as to justify a greater charge per hundredweight or other unit of trans portation in the one case than in the other. This view was urged with great earnestness in certain cases which have come before the Commission involving the relative transportation charges on oil shipped in barrels upon the carriers' cars and the same commodity shipped in tank cars belonging to the shipper.

It appeared that the practice of the carrier had been to publish its carload rates for oil in tank cars and for oil in barrels respectively, and the latter were greater per hundred than the former. The carrier it. self, however, never furnished tank cars to shippers, having in fact none in its equipment.

This of course meant that such shippers as were able to provide themselves with their own tank cars would have a great advantage in business over their competitors who were obliged to depend for the transportation facilities on the equipment provided by the carrier itself.

Such at least would always be the case where the amount paid by the carrier for the use of the shippers' car constituted more than a fair return on the value of the car as an investment. The amount so paid probably never fails to reach this standard, and, as will be presently shown, may under certain circumstances go far beyond it.

Assuming, however, that such payment would be a fair allowance by the carrier for the use of the car, and no more, the question of the carriers' right to discriminate in charges between the two methods of transporting oils remained to be decided. The argument of the carrier was that the rate charged for each mode of transportation was of itself reasonable and just; that it was no more than a fair equivalent for the service rendered in each particular case.

Any shipper, it was said, by providing himself with tank cars could have the benefit of the lower rates accorded to that mode of transportation.

The reply to the first suggestion was that the question of the reasonableness of the rate was usually, to a large extent, a relative one. Therefore, in determining the reasonableness of the charges on barreled oil in carriers' cars the Commission felt constrained to keep in view the disparity between them, and the rates charged by the same carriers upon the same commodity, when offered in cars furnished by the shippers. In regard to the suggestion that any shipper is at liberty if he chooses (and be able) to furnish his own cars, the reply was that it is properly the business of the railroad company to supply their patrons with suitable vehicles of transportation and to offer the use of them to everybody impartially.

The fact that such duty is imposed upon the carrier constitutes a very forcible reason why its customers, who are forced to make use of such facilities as it provides for them, shall not find its own want of rolling stock made a ground of discrimination against them.

The effect of the Commission's decision on this particular question was

to cause a general lowering of rates on oil in barrels and a general raising of rates on oil in tanks. But it soon became apparent that the discrimination between the two methods of transportation was only partially removed.

Since the railroad company is generally the exclusive carrier over its own road, it would certainly seem a reasonable requirement that it should be held to the duty of keeping constantly on hand for public use such cars and other facilities as the ordinary demands of traffic may be shown by experience to require. It might perhaps be going too far to say that the railroad company should always provide the most improved vehicles, or the latest devices in railway equipment, for the use of its patrons. But it certainly is its duty to use the utmost care to see that its failure in this respect shall not contribute to the creation of an unjust discrimination between its customers.

Now if the carrier provides only the ordinary box cars for the transportation of oil, so that it can not be carried in bulk, but must be put up in barrels, while at the same time it carries oil in bulk in shippers' tank cars, a case is presented for the practical application of the principle above announced. The shipper being able by means of his tank cars to dispense with the use of barrels is relieved of the payment of freight on so much dead weight as the barrels represent. The necessity of the ordinary shipper by barrel in the companies' cars paying freight on the weight of barrel as well as oil evidently puts him at a disadvantage to that extent in the competition with the shipper in tanks. This disadvantage results directly from the carriers' failure to furnish tank cars, and it is incumbent on the carrier to see that it shall not be imposed on the shipper who is obliged to use its common cars. Unless it does see to this, the carrier is guilty of unjust discrimination. The Com. mission has accordingly held, in certain cases which have come before it, that the carriers' practice of charging for the weight of barrels, in case of oil shipments in carriers' cars, while not charging for the weight of the tank in which the oil is transported in shippers' cars, is unjust discrimination. This conclusion was resisted by the suggestion that the tank was merely a part of the car and no part of the merchandise, while the barrels containing oil were as strictly merchandise as the oil in them, and hence equally with the oil should bear a freight charge in favor of the carrier.

This suggestion, however correct, technically speaking, it may ap pear to be, points as a practical result toward upholding what plainly appears to be an unjust discrimination between shippers. A more substantially correct view of the matter would seem to be to regard both tanks and barrels as packages for containing the oil, in which aspect the imposition of a freight charge on the barrels while imposing none on the tank would plainly be an unjustly discriminative practice.

The correctness of this view is further apparent from a consideration of the case which sometimes occurs in practice, where the carrier owns

the truck, or frame and running gear of the car, and the shipper owns the tank which is placed upon the truck.

It can hardly be controverted that in such a case the tank is as much a package for carrying the oil as the barrels are packages for that purpose, and to charge the latter with freight and not the former would beyond question be unjust discrimination.

This being true, any argument that insists upon a different criterion of right conduct where both truck and tank belong to the shipper (in other words, where the shipper owns the car) is manifestly founded in technical considerations and not on substantial justice.

Turning now to the question of compensation made by the carrier to the shipper for the use of the latter's car, it is plain that if this compensation is more than a fair return on the cost of the car, treating that as an investment made by the shipper, this practically amounts to paying the latter a bonus for his business, a plain and flagrant discrimination against other shippers.

Compensation for the use of shippers' cars is usually made on the same basis as for the use of cars of other carriers, and is commonly at the rate of three-fourths of a cent a mile for every mile run by the car, whether loaded or empty.

