and that company and the other defendants had been conducting their business, for almost ten years before this suit was com menced. If the making of that combination was originally a violation of the Anti-Trust Act, the prosecution of the defendants at law under sections 1 and 2 of the Anti-Trust Act for that violation was barred many years before this suit was commenced. 5. The evidence in this suit seems to me to present a new case under the Anti-Trust Law. No case has been found in the books, and none has come under my observation, in which the absence of all the evils against which that law was directed at the time the suit was brought, and for seven years before, was so conclusively proved as in this suit, the absence of unfair or oppressive treatment of competitors, of unjust or oppressive methods of competition, the absence of the drawing of an undue share of the business away from competitors and to the defendants, the absence of the raising of prices of the articles affected to their consumers, the absence of the limiting of the product, the absence of the deterioration of the quality, the absence of the decrease of the wages of the laborers and of the prices of the materials, the absence, in short, of all the elements of undue injury to the public and undue restraint of trade, together with the presence of free competition which increased the share of the competitors in the interstate trade and decreased the share of the defendants. Neither the Standard Oil company case, nor the American Tobacco company case, nor any other authority cited, seems to me to rule this case, because in none of them was there such affirmative and, to my mind, conclusive evidence that for years before the suits were commenced the defendants had practiced no acts and pursued no methods which constituted an undue restraint of trade or an unreasonable attempt to monopolize it. And because in this suit this court is without power to punish past violations of the Anti-Trust Law, and the limit of its jurisdiction is to prevent and enjoin future acts violative thereof, because the making of the combination of 1902 and 1903, whether violative of the Anti-Trust Law or not, did not deprive the defendants of their right thereafter and now to conduct their business in obedience to that law, because the question in this case is not whether or not the combination of 1902 and 1903

was violative of that law, but it is whether or not in April, 1912, when this suit was commenced, the defendants were unduly or unreasonably restraining or attempting to monopolize interstate or foreign trade, because it was not the effect of the Anti-Trust Law, nor was it the intent of the Congress which passed it, to prohibit all restriction of competition or all restraints of interstate or foreign trade, or all attempts to monopolize parts of it, but only those restraints and attempts to monopolize which are unduly injurious to the public by (1) raising the prices to the consumers of the articles they affect, (2) limiting their production, (3) deteriorating their quality, (4) decreasing the wages of the laborers and the prices of the materials required to produce them, or (5) practicing unfair and oppressive treatment of competitors, because the evidence has convinced me that for at least seven years before this suit was commenced, and at that time, the defendants were not injuring the public by unduly or unreasonably restricting competition in the manufacture or sale of the machinery or articles which they were making and selling, or by drawing to themselves an undue share of the business therein, or by excluding other manufacturers or dealers therefrom, or by practicing acts unjust or unfair to, or oppressive of, their competitors, that they were not injuring the public by raising the prices to the consumers of the articles they made or sold, or limiting their production, or deteriorating their quality, or decreasing the wages of the laborers employed to make them, or the prices paid for the materials required to construct them, that they were not threatening to do these things, but they were doing the opposite of these things to the substantial benefit of their competitors, of the consumers of their products, of the laborers who make them, the men who furnish the material for them, and the public in general, because the acts of the defendants during these seven years do not constitute that undue or unreasonable restraint of or attempt to monopolize interstate or foreign trade forbidden by the Anti-Trust Act, and because, in my opinion, the prevention or restraint of these acts or this business of the defendants, or the splitting of their business and property into three or more independent parts, or the seizure of it by a receiver, by virtue of a decree of a court of equity, would

not tend to prevent undue restraint of, or undue attempts to monopolize, interstate or foreign trade, but, on the other hand, would tend to produce or foster the very evils at which the Anti-Trust Act was leveled, to wit, the restriction or lessening of competition, the increase of the prices of the machinery and articles affected, the deterioration of their quality, the limitation or reduction of the product and the diminution of the wages of the laborers making them and of the prices of the materials required to produce them to the substantial injury of the public, I am unable to concur in the opinion or the decree against the defendants in this case. In my opinion, a decree should be rendered that the complaint in this suit be dismissed without prejudice to the right of the United States to bring another suit of like character against any of the defendants whenever any of them is found to be engaged in the commission of any acts in violation of the anti-trust statute.

