFECT OF CONTRACTS MADE PRIOR TO THE ACT.-Complainant is precluded, by the terms of the contract for shipping coal to Hoboken, from going into evidence to show that the rate on his coal to Hoboken ought to be different from that fixed by the contract; and witnesses and evidence asked for to that end are immaterial. Haddock v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company. The contracts providing that complainant may ship coal to points north and west, on the same terms and rates that respondent for the time being gives other persons, do not preclude complainant from showing that such rates are unjust, oppressive, or unreasonable. Complainant is therefore entitled to a hearing upon that question. (Ib.) ORAL AND DOCUMENTARY.-Subpoena duces tecum. The application for subpoenas duces tecum is denied. As applicable to contracts and papers of third persons, not before the Commission, it is denied on the ground of the injustice that might be done such persons; and generally (for the present at least) it is denied on the ground that the material facts can be proven by the testimony of witnesses, without the aid of documentary evidence; although respondent will be expected to produce, for purposes of examination, any books and papers of its own, material to the controversy. (Ib.) PROOF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING.— Proctor & Gamble v. Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Railroad CONTRACTS AND TARIFFS FILED WITH COMMISSION.-Contracts and tariffs filed with the Commission under section 6 of the Act may be considered, although not specifically introduced in evidence on the hearing. Boston Fruit and Produce Exchange v. New York and New England Railroad Company et al. EXCEPTIONAL CONDITIONS. See Circumstances and Conditions. EXPORT RATES. THROUGH. It is essential that any method for making rates should be practicable, and not afford a cover for discrimination and injustice. The only practicable mode yet devised for making through export rates, as appears by past experience, is to add to the established inland rates from the interior to the seaboard the current ocean rates. New York Produce Exchange v. New York Central and Hudson Under the amendments of March 2, 1889, to the statute requiring ten days' Third Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission. EXPORT TRAFFIC. New Orleans Cotton Exchange v. Louisville, New Orleans and EXPRESS COMPANIES." STATUS OF, UNDER ACT TO REGULATE COMMERCE. First Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission. HOW RELATED TO THE ACT.-The mere fact that a common carrier does other business besides the transportation of passengers and property, or performs a further service than that of transportation in respect to the articles carried. Held, Not sufficient to exclude the carrier from the operation of the act so far as applicable to its business. In re Express Companies. to The relation of express companies to interstate commerce considered, gether with the extent and measure of their participation therein. The bringing them within the provisions of the act found practicable, and on some accounts desirable. (Ib.) Express business conducted as a branch of the business of a railroad company. Held, To be subject to the act. (lb.) Express business conducted by an independent organization acquiring transportation rights by contract. Held, Not to be described in the act with sufficient precision to warrant the Commission in taking jurisdiction thereof. (Ib.) See Second Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission. LIVE STOCK.--Unlawful Device. Shamberg v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company et al. See Preference or Advantage. EQUALITY IN.— FACILITIES OF TRAFFIC. Chicago and Alton Railroad Company v. Pennsylvania Railroad Heck & Petree v. East Tennessee, Virginia and Georgia Railway The Kentucky and Indiana Bridge Company has the chartered powers of a common carrier and is such de facto. It is, therefore, under the act to regulate commerce, entitled to demand of railroad companies, whose lines are intersected by its tracks, the same reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic, and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of property that may be lawfully demanded by other carriers under that act. Kentucky and Indiana Bridge Company v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company. The Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company united with other companies having lines terminating on the Ohio River at or opposite Louisville in a contract, whereby it was agreed that all their business across the river at that point should be taken over the Louisville bridge. A new bridge being constructed over the river at this point, one of the railroad companies which had contracted to take all its business over the old bridge, transferred the business to the new bridge. The Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company thereupon refused to receive for transportation over its line any freights which had been brought over the new bridge in violation of the contract made with it. Held, That this refusal was unlawful. (lb.) A common carrier by rail to which property is offered for transportation can not in this indirect manner, and by refusal to perform obligations imposed by law upon it, enforce its contracts, but must for that purpose resort to the customary remedies. (Ib.) Nor can a common carrier, as a reason for refusal to afford to another common carrier the customary, reasonable, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic, assign the fact that such other common carrier supplies no public necessities, the public having been fully accommodated without it. All railroads created by competent public authority must be conclusively presumed to be public conveniences, and other common carriers can not refuse to exchange traffic with them on any suggestion or showing to the contrary. (Ib.) THROUGH ROUTES AND THROUGH RATES.—English legislation and the procedure thereunder in respect to applications by carriers to be admitted to through routes and to participate in through rates stated; and principles there applied explained. Little Rock and Memphis Railroad Company v. East Tennessee, The act to regulate commerce was probably intended to effect similar results, but in its present form and in the absence of the necessary machinery it is not adequate to afford the relief prayed in the petition. (lb.) Recommendations of second annual report for amendment of section 3 renewed. (Ib.) |