How Was State Labor Jurisdiction Expanded? The question of whether State governments or the federal government shall exercise jurisdiction over particular labor disputes has been a continuing one. Where a dispute involves only intrastate commerce, a State's jurisdiction is exclusive. In interstate commerce, the federal government clearly has jurisdiction over labor disputes, but whether its jurisdiction is exclusive so as to bar State action has been the issue. Historically, States have taken jurisdiction over labor disputes in interstate commerce on the theory that they had concurrent jurisdiction with the federal government except where federal law clearly preempted state authority. Even in cases where federal law could be applied, states formerly accepted jurisdiction and applied state law where state law was not clearly in conflict with the federal law and the two could be reconciled. When the first general labor-management law was passed by the Congress in 1935, administration of the law was vested in the National Labor Relations Board. The Taft-Hartley Act preserved this structure established in the Wagner Act. Even though the NLRB was authorized to handle all labor disputes arising in interstate commerce, it declined from the beginning to assert its jurisdiction over cases clearly involving interstate commerce but which it felt did not have a "substantial" impact on interstate commerce. States continued to take jurisdiction over these cases until 1957 when the Supreme Court of the United States in the Guss Case, 39 LRRM 2567, ruled that the Taft-Hartley Act gave exclusive jurisdiction over cases in interstate commerce to the National Labor Relations Board. Even where the NLRB had declined to exercise its jurisdiction the Court held that the states were powerless to grant relief. The effect of this decision was to create a legal no-man's land. Millions of small employers and their employees and unions were thereby denied access to any forum for the resolution of labor disputes. The Landrum-Griffin Act amended Section 14 of the Taft-Hartley Act to permit the States to assert jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the NLRB declines to assert its jurisdiction. (For text of Sec. 701(a) see page 198.) The effect of this new section is to eliminate the no-man's land by returning to the practice that prevailed prior to the Guss Case. The new section authorizes the NLRB in its discretion to decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute which it decides has only a slight impact on interstate commerce. It may decline cases by rule of decision or by published rules adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act. It may eliminate any class or category of employers. An important proviso, however, freezes the minimum juris diction of the NLRB by prohibiting the NLRB to decline to take any case over which it would have asserted its jurisdiction under the standards prevailing on August 1, 1959. (For text of NLRB standards see page 250; for legislative history, see Rep. Barden's statement, page 136.) The Board is free to expand the exercise of its jurisdiction at any time, but it may not reduce its jurisdiction below the minimum fixed in the law. The new section allows State agencies or courts to assert jurisdiction over cases declined by the Board. In so doing, such agencies or courts will apply state law in resolving the disputes. A proposal to require State bodies to apply federal law in all cases affecting interstate commerce was specifically rejected by the Conference Committee which composed the final language of the Landrum-Griffin Act. (For legislative history, see exchange between Senators Carroll and Kennedy on page 135, Senator Kennedy's statement, page 136, and Senator Goldwater's statement, page 137.) Since the Congress was aware that the National Labor Relations Board had established general standards, based upon an employer's annual dollar volume of business in interstate commerce, and the Congress gave specific approval to this procedure in Section 701 of the Landrum-Griffin Act, it is clear that a labor dispute case need not first be brought to the NLRB for rejection before it is taken to a state court or other appropriate state agency. Resort can be had immediately to the state authority whenever the employer involved does not meet the announced standards of the National Labor Relations Board. It should be noted that this new language does not in any way affect the power of the NLRB to cede its jurisdiction to a state agency under the provisions of Section 10(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act. Moreover, this section has no effect on cases over which the States had jurisdiction prior to the enactment of the Landrum-Griffin Act. These include cases involving violence, mass picketing or other coercive conduct. What Authority May the National Labor Relations The Landrum-Griffin Act amends Section 3(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act to permit the Board to delegate certain of its powers in representation cases to its regional directors. (For text of Sec. 701 (b) see page 198; for legislative history, see excerpt from House Conference Report, page 137.) The Board is given authority to, but is not required to, delegate any, all or none of the following powers it has under Section 9 of the Taft-Hartley Act to any or all of its regional directors: (1) to determine the appropriate bargaining unit, (2) to investigate and provide for hearings, (3) to determine whether a question of representation exists, and (4) to direct and conduct elections or a secret ballot under Subsections 9(c) or 9(e) of the Taft-Hartley Act. (For legislative history, see Sen. Goldwater's statement, page 137, and Rep. Barden's statement, page 138.) Since this language is permissive, the Board