In order to determine whether an employer, or other person required to report, has violated, or is about to violate these requirements, the Secretary of Labor has the power to initiate and conduct a full investigation. He may enter such places and inspect such records and accounts and he may question such persons as he may deem necessary to get the facts. (For text of Sec. 601(a) see page 196.) Apparently, the Secretary is the sole judge of what investigation is required.

For the purpose of such an investigation the Secretary of Labor is armed with the powers provided in sections 9 and 10 of the Federal Trade Commission Act relating to the production of books, papers, and documents and compelling the testimony of witnesses. (See Senator Cooper's remarks concerning Sec. 601 on page 125; for full text of Sections 9 and 10 of the Federal Trade Commission Act of September 16, 1914 see page 125.)

Chief among these powers is the authority to grant immunity from prosecution to witnesses in order to compel their testimony over an objection of self-incrimination under the 5th amendment of the United States Constitution. (For legislative history of Sec. 601 see page 125.)

May an Employer Financially Support a Candidate for Union Office?

No employer may pay any money to promote the candidacy of any person seeking union office. If an employer does so, either directly to the candidate or indirectly through the purchase of advertising space, contributions to testimonial banquets, or through other fund raising devices, the election can be set aside upon complaint filed by any union member with the Secretary of Labor who may then seek judicial nullification of the election in the district court of the United States where the election took place.

No criminal or other civil penalties for violation of this prohibition are in the law. (For text of 401(g) see page 189; for legislative history, see page 111.)

May an Employer Pay the Fine of Any Employee or Union Officer?

It is a crime punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year, or fine of not more than $5,000, or both, for an employer to pay the fine of any of his employees convicted of violation of the Landrum-Griffin Act, or the fine of any union officer or employee. (For the text of Sec. 503(b) see page 193.)

What Persons Are Denied Employer Association Office?

Any person who has been a member of the Communist Party or who has been convicted of either robbery, bribery, extortion, embezzlement, grand larceny, burglary, arson, violation of narcotic laws, murder, rape, assault with intent to kill, assault which inflicts grievous bodily injury, or conspiracy to commit any such crimes, or who has been convicted of a violation of Title II-the reporting title-or Title III-the trusteeship title of the Landrum-Griffin Act may not serve as

-a labor relations consultant,

-an officer,

-a director,

-an agent,

-an employee

of an association or group of employers that deals with any union. (For text of Sec. 504 (a) see page 193.)

After the passage of a five year period following termination of Communist Party membership or conviction of one of the above crimes, this disability no longer exists. A shorter period of disability is possible through earlier restoration of citizenship rights or certification of acceptability by the Federal Board of Parole.

The period of disability begins with the date of judgment in the trial court or the date of the final sustaining of such judgment on appeal, whichever is the later event. (For text of Sec. 504 (c) see page 193.) Thus, a person is not barred from office during the time his conviction is being appealed. (For legislative history regarding Sec. 504 (c), see page 122.)

By enumerating the specific crimes which create the disability as to the prescribed positions, the statute obviously intended to permit persons convicted of other crimes to hold office. This is a rather curious approach particularly when the overall intent of Congress is considered with respect to office-holding by persons of dubious background.

Interestingly enough, no state laws make "assault which inflicts grievous bodily injury" a crime, although "assault with intent to inflict grievous bodily injury" commonly appears in state criminal statutes. Yet this latter crime is not among those recited in the statute.

The use of the precise label of crimes poses a question for the individual convicted of crime, substantially identical to one set forth in the law, but which carries a different label. For instance, "grand larceny" in some states is called "grand theft".

The individual convicted of "grand theft" presumably is not under any disability regarding the positions with an employer association.

Nevertheless federal law now establishes the specific crimes the conviction of which would bar holding certain offices.

Further difficulty arises in connection with the use of the expression "membership in the Communist Party" in the statute as a disqualifier. Nowhere in any federal statute is membership in the Communist Party defined, nor does the Landrum-Griffin Act set forth any standards for its definition. (For legislative history, see the discussion of Sec. 504 (a) by Senators Magnuson and Kennedy on page 120.)

The individual barred from office by the law commits a crime by serving in willful violation of the law.

The penalty for violation is a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. (For Labor Department Regulations see page 248.)

What Employer Payments Are Unlawful?

Section 505 of the Landrum-Griffin Act amends Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act relating to unlawful employer payments to unions or employees.

In effect, Section 505 constitutes both an anti-bribery and an antiextortion statute as between employers and their employees, between employers and unions, and between employers and union officers and employees. (For text of Sec. 505 see page 194; for legislative history, see excerpt from Senate Committee Report No. 187, page 124.)

