+

e.The

the neutrality of France. The unchecked success of Prussia in her enterprise gave, as we believe, a deep blow to political morality; it has shaken all trust in those public engagements on which the peace of the world depends; it has taught mankind once more the hard lesson that strength alone, and not law, can give them security; it has placed all the smaller States of continental Europe at the mercy of three or four colossal empires; and it has compelled even these empires to augment their immense military establishments, and to press their whole adult male population into the ranks of their armies. Great indeed must be the advantages and political results of the new system to be established by the Prussian arms, which can compensate mankind for these positive evils. But what are these results? Let us try them by a single test.

Hostilities commenced in the Elbe Duchies because it was not to be endured by the German nation that two small provinces, in which the German race preponderated, should be cut off from the German Fatherland, and governed by a foreign sovereign. To win these Duchies back to Germany, the Danish Monarchy was dismembered, a solemn treaty was broken, and Prussia has now settled the question by annexing them to her own dominions. But the very same operations which accomplished this object, have produced contrary results at the opposite extremity of Germany. There, too, are German Duchies and German provinces, inhabited by eight millions of Germans, including the first of German capitals, and identified with the whole current of German history. Is it credible that the Duchies of Austria, Styria, and

Carinthia, with the Tyrol have been ejected from the German State, by the very same policy used to bring the Duchies of Holstein and Schleswig into it? The Treaty of Nikolsburg has in fact dismembered Germany, and consigned these important German provinces to form part of a monarchy, now expressly excluded from Germany and linked to those nonGerman elements which numerically preponderate in the Austrian dominions. They are now, in fact, the German appendages of the kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia. At the same time the independent States of South Germany, too large to be absorbed by Prussia, but too weak to stand alone, have been left to form a pretended confederacy without the possibility of its duration. In other words, all that could add/ to the paramount force of Prussia has been seized and incorporated by her; but the remainder of Germany has been deprived of its former constitution, without even the liberty to form a new combination. These considerations suffice to demonstrate that the terms of the recent treaty of peace were insincere and incomplete.

As we revise these pages Europe has armed for a new and more tremendous contest. The sword is drawn, and Parliaments are forgotten. Liberals must defer to another era their hope of constitutional government and it becomes clear to the whole world that the success of 1866 was but a single step in the path which Prussian policy treads.

126

THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE.'

[Reprinted from the EDINBURGH REVIEW, July 1867.]

IF the Constable's sword and the Marshal's staff of modern France were in the hands best able to wield those symbols of military authority, the three distinguished officers, whose publications stand at the foot of this page would probably not have employed the pen to place their experience and judgment at the service of their country. But as matters stand, France is indebted to them for a most animated sketch of her military institutions, and all Europe may profit by the wise and enlightened principles of military organisation which they have expressed in these pages.

The cause which has opened this momentous discussion is not far to seek. The astonishing results of the campaign of Prussia against Austria and the Minor German States in 1866, awakened doubts. where no doubts existed before, as to the relative strength of the great continental armies. The Prussian system, which was officially regarded and

1 1. Les Institutions militaires de la France, par M. le duc d'Aumale : Bruxelles, 1867. 2. Un Mot sur le Projet de la Réorganisation militaire, par le général Changarnier. 3. L'Armée française en 1867, [par le général Trochu,] seizième édition: Paris, 1867.

described in France, but a short time ago, as a school of militia, of doubtful value for defensive warfare, and extremely imperfect in the first period of offensive operations,' has suddenly shown itself to be the mistress of Germany, and has become an object of interest and emulation to the rest of Europe. The French Government instantly, and perhaps hastily, avowed that it could no longer regard the existing armies of the Empire as of sufficient strength to uphold the military renown of France against so formidable an antagonist. A Bill was immediately prepared to enable the Government to raise the forces of France to no less than 800,000 men; and although this measure has not been received with favour by the population, by the legislature, and even by the military authorities, it is not denied that a large augmentation of the reserves of the French army is indispensably necessary, and that the burdens of military service and military establishments are likely to be increased there, as in every other part of the Continent.

This is, it must be confessed, a deplorable result of the political changes which have been effected by the ambition of Prussia and by the policy of Count Bismarck. Already, before the late war, the enormous amount of the forces levied by conscription and maintained at a prodigious cost, were the standing reproach to our age, and a standing menace to that peace which is cordially desired by all nations. We had ventured to entertain hopes that sooner or later a general disarmament might be effected; and that France, which was so long regarded as the only Power capable of threatening the tranquillity and

independence of other nations, would some day set the example of a more pacific course of action. But whatever may be thought of the political institutions of the French Empire, justice and truth require us to acknowledge that up to this time it is not by Napoleon III. that the great treaties, on which the law of nations and the peace of Europe rested, have been set at nought, and that it is not France which has snatched an immense political aggrandisement from a military triumph. On the contrary, the consolidation and increase of the vast military powers of Germany under a single sceptre were more unwelcome and dangerous to France than to any other Power; and these events forced her to enter upon an inquiry into her own resources, which she would willingly have avoided. The effect of the comparison which has thus been instituted between the work which the Prussian armies have lately performed and the work of which the French armies are capable, has disturbed the complacency of the French; it has awakened a suspicion that they may be behindhand in the great evolution of military power in which their neighbours and rivals have made so much progress; and it has satisfied reflecting men that no absolute reliance can be placed on the splendid achievements of the past, or on resources which seemed but yesterday to be invincible, to maintain the honour of the French arms and to ensure the safety of the country. A more thorough organisation, a more comprehensive system of enlistment and of reserves, a more effective armament, and perhaps a new system of drill and tactics, are required to encounter with success an antagonist by