As has been previously observed, it is a matter of comparatively little consequence what price is agreed on between carriers for the use of each other's cars, as it is in any case largely a matter of exchange. But not so as respects payments for cars of private shippers. The mode of fixing the compensation, on the basis of mileage, evidently puts it to a large extent into the carrier's power to determine what the aggregate compensation in any particular case shall be. The carrier thus has the power to discriminate, not only between shippers having cars of their own and those who are obliged to use the carrier's cars, but also between shippers who may both be provided with their own

cars.

It should be said that the carriers in agreeing with shippers for the use of private cars over their lines usually provide that the car, after discharging the freight consigned by the shipper, may be used for the transportation of such return freight as the carrier may be able to secure. Delays occurring in waiting for return loads or from other circumstances of course prevent the car from making the full mileage which by rapid movement it would make. Such delays on the one hand, or on the other the constant and rapid movement of the cars, are matters which the carrier evidently has almost entirely under his own control, and by means of which he can easily manage to effect discrimination in ways that may often be difficult of detection.

Where the use of a special kind of car by the carrier is made very profitable to the owner, who is also a shipper, and where such use is in fact designed to operate as a discrimination in that shipper's favor, the effort is sometimes made to screen the real transaction from public scru

tiny by the adoption of various devices of more or less subtilty and ingenuity.

A very instructive illustration was afforded in a case decided by the Commission during the past year.

The case, as bearing on this particular matter, was as follows: Certain large shippers of cattle from Chicago to New York, having their place of business in the last-named city, agreed with one of the lines of railway leading into New York from the West, to ship all their cattle over that line. To get this large business the railway company, from the first inception of its dealings with these shippers, appears to have made to them certain valuable concessions. As these concessions were met by similar concessions made by rival lines to their patrons, it became necessary, as it appears to have been thought, to look about for some other means of preserving the advantage which the shippers in question had generally been enjoying.

A corporation in form was then gotten up by the shippers, called Lackawanna Live Stock Express Company. The formality of issuing stock and allotting shares in this new company was complied with to a limited extent only. The whole concern evidently belonged to—in fact was identical with-the firm of shippers who organized it. The shippers in question, in the name and under the cover of this corporation, then agreed with the railroad company to supply it with a large number of cattle cars of a special make, designed to be used in shipping stock furnished by the Express Company. For the rental of these improved stock cars the railroad company agreed to pay the Express Company of a cent for every mile run by each of them, whether loaded or empty. In point of fact, although it was not provided for specially by contract, such extraordinary facilities and rights of way were given these cars over the line of the railroad as to enable them to make more than twice the average mileage of ordinary stock cars. In this particular case it was shown that the mileage paid on these cars, within two years, was more than enough to reimburse the owners for the original cost of them and all expenses of operating them meantime. The cars too still remained on hand for a continuation of the business. This was held to constitute an unjust discrimination against all other shippers.

The effect which arrangements of this kind may sometimes have upon the revenues of the railroad company-quite the opposite from what was contemplated-finds strong illustration in this case. The contract between the parties was for a term of five years, and the railroad bound itself to carry at the same rates as should from time to time prevail over other roads. The rates on cattle when the contract was made were sufficiently high to make the arrangement reasonably profitable to the carrier, in view of the large volume of traffic secured by it; but rates soon fell and the continuance of the business on the same footing beyond all doubt resulted in heavy loss to the carrier.

Such improvident management as this is not primarily and in itself a matter with which the act to regulate commerce undertakes to deal. So far, however, as this improvidence in contracts for the use of cars of private shippers is connected with undue and exclusive advantages. given to certain parties, it is a matter affecting the public interest, and undoubtedly comes within the purview of the law forbidding unjust discriminations and undue preferences.

It is believed that there are other methods by which the use of private cars may be, and has been, made the means of conferring undue .advantage on certain shippers.

But it would be tedious to enter into further details on this subject; and the matter treated of is left to the wisdom of Congress, should it see fit to act, without any special suggestion from the Commission.

CONNECTING LINES-THROUGH ROUTES AND RATES.

The question of transportation over connecting lines of railway becomes every year more important, and seems quite inadequately provided for by existing legislation.

The act to regulate commerce, as first enacted, provided that

In cases where passengers and freight pass over continuous lines or routes operated by more than one common carrier, and the several common carriers operating such lines or routes established joint tariffs of rates or fares or charges for such continuous lines or routes, copies of such joint tariffs shall be filed with said Commission.

*

*

*

And the Commission was empowered to prescribe the measure of publicity which shall be given to such rates, fares, and charges, or to such part of them as it may deem it practicable for such common carriers to publish, and the places in which they shall be published.

The original act, however, failed to provide expressly against charging more or less than the rates specified in the joint schedules, or against making charges in the same without previous notice. This defect in the law has since been remedied; joint rates as published are now required to be adhered to, and changes in the same are forbidden except after ten days' notice to the Commission in case of an advance and three days' notice in case of a reduction. The Commission, under the power given it to prescribe the measure of publicity which common carriers shall give to joint schedules of rates, and to advances or reductions in the same, has directed they shall be published and posted in the same manner as is required by the act itself in respect to the charges of a single carrier.

The duty of connecting carriers having joint traffic arrangements over a continuous route in respect to the publication of their rates, and of changes in the same, is not one which the law itself directly imposes and requires. The measure of publicity to be given them is left to the Commission from time to time to prescribe.

The difference between the requirements in regard to publication of