The anti-bribery provisions of the new law make it unlawful for an employer; employer association; or any person acting as a labor relations expert, adviser or consultant; or anyone who "acts in the interest of an employer" to pay, lend or deliver anything of value, or agree to do the same, to:

(1) Any representative of any of his employees;

(2) Any union or any union officer or employee, which represents, seeks to represent, or would admit to membership any of the employees of such employer; (for legislative history, see excerpts from Senate Committee's Report No. 187, page 124.)

(3) Any employee or employee group or committee in excess of their normal compensation for the purpose of causing such employee directly or indirectly to influence any other employee in the exercise of his collective bargaining rights; and

(4) To any officer or employee of a union with intent to influence him as to any of his actions, decisions or duties as a representative of employees or as an officer or employee of a union.

This criminal provision expressly forbids payments by employers who are so defined by the Taft-Hartley Act. Therefore, railroads, agricultural employers, state or federal governments, and nonprofit hospitals, most of which are considered as employers under the other provisions of the Landrum-Griffin Act, are not covered by this amendment to the TaftHartley Act.

The prohibitions formerly applicable only to employers have been broadened extensively by applying them to "associations of employers", "labor relations consultants", and "any person acting in the interest of an employer". Presumably, these prohibitions apply to the pure volunteer who acts on behalf of an employer without the specific sanction of or even the direct knowledge of the employer for whom he acts. (For legislative history, see excerpt from page 11, of Senate Committee Report No. 187, page 123.)

The penalty provisions, fine or imprisonment or both, apply only to the person or organization making the proscribed payment. Thus, an employer cannot be penalized for payments made by another in his interest except where a true agency relationship exists between the person making the payment and the employer.

Little question arises as to the intent and meaning of the prohibition against payments to unions or union officials. These payments were, in fact, illegal under the old language of the Taft-Hartley Act. Serious problems arise, however, regarding the completely new prohibition against the payments to employees or employee groups. (For legislative history, see excerpt from page 11 of Senate Committee Report No. 187, page 123.)

Although this is criminal language, it is broader in coverage than the reporting section, 203, since the criminal payments are those made “to influence" other employees, whereas the reporting language is "to persuade." The single exculpatory provision in this criminal section is that the payment must be made "for the purpose of" influencing, directly or indirectly, other employees in the exercise of their right to organize and bargain collectively before the crime is committed. Thus, where any legitimate reason exists for the payment to employees or to employee groups, such payments cannot be considered violations of this subsection.

What Are the Anti-extortion Provisions of the New Law? The counterpart to the anti-bribery provisions described above is the anti-extortion provision of the new law.

Section 302(b) as amended by Section 505 of the Landrum-Griffin Act now outlaws any request, demand, receipt or acceptance or agree

ment to receive or accept, by any person, payments outlawed in the antibribery sections, discussed above.

In this way, both the giver and the receiver are guilty of a violation in any prohibited transaction.

One particular form of extortion which is specifically prohibited is designed to reach the practice of Teamster Union agents demanding or accepting from the operator of a motor vehicle used for the transportation of property in interstate commerce, or demanding or accepting from the employer of any such operator, any money or other thing of value as a fee or charge for unloading, or in connection with the unloading, of the vehicle's cargo. This does not include payments made by an employer to any of his employees as compensation for their services as employees. (For legislative history, see page 43 of Senate Committee Report No. 187, page 123.)

This language will not reach truckers who are not covered by the Interstate Commerce Act. Nor will this prohibition be applicable where the demand for payment is made by an individual who claims to be, but who, in fact, is neither an agent, representative, officer nor employee of a union.

Moreover, if the payment is made to the individual who actually performs the unloading, as distinguished from a payment to a union or its officers, no violation occurs.

The payment has to be made to a union as a "fee" or "charge" for the unloading or "in connection with" the unloading. The type of payment that would be considered to be "in connection with" unloading is not legally clear. For example, would a demand for, or a payment of, a fee for a work permit or a union membership card be "in connection with" unloading. This situation occurs when a union places a demand upon a truck driver who is not himself an employer.

The law specifically deals with "unloading" but makes no reference to "loading" of cargo. While this appears to be merely an unintentional oversight, it may nevertheless be a loophole.

What Employer Payments Are Proper?

The law sets forth a series of exemptions from the general prohibition against employer payments to his employees or to unions. These are:

(1) Any money or thing of value paid to any employee whose established duties include acting openly for such employer in labor relations matters or personnel administration;

(2) Payments of wages or salary to any union representative or to any