But Prince Lieven was one only of the persons consulted upon this occasion. The Emperor was desirous of knowing what opposition he was likely to meet with from the other powers individually, and what chance there was of a combination against him should he persevere in the execution of his design. The most detailed, and at the same time the most able, of the secret despatches transmitted to St. Petersburg upon the occasion was from Count Pozzo di Borgo, an adopted Russian, not an overscrupulous, but a very keen and subtle diplomatist. He was intimately acquainted with this country and its policy, and was at that time the representative of Russia at Paris.

This paper cannot be read at the present time without a feeling of curiosity and deep interest. He adverts to the different powers in succession, beginning with this country:

"England," » he says, "has recovered from her commercial and financial crisis, and is in a condition to oppose us, and possibly may take that course. She may, in that event, do us considerable injury, but not of such a nature as to be wholly irremediable. She cannot, however, alone obstruct our designs or oppose the march of our armies."

His conclusion, therefore, is that the single opposition of this country could not stand in the way of the accomplishment of the Emperor's designs.

He then comes to France, and, after some curious and amusing comments upon Monsieur de Villele, the minister of that country, considers what would be the probable effect of the union of France and England in opposition to the projected enterprise. Whatever, he says, can be done by a superior naval force can be effected by England alone; the addition, therefore, of the maritime means of France will not be material; and as to her military power, she will be prevented from using it with any effect against us by reason of her geographical, moral, and political position. "Where," he observes, "is she to find a field of battle to oppose us; and," he adds, with an expression of triumph, "her armies well know what they have to expect if they come in collision with ours. >> What is to be the result of that collision at the present day must soon appear, and may, and I trust will, disappoint the confident anticipations of the Russian diplomatist.

Having thus disposed of England and France, he proceeds next to consider whether anything is to be apprehended from

Austria. Prince Metternich, that experienced, sagacious, and clear-sighted statesman, had endeavored, but without success, to awaken attention to the designs of Russia, and to form some sort of union against her. The attempt had excited the strongest feeling of resentment and indignation against that eminent person. Accordingly his policy was decried, his schemes ridiculed, and the power of Austria treated with contempt. One short sentence disposed of the whole: "To every country," said the Russian diplomatist, "war is a calamity; to Austria it would be certain ruin." Thus far then, according to this statement, there appeared to be no serious impediment to the aggressive designs of Russia.

I hear it whispered near me: You have forgotten Prussia. Far from it! I have reserved her as a pattern of constancy in political connection, and which would be most praiseworthy in connections of a different description. My noble friend opposite must possess some powerful attractive force to have torn asunder, or dissolved the strong cohesion between these two powers, Russia and Prussia. Read what Pozzo di Borgo says of Prussia. With what an affectionate sneer he treats that Government. It can scarcely be considered as irony, it is so broad and undisguised:

"Prussia being less jealous, and consequently more impartial, has constantly shown by her opinions that she has a just idea of the nature and importance of the affairs of the East, and if the Court of Vienna had shared her views and her good intentions, there can be no doubt that the plan of the Imperial Cabinet would have been accomplished."

Fortunate it is for Europe and the world that she has not shared her views upon the present occasion, but, on the contrary, has persuaded Prussia to adopt a more wise and generous policy.

At a subsequent period Count Nesselrode, in the despatch to which I have already referred, speaking of what I may call Prussia's subserviency to the Emperor, expresses himself in these

terms:

"The Count Alopeus transmits to us the most positive assurances, which leave no doubt touching the favorable dispositions on which Russia may reckon on the part of Prussia, whatever may be the ultimate course of events."

These passages present a striking picture of the cautious policy, and at the same time of the industry, unwearied activity, and energy, of the Russian Government. Acting upon these opinions, the invasion of the Principalities, after a short but necessary interval, was decided upon, and the armies of Russia, without opposition from any European power, passed the Balkan, and dictated the degrading and disastrous terms of the Treaty of Adrianople.

Place Russia there upon the termination of the present war in the position she then held, and which is so forcibly described by Count Nesselrode in his secret despatch to the Grand Duke, and what can you reasonably expect, when a convenient opportunity occurs, but further encroachments on the Sultan, and, ultimately, the entire subjugation of the European portion of his empire ?

But then this paper refers to some projected guarantee — some treaty, to which the four powers and Russia are to be parties, for the maintenance of the independence of the Sultan and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Now, my lords, I fully admit, as to the four powers, that as long as they continue united in friendship and policy, such a guarantee might afford effectual security against the ambitious designs of Russia; but, if circumstances should occur to disturb this union, and, in the ever-varying events of the world, to create rival or hostile feelings among them, there would at once be an end of this security. And as to the guarantee of Russia, or the obligation of any treaty into which she might enter, who is to be found so weak, so credulous, as to place the least reliance upon it? It would be utterly valueless; not worth the paper upon which it was written.

