mightier through grace than the old, and thus reach the branches and the fruit. And so the regular use of the word "sins," as the object of forgiveness," is incompatible with Dr. Bushnell's theory of what is meant by this term.

୧୧

And, finally, it may be observed that Dr. Bushnell speaks of pardon, remission, forgiveness, as signifying in common speech a "letting go of blame," but never as a letting go of punishment, while the dictionaries give the latter a leading place in their definitions. Thus, Webster says that the word "pardon" is from per and dono, meaning properly to give back or away, and assigns it two meanings, namely, to forgive, and to remit as a penalty. He adds, that we pardon an offence when we remove it from the offender and consider him as not guilty; we pardon the offender when we release or absolve him from his liability to suffer punishment. Again, he assigns two meanings to the word "forgive," namely, to remit as an offence or debt, and to remit as a debt, fine, or penalty. And, lastly, he defines "remit" as signifying, among other things, to forgive, as to remit punishment, to pardon, as a fault or crime. All these words signify, therefore, a letting go of penalty, as well as a letting go of blame. But "The Vicarious Sacrifice" does not, we think, allude to the former sense, while it evidently

belittles the latter. And the explanation is at hand: Dr. Bushnell's theory of the Divine Government determines for him beforehand what the words of Scripture must mean, and so what they do mean, dictionaries and context to the contrary notwithstanding. This may be regarded as unduly severe; but the truth must be spoken with all the more emphasis when error has found an able champion.

IV. JUSTIFICATION.

The Greek word dikaioun, which is commonly translated in the New Testament to justify, was employed by the Seventy to represent forms of the Hebrew verb tsadhak, and the writer whom we are reviewing says that, after careful examination, he must reject altogether the alleged forensic or legal sense of the Hebrew word. He pronounces it a strictly moral term, and remarks (p. 411): "On the whole I do not know an example in the Old Testament where the original moral word referred to, whether translated righteousness, righteous, and be right, or justice, just, and justify, is used in any but a properly moral sense." Now it is singular, to say the least, that the studies of this gifted writer should have led him to a conclusion so different from the one reached in every age by the most eminent Hebrew scholars; for, turning to

the lexicon of Gesenius, we find among the definitions of this word the following, to have a just cause in a forensic sense, to gain one's cause, to pronounce righteous or just in a forensic sense, that is, to acquit, to absolve, and to justify one's self. Fürst, an authority hardly second to Gesenius, gives nearly the same definitions, thus, to declare righteous in judgment, to acquit or absolve, to justify or defend one's self. But these lexicographers may, of course, be wrong and Dr. Bushnell right. Let us, then, look at a few passages which bear on the point in question, and which are briefly noticed by him.

The first is Deut. xxv. 1: "If there be a controversy between men, and they come near to the judgment, that they may judge them, then they shall justify the righteous and condemn the guilty." Here the Hebrew verb, translated "they shall justify," expresses a judicial act. The judges are not, properly speaking, to pronounce a decision on the moral character of the parties, as related to the "law before government," but rather a judgment on their conduct as subjects of a revealed law. This fact could not have been made plainer by any form of speech. Indeed, the direction to the judges "to justify the righteous and condemn the guilty," implies their power to do the reverse of this, that is, justify the guilty and

condemn the righteous. Nothing but a judicial sentence can therefore be referred to. And if the decision of a legal tribunal may be given by the original word here rendered "justify," this word does certainly express the idea of righteousness under “judicial analogies;" it sets forth one's relation to law and penalty; and is not therefore restricted to the purely moral uses allowed by Dr. Bushnell. Besides, we know that it is the function of earthly judges not to make character, to "righten" men inwardly, nor to pronounce character as a whole to be good or evil, but to declare men innocent or guilty, right or wrong, in some particular act or course of action; and the standard, to which they are bound to adjust their decision, is the civil law, a law which may or may not coincide exactly with moral right.

The second passage is Isaiah v. 22, 23: "Woe unto heroes in wine-drinking, and to men of strength in mingling strong drink, justifying the wicked for a bribe, and they take away the righteousness of the righteous from them." Knobel speaks of these verses as being a "woe against judges without conscience, who take bribes to be spent in drunkenness ;" and Alexander remarks that "the effect here ascribed to drunkenness is not merely that of incapacitating judges for the discharge of their official functions, but that of

tempting them to make a trade of justice, with a view to the indulgence of their appetites." Here, then, we have the word which Dr. Bushnell describes as "the original moral word," nowhere used in any but a properly moral sense," chosen by the sacred writer to denote a strictly forensic act, and indeed an act by which a guilty person is pronounced righteous before the law, rectus in curia. And the judges are represented as doing this for a bribe. The decision which they give does not express their real opinion; it is merely a legal sentence. It is also worthy of note, that they are said "to take away the righteousness of the righteous from them." Is righteousness in this case a moral quality? Can unscrupulous judges take away from any man his rectitude before the eternal law? They may pronounce him guilty of a crime against the civil law, when he is not, and may deprive him of his standing as a good citizen, by a judicial act; but they cannot touch his moral character. Dr. Bushnell must have submitted the language of this passage "to heavy practice," if we may borrow one of his phrases, before he found it in harmony with his view. Indeed, we regard the language of Isaiah in this place as illustrating that of Paul in Romans i. 17, and elsewhere; for human judges are supposed, by the prophet, to give or take away righteousness, that is, to acquit