Obviously, the Taft-Hartley definition of employer, which is more limited, would be applicable to such provisions. The significance of such a broadened definition might well be that certain employers, heretofore exempt from the provisions of the TaftHartley Act, will now find themselves subject to the reporting requirements of the Landrum-Griffin Act. An entirely new group of employers-those engaged in agriculturewill find themselves subject to federal regulation concerning their employee relations. A union is an employer when dealing with its own staff personnel. Trade associations that deal with unions on behalf of their membership are employers within the meaning of this law, as would be joint employer bargaining committees established to negotiate particular bargaining agreements. What Provisions of the Act Apply to Employers? Major portions of Title II on reporting, and Title VII on Taft-Hartley Act amendments apply directly to employers. In addition, individual sections of other titles apply to employers. These include: Section 401(g) concerning employer financial support of unions; concerning employer payments of union officials' fines Section 504(a) concerning the employment of ex-convicts by employer associations that deal with unions; and Section 505 concerning employer payments to employees. Are All Employers Subject to the Reporting Requirements? Despite the Act's broad definition of "employer" not all employers are subject to the reporting provisions of the law. The circumstances and conditions under which employers must report are specifically spelled out in the law. While many of the provisions of this complex law must await judicial determination as to precise meaning and coverage, it seems clear from the legislative background, that fairly well-defined areas of "reportable" and "unreportable" activities are set forth. What Activities Subject an Employer to the Reporting Five major activities engaged in by an employer require him to report to the Secretary of Labor. These are (1) certain payments to unions or union officials, (2) certain payments to employees, (3) payments involving interference with employees' rights, (4) certain agreements with labor relations consultants, and (5) certain payments to those consultants. (For text of Sec. 203 (a) see page 182; for legislative history, see Senator Goldwater's statement, page 91). 1. Payments to Unions or Union Officials Employers must report all payments or loans of money or other things of value, including reimbursed expenses, to unions, union officials, union agents, shop stewards or union employees unless one of certain enumerated exemptions applies. The purpose of this provision is to expose financial transactions which could result in employer domination of labor unions or could encourage and perhaps otherwise lead to shady financial manipulations detrimental to the union membership. Of particular importance is the requirement of a report by an employer of a payment to any union or union official. Thus, the reports are not limited to dealings between an employer and the bargaining representative of his own employees. Those financial transactions containing no element or risk of such domination are exempt from the reporting requirements. Thus, a payment to a union or a union official by any national or state bank, credit union, insurance company, or savings and loan association need not be reported. Similarly, payments to a union official or other employee because of services as an employee of the employer; payments in satisfaction of a court judgment or arbitration award, or any adjustment, settlement or release of any claim; and deduction of dues from any employee's salary in payment of union membership dues and payments to an employee welfare or pension fund or other employee benefit program need not be reported. Likewise, an employer who sells merchandise or goods to a union or a union official need not report such sale if it is made at the prevailing market price in the regular course of business. Another important exemption covers payments made by an employer to a union or union official for advice given or for the services of such union or union official in collective bargaining on behalf of the employer. While this type of relationship seldom exists, in certain union jurisdictional disputes the exemption may be important. Enforcement of the reporting requirements, insofar as payments to unions or union officials are concerned, raises several legal questions. An employer who willfully violates this section by failing to file subjects himself to a penalty of $10,000 fine, or imprisonment for one year, or both. This penalty is imposed by Section 209 of the Landrum-Griffin Act. Also, under Section 210, the Secretary of Labor may seek an injunction to require filing of the reports. At the same time, the payments required to be reported may themselves be illegal under Section 505 of the Act. Section 505 of the Landrum-Griffin Act amends the Taft-Hartley Act to make it a crime for an employer to pay money to a union or to union officials who represent his own employees or who are seeking to represent his employees. Thus while Section 203 (a) (1) requires a report, a criminal indictment under Section 505 (amending Taft-Hartley) could result based upon confession of guilt by the employer. The constitutional question is thus whether or not an individual can be compelled to so testify against himself. (For legislative history, see Senator Morse's statement, page 92.) This constitutional issue would not seem to be present in the case of reports by a corporation, as distinguished from reports by an individual or a partnership of individuals, since corporations are unable to invoke the protection of the fifth amendment against self-incrimination. A further difficulty is that Section 505 of the Landrum-Griffin Act (amending Taft-Hartley) applies to one group of employers while Sections 209 and 210 apply to another group. This arises from the different