As to trusting in this power, whether we look to recent or more remote events, we come to the same conclusion. Sir Hamilton Seymour, our able and observant minister at St. Petersburg, had learned, from various authentic sources, that large bodies of Russian troops were moving towards the Turkish frontiers. In communicating upon this matter with Count Nesselrode, he was told by that minister that he must have been misinformed; that these movements were nothing more than a change of quarters, usual at that season of the year. In commenting upon this statement, Sir Hamilton Seymour observes, in his despatch to my noble friend, that he found it impossible to reconcile the facts

which had come to his knowledge with the assurances of the Russian minister. The result abundantly proved the correctness of the information.

In the course of an interesting conversation that occurred in this House some weeks since, a noble friend of mine on the crossbench, enlarged, with much eloquence, and in a strain of high feeling, upon the unworthiness of entertaining doubts of the integrity and honor of illustrious persons with whom we were negotiating in matters of public and national interest. I listened with pleasure to the charms of his brilliant declamation, which reminded me forcibly of former days, but remained unconvinced by his reasoning.

In the intercourse of private life, liberal confidence in those with whom we converse and associate is the characteristic of a gentleman; but in the affairs of nations, where the interests and welfare of millions are at stake, where the rise or fall of empires may depend upon the issue, those who are intrusted with the conduct of such negotiations must be guided by a different and a stricter rule. Their duty in such a position is to exercise caution, vigilance, jealousy. "Oh, for the good old parliamentary word 'jealousy,'" exclaimed Mr. Fox, in one of those bursts of feeling so usual with him, "instead of its modern substitute, 'confidence.› » And if such be the true policy, which I think it is as between Parliament and the ministers of the Crown, how much more ought it to prevail in the conflicting affairs of nations, where such mighty interests are concerned. If confidence, with its natural tendency, should sink into credulity, to what disastrous results might it not lead?

But, in the case of Russia, in particular, and in negotiations with that Government, nothing but the extreme of blindness and credulity could lead to a departure from these principles. The whole series of her history, from the earliest period to the present day, has been one long-continued course of fraud and perfidy, of stealthy encroachment, or open and unblushing violence-a course, characteristic of a barbarous race, and, whether at St. Petersburg or Tobolsk, marking its Asiatic origin. To go back to the reign of the Empress Catherine, we find her policy in one striking particular corresponding with that of the present Emperor, and which policy may in truth be traced back to the Czar Peter. She ostentatiously proclaimed herself the Protector of the Greek Church in Poland, fomented religious dissensions among

the people, and, under pretense of putting an end to disorders which she herself had created, sent a large military force into the country, and gradually stripped it of some of its fairest possessions. I need not add a word as to the ultimate and disastrous issue of these intrigues- the impression they created is strong and will be lasting.

With a like policy in the Crimea, the independence of which country had been settled by treaty, she set up a prince whom she afterwards deposed, and, amidst the confusion thus created, entered the country with an army under the command of one of the most brutal and sanguinary of her commanders, and, having slaughtered all who opposed her, annexed this important district permanently to the Russian Empire. While these proceedings were going on, she prevented, by means of her fleet, all communication with Constantinople, being at peace with the Sultan, with whom she was at that time negotiating a treaty of commerce.

I pass over the extensive conspiracy in which Russia was engaged with Persia and other powers in the East in the years 1834 and 1835 against this country, while she professed to be on terms of the closest friendship with us. These scandalous transactions were strenuously denied by Count Nesselrode to our minister at St. Petersburg, but were afterwards conclusively established by Sir Alexander Burnes and by our consul at Candahar. To enter into details upon this complicated subject would lead me too far from my present object.

But I cannot forbear adverting to the designs of Russia upon Khiva, an inconsiderable place in the desert, east of the Caspian ̧ I recollect the expressions of Mr. Pitt, in alluding to Bonaparte, who, after taking possession of Malta, seized a barren rock in the Mediterranean on his passage to Egypt. "Nothing," he exclaimed, "is too vast for the temerity of his ambition, nothing too small for the grasp of his rapacity "-expressions no less applicable to the restless and insatiable ambition of Russia. Russia sacrificed two armies in endeavoring to reach this remote place. For what purpose? Not with a view to any beneficial trade, but evidently as a convenient centre from which to form combinations and carry on intrigues for the disturbance of our Eastern empire. She has at length, by sending an expedition in a different direction, succeeded in obtaining a footing in that district, the preparations for the enterprise having been made while she was in apparent friendship with our Government.