prima facie evidence in a proceeding instituted by any other party against the same defendant under those statutes. 6. APPLICATION AND HEARING. Requirements as to Notice.-The practice with regard to notice to adverse parties is in substantial accordance with the recommendations by President Taft, contained in his message to Congress, dated December 7, 1909, to the effect that positive enactments should be passed regulating the issuing of injunctions, and requiring them to be granted only on notice, "unless it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that The final recommendation refers to the suggestion previously occurring in said message, that the injunction or restraining order, when granted without notice or hearing, should expire by statutory limitation within not to exceed seven days, unless the court should, upon notice and hearing, within said time extend the injunction or order. Recommendations from a person so well qualified to speak authoritatively were entitled to respect; and the requirements of the Clayton Law were drawn in accordance with those suggestions. By the provisions of Section 17,— "No temporary restraining order shall be granted without notice to the opposite party unless it shall clearly appear from specific facts shown by affidavit or by verified bill that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the applicant before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon." Such order shall be indorsed with the date and hour of issuance and filed forthwith in the clerk's office and entered of record. It "shall define the injury and state why it is irreparable and why the order was granted without notice, and shall by its terms expire within such time after entry, not to exceed ten days, as the court or judge may fix, unless within the time so fixed the order is extended for a like period for good cause shown, and the reasons for such extension shall be entered of record." Practice Upon Hearing.-The hearing upon the application for the preliminary injunction shall be advanced before all other matters excepting prior applications of a like nature; and the temporary restraining order shall be disssolved, unless the applicant for the temporary injunction proceeds with the hearing. The opposite party upon two days' notice to the applicant may appear and move to dissolve or modify the temporary restraining order, and "in that event the court or judge shall proceed to hear and determine the motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice may require." Security in the usual terms is required by Section 18, unless some ground of exception specified in Section 16 is made to appear. No class of applications for injunctions is relieved from the necessity of a bond by the provisions of Section 16, but it is there set forth that applications are governed by the rules of equity courts regulating such proceedings. In effect, therefore, the court or judge may exercise discretion regarding security only to the extent that the practice in equity permits. 7. ORDER MUST BE SPECIFIC. Injunction Order Must be Specific in Terms.-In another particular also, the Clayton Law is explicit as to the requirements of the reformed practice in injunction suits. It is decreed that henceforth injunction orders shall be specific. Section 19 enunciates the rule as follows: "That every order of injunction or restraining order shall set forth the reasons for the issuance of the same, shall be specific in terms, and shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the bill of complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained, and shall be binding only upon the parties to the suit, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, or those in active concert or participating with them, and who shall by personal service or otherwise, have received actual notice of the same." This statutory regulation makes specific and obligatory a requirement which every well-equipped equity practitioner observes. Under nebulous rules of practice inconceivably lax methods have prevailed. Injunctions against assemblages of strikers have contained restrictive provisions forbidding them to congregate at a spot named in the order "or elsewhere"; indeed under orders thus drawn, assemblages in Europe, Australia, or Japan, or in any other inhabited or uninhabited portion of our globe would fall equally within the prohibited zone. To instance every type of looseness or deficiency in drafting would require thought and attention to a prohibitory extent; like proving a negative, the task is theoretically possible but impracticable in application. It will no doubt suffice in this connection to state that the rule enunciated above is in accordance with the procedure in force in those courts of equity which stand highest in that department of law. 8. SPECIAL LIMITATIONS IN TRADE DISPUTES. When Injunction Orders in Trade Disputes Allowed.-The leading cases were studied and followed by the Congressional committees engaged in drafting the Clayton Law, with the result that the substance of those decisions is incorporated in the section relating to injunctions, so far as applicable. The authorities followed are valuable and form a useful guide to the legislative intent.10 The Clayton Law enters fully into the question of the nature and extent of injunctive relief permissible in cases between employer and employees. When disputes arise concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless such relief is necessary "to pre 10 For extracts from Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary, with authorities, see Appendix N, pages 335-344. vent irreparable injury to property, or to a property right, of the party making the application, for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law"-the application will be denied. This provision is contained in Section 20, which includes within said limitation cases of persons seeking employment, as well as employees. That section further requires that when an injunctive order is issued in a case of dispute between employer and employees, there must appear in the moving papers a statement of the right or property jeopardized, which right or property "must be described with particularity"; and it is also provided in said section that the application "must be in writing and sworn to by the applicant or by his agent or attorney." The second paragraph is drawn to cover a variety of instances where courts have seemed to over-extend their powers in the protection of "property or property rights," when granting injunctions against acts of employees; and the law in effect now requires that employees shall not be enjoined when they seek to terminate any relation or employment, singly or in concert; or when they seek to peacefully persuade others to join them in such acts, or engage in kindred lawful conduct connected with labor disputes. Peaceful behavior or persuasion under such circumstances is expressly permitted and removed from the liability to restraining orders; for the statute goes very far in the way of protecting labor and holding above it the aegis of the law." The section concludes with the general phrase— "nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be violations of any law of the United States." 9. CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS WHERE DISOBEDIENCE INVOLVES CRIMINAL ACT. Special Contempt Proceedings Authorized Where Criminal Conduct is Shown.-Presumably to differentiate between liberty and license, and to repress at the inception the use of violence, II See Senate Report, No. 698, July 22, 1914, for a full statement of the reasons leading to the enactment of the various restrictions upon injunctions in labor disputes. The extracts referred to in note 10, page 119, supra, relate solely to general history and practice. more particularly in strikes and in other situations where force might be employed to resist the enforcement of the orders and decrees of the court,-disobedience of court writs, process, orders, etc., are made punishable by a proceeding for contempt, when such disobedience consists in doing a criminal act. Any offence against any criminal statute of the United States or against the penal laws of any State where the act was committed, is included in the general inhibition; and the provision likewise applies to the District of Columbia. This enactment and the procedure pertaining thereto are comprised in Sections 21 to 25, inclusive, of the Clayton Law. The proceeding is instituted by an order to show cause, with right to attach the person, if the defendant is an individual, or to sequestrate the property if the charge is made against a corporation, and the defendant neglects or refuses to appear. If good cause is shown, however, by affidavit or proof taken in open court or before a judge and filed with the papers in the case, the court or judge may dispense with the order to show cause, and issue a warrant for the summary arrest of defendant. The person so charged with contempt shall be brought before the court without unnecessary delay when he is apprehended, and shall be admitted to bail in a reasonable amount. Thereafter he shall be brought to trial for the contempt, and the subsequent proceedings shall be the same as are provided in cases where an order to show cause has issued in the first instance. Defendant May Demand Jury Trial; is Entitled to Release upon Reasonable Bail.-The defendant under the practice in contempt proceedings of this nature is entitled of right to a jury trial, if demanded, and the trial shall be conducted as is usual in criminal prosecutions. The punishment consists of imprisonment for a term not to exceed six months, and a fine. The amount is not fixed, except that the sum paid to the United States shall not exceed $1,000 where the defendant is a natural person. The fine shall be paid to the government or to defendant or defendants, in the discretion of the court; and the court has a like discretion to distribute the fine, where one or more of the complainants or other parties to the proceeding have been injured by the act constituting the contempt. Appeals may be taken as provided by law in criminal cases, and |