THE KEYSTONE WATCH CASE1

Unfair Practice

As might be expected in a record so voluminous, the evidence, whether oral or in writing, is not always either relevant or competent; but we shall not discuss it in detail, contenting ourselves with finding such of the ultimate facts as seem to be necessary.

The present Keystone company is the second of that name, both of them being Pennsylvania corporations. The first was organized in 1886, and was the successor of several Philadelphia manufacturers, beginning with James Boss, the inventor of the filled or rolled-plate case, and comprising also John Stukert, Hagstoz & Thorpe, and C. N. Thorpe & Co. These firms and their corporate successor manufactured superior cases and acquired an excellent reputation in the trade. Owing to the death of certain persons that had been interested in the business, and to the consequent need of providing for the demands of their estates, some new financial arrangements seemed to be desir

1 U. S. v. Keystone Watch Case Co., Circuit Court, 218 Fed. Rep. 502; decided Jan. 2, 1915.

able. At the same time an association known as the T. Zurbrugg Co. was manufacturing an inferior grade of watch cases at Riverside, N.J., and some of the persons interested in that association had certain financial connections with the two estates just referred to. (A year or two before, the Zurbrugg company had bought a small business, owned by J. Muhr & Brother, of Philadelphia, and had combined it with their own.) It was believed by the old Keystone company and by the Zurbrugg company that a union of the two enterprises would be mutually advantageous, so that both grades of cases might be made under one management. Accordingly, a new company - the present defendant - was incorporated, and this company bought outright the title to the plant, business, and good will, of the old corporation and of the Zurbrugg company. The persons interested in these two enterprises received either cash or stock in the new company at their option. This transaction took place in July, 1899. In the following August the Philadelphia Watch Case Company was organized for the purpose of selling the product of the Riverside plant. All of its capital stock was owned by the Keystone company. As already stated, this product was inferior in grade, and a separate sale thereof seemed advisable in order to avoid confusing the cases made in the two plants respectively.

Early in 1900 the capital stock of the New York Standard Watch Company, a New Jersey corporation with a plant at Jersey City, was in the market. This company did not manufacture cases, its only product being inexpensive movements. The Keystone company purchased for cash the capital stock of the Standard company, the object being to supply the demand for cheap completed watches. The Keystone company found some difficulty in selling its cheaper watch cases because of the lack of cheap movements to go with them, the movements manufactured by the principal movement companies being relatively too expensive. The separate corporate organization of the Standard company was continued, and the size and the product of the plant were increased.

Early in January, 1901, the Philadelphia firm of Bates & Bacon, a small manufacturer of cases, sold all its property to

the Keystone company, the machinery at cost, and the finished product at selling prices.

In the same month, a small movement business at Waltham, Mass., owned by the United States Watch Company, offered to sell out to the Keystone company, and in June, or thereabouts, the sale was made. The object of the purchaser was to manufacture medium-priced movements at Waltham, and for this purpose additional capital was furnished, and the plant and facilities were enlarged. A New Jersey corporation by the same name - United States Watch Company with an authorized capital of one million ($1,000,000) dollars was organized, and operated the Waltham plant for about two years, manufacturing medium-priced movements only. The business, however, was not successful.

In January, 1903, the watch-movement business of the E. Howard Clock Company was offered for sale by a receiver. This company had formerly manufactured an excellent and favorably known movement, but for several years the business had been discontinued. Seeing an opportunity to use the reputation of the Howard movement to aid the United States Watch Company's business at Waltham, the Keystone company bought the good will, machinery, and trade-marks, of the Clock company, so far as they related to watches and watch movements, and moved everything to Waltham. The United States Watch Company was thereupon abandoned, and a new company was organized under the laws of New Jersey, called the E. Howard Watch Company — all of its stock being owned by the Keystone company-and the Howard company took over the United States company's plant, and has since been manufac turing fine and expensive movements at Waltham. The watch movements formerly manufactured by the E. Howard Clock Company had in no way competed with the product of the Keystone company, whose movements were neither high grade nor expensive.

In December, 1902, the common stock (4000 shares) of the Crescent Watch Case Company, of Newark, N.J., was offered to the Keystone company, and was purchased in the following February, being paid for partly in cash and equivalent