definition of "employers" in the two laws. 2. Payments to Employees Employers must report payments, including reimbursed expenses to any of his employees, group or committee of employees if the purpose is to cause these employees to persuade other employees to exercise or not to exercise their right to organize and bargain collectively. If these payments have been disclosed to the other employees, either when made or before they were made, they need not be reported. (For text of Sec. 203(a)(2) see page 182; for legislative history, see page 92.) The primary purpose of this report is to reveal secret efforts of an employer to "persuade" some of his employees by using others of his employees, to do his "persuading". For the first time, the word "persuade" has been used in a management-labor law. Its actual legislative meaning will have to be litigated. The dictionary definition of the word is "to induce one to believe or do something; to argue into an opinion or procedure; to plead with; urge." It is significant that the language of the Taft-Hartley Act "interfere, restrain and coerce" is not used. Persuasion was doubtless intended to apply to payments which not only amount to unfair labor practices but also to payments amounting to something less than unfair labor practices. Otherwise, the basic interest of the law in revealing secret arrangements affecting employees' rights, respecting collective bargaining or union membership, might be circumvented. Reports are not required, however, as long as payments are disclosed to the other employees. Employer payments to further good employee relations such as employer sponsored banquets, picnics and similar affairs would appear to be exempt. This is so for two reasons. First, the payments are not made "for the purpose of" persuading employees, and, second, full disclosure of the employer sponsorship of the activities presumably is made to the employees. The net effect of this reporting requirement is that only those employers who make secret payments to "stooges" posing as legitimate employees or to employer dominated employee committees must report such payments. Once again a conflict arises between the reporting requirements of Section 203 (a)(2) of the Landrum-Griffin Act and Section 505. Section 505 subjects an employer to a criminal penalty if he makes a payment to any employee or group of employees for the purpose of causing such employee or group "directly or indirectly to influence any other employees in the exercise of the right to organize and bargain collectively". The reporting provision of 203 requires filing only if there are efforts to persuade employees. In Section 505-a criminal section— the word "influence" replaces the word "persuade". Thus, the criminal provisions seemingly have a broader application than does the reporting section. The constitutional conflict comes into play because an employer, filing under 203, very likely would thereby subject himself to criminal prosecution under 505 and he cannot constitutionally be compelled to testify against himself. 3. Payment Involving Interference with Employees' Rights Every employer must report any expenditure where an object, either direct or indirect, is to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to organize and bargain collectively; or the object is to obtain information regarding the activities of employees or a union in connection with a labor dispute involving the employer. (For text of Sec. 203(a)(3) see page 182; for legislative history, see page 93.) If the expenditure is for use solely in connection with an administrative or arbitration action or criminal or civil case, it need not be reported. The use of the well-defined Taft-Hartley Act's terms of "interfere, restrain or coerce" are embodied in this provision and have the same meaning. It also should be noted that direct as well as indirect efforts must be reported. Reports filed under this section are obviously admissions of unfair labor practices. Whether the activity involved is in fact an unfair labor practice is not always easily determined. In effect, this section requires an employer to be the judge of his own actions. The final determination rests with the National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts. Since an employer who fails to file may subject himself to criminal penalties, it is important for him to protect himself. He can do so. If, after consulting his attorney he makes a determination in good faith that the activity in question is not an unfair labor practice amounting to interference, restraint or coercion under the Taft-Hartley Act, it is unlikely that he could be held criminally liable for failure to file a report under Section 209 since he would not have willfully failed to report. There is a general exemption for expenditures to regular officers, supervisors, or employees of the employer for the performance of their regular duties. One further exemption is found in the language of Subsection 203 (f). The original Senate bill exempted from the reporting requirements any communication directly from an employer to his employees provided that communication was identified as the employer's. The comparable House bill provision was much broader and exempted from reporting all employer free speech activity (activity under Section 8(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act). Inasmuch as the narrow language of the Senate bill was rejected in favor of the broader approach of the House bill, the present text of Subsection 203 (f) presumably intends to exempt from the reporting requirements any proper exercise of the right of free speech by an employer in his communications directly with his employees, so long as they contain no threat of reprisal nor a promise of benefit to his employees. One final comment should be made. When an employer seeks to obtain information about a union or the activities of his employees, he need not report expenditures for that purpose unless the information |