can withdraw from any regional director at any time the powers granted to him. Furthermore, the Board is authorized to review any action of a regional director, pursuant to a delegation of power under this section, upon request by any interested party. Such review, however, will not stay the action of the regional director unless the Board specifically so orders. (For legislative history, see Rep. Barden's statement, page 138, and Rep. Griffin's statement, page 138.) In exercising any power delegated to him by the Board pursuant to this section, a regional director is bound by the rules, regulations, procedures, and most importantly, the precedents of the Board and must act in accordance with the dictates of the Board. (For legislative history, see Sen. Goldwater's statement, page 137.) What Priority Is Given to Discrimination Cases? The Landrum-Griffin Act adds a new paragraph (m) to Section 10 of the Taft-Hartley Act that requires the National Labor Relations Board to give priority in handling to charges of employer discrimination against employees regarding union membership, and charges against unions to cause such employer discrimination. These cases must be handled before all others except cases given priority under the mandatory injunction provision, 10(1), of the Taft-Hartley Act. First priority must be given to 10(1) cases-secondary boycott and organizational picketing charges; second priority must be given to 10(m) cases. All other cases are then handled in the normal course of events. The practical effect of this section will be to speed up the handling of discrimination charges against employers. V EMPLOYEES AND THE LAW MANY OF THE NEW RIGHTS for employees created by the LandrumGriffin Act benefit only employees who are members of a union. Perhaps the greatest impetus for enactment of a labor reform law came from individual union members whose rights had been trampled on by autocratic and racketeer union officials. However, employees generally are beneficiaries of many parts of the new law applicable to unions and employers. For instance, the anti-blackmail picketing provisions serve to give greater protection to employees to choose for themselves which, if any, union shall represent them. Likewise, the resolution of the federalstate jurisdiction problem benefits employees of small employers. Many employee rights are established under the Taft-Hartley Act or under state laws. However, the rights discussed here are those of employees under the Landrum-Griffin Act. Who Qualifies as an Employee? An employee under the new law is any individual employed by an employer. Since an employer under the Act does not include the United States or any State or political subdivision or any wholly owned government corporation, the persons employed by such agencies are not employees under the Landrum-Griffin Act. Persons whose work has ceased because of a labor dispute, an unfair labor practice, or unlawful expulsion from a union are, however, employees under the new law. (For full text of Sec. 3(f) see page 175.) Who Qualifies as a Member of a Union? Since the rights of employees under the new law are generally limited to members of unions, it is important to understand what the law means when it refers to union members. A union "member" includes any person who has fulfilled the requirements for union membership. It includes those who have neither voluntarily resigned nor have been lawfully expelled. What Union Member Rights Are Granted? First, every union member has equal rights within the union to -Vote in union elections or referendums -Attend union membership meetings -Participate in the deliberations and voting at such meetings subject to reasonable rules in the union's constitution and bylaws. (For text of Sec. 101(a)(1) see page 177; for legislative history, see Senators' comments, pages 71-74.) Second, every union member has the right to -Meet and assemble freely with other members whether under union auspices or not -Express any views, arguments, or opinions -Express at union meetings his views on candidates for union office or other union business, subject to established and reasonble union rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings provided, that the union is free to have and enforce reasonable rules covering the member's responsibility to the union as an institution, or rules designed to prevent a member from interfering with the union's legal or contract obligations. (For text of Sec. 101(a)(2) see page 177; for legislative history, see Senators' comments, pages 74-76.) Third, every union member is protected from being required to pay higher dues or to pay a general or special assessment -to a local union, unless it is approved by a majority of all members voting by secret ballot in a meeting, called with adequate notice that such vote will be taken, or by referendum -to an international union or intermediate body, unless it is approved by a majority of (1) delegates voting at a regular convention or a special convention called after at least 30 days notice, (2) members voting by secret ballot in a referendum, or (3) members of the governing body of such union if such a vote is authorized by the union's constitution and bylaws. Action by the governing body is effective only until the next regular convention of the union. (For text of Sec. 101(a)(3) see page 177.) Fourth, every union member has the right -to bring legal action against a union or its officers before a court or administrative agency -to appear as a witness in any court, administrative or legislative proceeding -to petition any legislature or legislator except that the union can (1) require a member to exhaust reasonable union hearing procedures not to exceed four months before a suit is brought against the union or its officers, and (2) discipline a union |