manufacturers of this commodity in an unfavorable position in the financial control of their properties. If, in the last instance, we must choose between a rate established by a manager, practically unrestricted by law, whose business and duty it is to take the railway point of view, and a rate pronounced reasonable by a body of five capable men whose highest function it is to view impartially the interests of the public and of the railways, there can be no mistake in accepting the judgment of the latter, especially when their judgment is subject to review by the courts and is safeguarded in every way by powers directly vested by the bill in the judiciary.

"Any carrier may, within thirty days from the service of an administrative order upon it, begin, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the district in which its principal operating office is situated, proceedings to review such an order and the findings on which it is based. . . . The court may also, if upon an inspection of the record it plainly appears that the order proceeds upon some error of law or is unjust and unreasonable on the facts, and not otherwise, suspend the operation of the order during the pendency of the proceedings in review, or until further order of the court. Either party may appeal from the judgment or decree of the Circuit Court to the Supreme Court of the United States; but such appeal shall not operate to stay or supersede the order of the Circuit Court nor the execution of any writ or process

thereon. In the Supreme Court the cause shall be given preference over all others, excepting criminal causes."

Especial emphasis should be placed upon the promptness with which a carrier can find a remedy in the courts in case the Commission should make an unjust order. For fifteen years it has taken, on the average, three or four years to get a final decision; and to assert, in the face of that fact, that the proposed law affords no adequate remedy for unreasonable orders of the Commission, sounds very much like the old cry of "stop thief!" Furthermore, the Commission can make no order except after a full and impartial hearing. Having all the facts before it, and having duly weighed the evidence, the Commission may revise a rate fixed by the carriers in the first instance. That the Commission should be incapable of properly comprehending the facts entering into a question of rates, is too preposterous to admit of discussion. And unless we are willing to believe the absurd proposition that both the Commission and the federal courts can together not understand a rate question and decide equitably in the premises, we are compelled to admit that substantial justice will be done under the proposed law to an extent hitherto unknown justice administered with promptness and efficiency to carriers and shippers alike and to competitive cities, harbors, productive areas, and industries.

In connection with the publication of rates the

most important point in the bill determines the relation of charges actually collected to the tariffs contained on sheets published and filed, a departure from the latter being in violation of law: "Whenever any carrier files or publishes a particular rate under the provisions of this Act, or participates in any rate so filed or published, that rate, as against such carrier, its officers, or agents, in any prosecution begun under this Act, shall be conclusively deemed to be the legal rate, and any departure from such rate, or any offer to depart therefrom, shall be deemed to be an unjust discrimination.

"Whenever, on the trial of a defendant for a violation of this Act, such defendant is shown to have given, aided, abetted, or assisted in the giving of a rate to one or more individuals, firms, companies, or corporations different from the rate or rates fixed for such service by the tariff of rates provided for by this Act, such showing shall be deemed evidence sufficient to authorize a conviction; and it shall not be necessary on the trial of any indictment hereunder for unjust discrimination to allege or to prove that other and less favorable rates were offered or granted to other shippers by the defendant, or to allege or prove the names of such shippers, the true intent of this being that the published tariff shall be conclusive evidence that the rates therein prescribed were the rates charged to the general public."

Under the present law a departure from the pub

lished rate is not unlawful unless it can be shown that the degree of departure is different for different shippers. For instance, if a published rate of one dollar is assumed, and it can be shown that A secured a rate of ninety cents, the law has not been violated unless it can also be shown that B secured a rate of, say, eighty cents. In other words, departures from published rates are not discriminations unless such departures vary for different individuals, a fact which it is practically impossible to prove. While it was undoubtedly the intent of section x of the act to impose a penalty upon the corporation itself, under its peculiar phraseology, it has, however, been judicially determined that the corporation is not liable. The agent alone can be punished. Now the object of rate-cutting is to get business and make money, and the corporation, if any one, profits by the illegal act. It is the real offender, and ought certainly, as well as its officer, to pay the penalty. It is anomalous and unjust that the representative or employee only should be liable to prosecution, while the real offender, the corporation, the principal, and beneficiary in the transaction, is not. If every illegal act of that character subjected the carrier to a substantial forfeiture, so that the money result of the transaction was likely to be the other way, the inducement to commit such offences would be greatly diminished.

In the Cullom Bill the long and short haul section appears in a radically modified state by the

omission of the words "under substantially similar circumstances and conditions," thus absolutely prohibiting a greater charge for the shorter haul unless, as under the present law, the Commission authorizes the same. The change will prevent violations of the long and short haul principle that are justified on the ground of competition among carriers subject to the act.

From a theoretical point of view a single national classification of freight would be desirable, and in practice such a classification is perhaps not impossible, although the reduction of the number of classifications to three-excepting the state classifications - has greatly reduced the inconvenience and discriminations resulting from a diversity of classifications. The testimony before the Industrial Commission can scarcely be said to give very strong support to the idea of a national system; yet that same testimony offers no strong and decisive arguments against such a system. The objection that commodities like oranges and cotton must be classified differently in different sections of the country, which would not be permitted under a national classification, is more apparent than real; for these and similar articles could be carried, as they are in part at present, at commodity rates, properly adjusted to meet the conditions of transportation in different sections of the United States. Goods carried at commodity rates constitute the bulk1

1 The great mass of articles in point of numbers, and probably also in point of gross revenue, go at class rates.